July 22, 2008
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Russia May Send Military Aircraft Back to Cuba, Izvestiya Says
By Sebastian Alison
July 21 (Bloomberg) -- Russia may send military aircraft back to bases in Cuba in response to U.S. plans to deploy elements of a missile defense system in Europe, Izvestiya reported, citing an unidentified ``highly placed source.''
Both the supersonic Tu-160, a nuclear bomber known as ``White Swan,'' and the strategic bomber Tu-95, known to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization as the ``Bear,'' are capable of flying as far as Cuba, the paper said.
``There are such discussions, but they're only discussions,'' the paper cited a ``highly placed'' source on the staff of Russia's long-distance strategic aviation command as saying. ``I'm not going to say that there's nothing behind'' the talks.
Russian military-transport aircraft regularly fly to Cuba, the paper said, carrying out orders for private companies.
To contact the reporter on this story: Sebastian Alison in Moscow at Salison1@bloomberg.net.
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601086&sid=a4g_h7aDG8HY&refer=latin_america#
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Russia needs bombers in Cuba due to NATO expansion - ex-commander
21/07/2008 14:53
MOSCOW, July 21 (RIA Novosti) -
The possible deployment of Russian strategic bombers in Cuba may be an effective response to the placement of NATO bases near Russia's borders, a former Air Force commander said on Monday.
Russian daily Izvestia earlier on Monday cited a senior Russian military source as saying that Russian strategic bombers could be stationed again in Cuba, only 90 miles from the U.S. coast, in response to the U.S. missile shield in Europe.
"If these plans are being considered, it would be a good response to the attempts to place NATO bases near the Russian borders," Gen. of the Army Pyotr Deinekin told RIA Novosti.
"I do not see anything wrong with it because nobody listens to our objections when they place airbases and electronic monitoring and surveillance stations near our borders," the general said.
However, Deinekin said the possibility of Russian bombers being stationed in Cuba is largely hypothetical, because Russia's Tu-160 Blackjack and Tu-95MS Bear strategic bombers are both capable of reaching the U.S. coast, patrolling the area for about 1.5 hours, and returning to airbases in Russia with mid-air refueling.
Russia resumed strategic bomber patrol flights over the Pacific, Atlantic, and Arctic oceans last August, following an order signed by former president Vladimir Putin. Russian bombers have since carried out over 80 strategic patrol flights and have often been escorted by NATO planes.
Deinekin suggested that Cuba could be used as a refueling stopover for Russian aircraft rather than as a permanent base, because the Russian political and military leadership would be unlikely to take such a drastic step under current global political conditions.
In October 1962, the Cuban Missile Crisis brought U.S. and the U.S.S.R. to the brink of nuclear war when Soviet missiles were stationed in Cuba.
The crisis was resolved after 12 days when the Soviet leader, Nikita Khrushchev, backed down and ordered the missiles removed.
Moscow had a military presence on Cuba for almost four decades after that, maintaining an electronic listening post at Lourdes, about 20 km (12.5 miles) from Havana, to monitor U.S. military moves and communications.
Russia was paying $200 million a year to lease the base, which it closed down in January 2002.
http://en.rian.ru/russia/20080721/114527149.html
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Russian daily Izvestia earlier on Monday cited a senior Russian military source as saying that Russian strategic bombers could be stationed again in Cuba, only 90 miles from the U.S. coast, in response to the U.S. missile shield in Europe.
"If these plans are being considered, it would be a good response to the attempts to place NATO bases near the Russian borders," Gen. of the Army Pyotr Deinekin told RIA Novosti.
"I do not see anything wrong with it because nobody listens to our objections when they place airbases and electronic monitoring and surveillance stations near our borders," the general said.
However, Deinekin said the possibility of Russian bombers being stationed in Cuba is largely hypothetical, because Russia's Tu-160 Blackjack and Tu-95MS Bear strategic bombers are both capable of reaching the U.S. coast, patrolling the area for about 1.5 hours, and returning to airbases in Russia with mid-air refueling.
Russia resumed strategic bomber patrol flights over the Pacific, Atlantic, and Arctic oceans last August, following an order signed by former president Vladimir Putin. Russian bombers have since carried out over 80 strategic patrol flights and have often been escorted by NATO planes.
Deinekin suggested that Cuba could be used as a refueling stopover for Russian aircraft rather than as a permanent base, because the Russian political and military leadership would be unlikely to take such a drastic step under current global political conditions.
In October 1962, the Cuban Missile Crisis brought U.S. and the U.S.S.R. to the brink of nuclear war when Soviet missiles were stationed in Cuba.
The crisis was resolved after 12 days when the Soviet leader, Nikita Khrushchev, backed down and ordered the missiles removed.
Moscow had a military presence on Cuba for almost four decades after that, maintaining an electronic listening post at Lourdes, about 20 km (12.5 miles) from Havana, to monitor U.S. military moves and communications.
Russia was paying $200 million a year to lease the base, which it closed down in January 2002.
http://en.rian.ru/russia/20080721/114527149.html
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21.07.2008
Source:
URL: http://english.pravda.ru/russia/politics/105839-russia-sudan-0
Russia has been accused of delivering military hardware to Sudan in violation of UN Resolution 1591, which forbids any arms shipments to the government of this country and Darfur insurgents.
The Sudan Tribune newspaper wrote that the government of Sudan received a batch of Russian MiG-29 fighter jets. A source of the newspaper in the Sudanese army said that 12 fighters had been secretly delivered to Sudan from Belarus. The aircraft, the newspaper wrote, have been delivered to Wadi Seidna air base in Sudan.
Belarus is one of the countries that supplied military hardware to Sudan, the newspaper wrote. According to the Sudan Tribune, Belarus signed a defense cooperation agreement with Sudan in 2006.
Official spokespeople for the Ministry of Defense of Belarus said that the information of the Sudan Tribune newspaper was a hoax.
“I do not see a point in commenting stupidity,” the press secretary of the Belarussian Defense Ministry, Vyacheslav Remenchik said.
It is worthy of note that Russia sent another group of peacemakers to Sudan in February of the current year. It became the fourth group of peacemakers that Russia sent to the country after it joined the UN peacemaking mission in Sudan.
The presence of Russian specialists and Russian-made arms in Sudan has been made the subject of international discussions repeatedly. There is no reliable information to prove the existence of Russian-made jetfighters in Darfur. Moscow officially rejects it, although there were several scandals on the matter before.
Russia and China have been named the largest suppliers of arms to the conflict zone. A serious scandal broke out in 2004, a year after the start of the civil war in Darfur. Amnesty International published a report, in which it was said that Russia had signed a contract to ship 12 MiG-29 fighters, Mi-24 battle choppers and other arms to Sudan in the total sum of $200 million.
The document stated that the deal to sell the jetfighters had been concluded upon the request of the Sudanese government. Amnesty International stated that two constant UN Security Council members – Russia and China – were virtually exacerbating the armed conflict.
Moscow immediately rejected those accusations. The Russian Foreign Affairs Ministry said that Russia was promoting the peaceful regulation of the conflict and never supplied any arms to Sudan.
Agencies
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July 21, 2008
The Russia-Venezuela Axis: Using Energy for Geopolitical Advantage
by Ariel Cohen, Ph.D. and Ray Walser
WebMemo #2000
When Venezuela's President Hugo Chávez touches down in Moscow on July 22 to meet with the duumvirate of Prime Minister Vladimir Putin and President Dmitry Medvedev, he will be ready for more than the usual diplomatic photo-op. This odd trio will be well-positioned to plan substantial international mischief.
A Russian-Venezuelan axis is a 21st-century throwback to the Cold War Soviet-Cuban alliance. Such a partnership bodes ill for energy security, for freedom in both nations, and for the Western Hemisphere.
Despite differences in culture, language, and geography, the rulers of Russia and Venezuela are increasingly rejecting civil society and narrowing political space in their respective countries. They drive out foreign investors and erode market mechanisms. Both governments have mounted sustained attacks on the rule of law in an effort to exert control over energy resources, excessively strengthen the state, and expand geopolitical clout. Putin and Chávez are promoting an alternative vision to that of the U.S. and the West and are comfortable with the progress they are making toward this end.
Redistribution of Global Power
The Russia-Venezuela condominium is emblematic of geopolitical forces rising to challenge U.S. leadership and influence. Chávez and the Russian duo want to redistribute global power as expediently as possible. In pursuit of this "world without the West," the two governments are dumping the dollar in favor of the Euro during energy transactions, using energy as a geopolitical weapon, and calling for the creation of "new economic and financial institutions" to supplant the post–Bretton Woods order. They also are cooperating in launching a natural gas OPEC-style cartel, led by Russia.
For Russia, this new relationship is part of a larger effort to recover its great power status lost as the result of the Soviet Union's precipitous collapse. Chávez, on the other hand, seeks to realize Simón Bolivar's dream of a united Latin America capable of challenging the "Colossus to the North." Such geopolitical ambitions reflect the buoyancy found in oil- and gas-rich nations riding the crest of $135 per barrel oil.
Russia and Venezuela, together with Iran, are among the trend-setters in the democracy roll-back taking place since the late 1990s, especially in petro-states. The rise of oil prices has accelerated this process and helped precipitate the rise of statism and the decline in democratic governance, while energy revenues provide the means to buy off political opponents and the media, build up internal security forces, and insulate regimes from any domestic and international criticism.
While Russia is supporting Iran—both diplomatically and militarily—and buying European politicians with Gazprom jobs, Chávez is working to undermine stability in the Western Hemisphere. For instance, Chávez provides covert support for the narco-terrorism of the FARC, suitcases of clandestine cash for political candidates, friendship with Hezbollah, and a permissiveness or inattention that has allowed Venezuela to become a major transit point for cocaine.
Sprawling and Increasingly Statist Economies
Chávez and the Putin-Medvedev duumvirate both preside over sprawling and increasingly statist economies, gorged upon freshly nationalized industries and deeply dependent on resource nationalism. Russia has forced Western energy companies out of massive development projects in Siberia and the Far East, pressured British Petroleum to sell a major stake in a large Siberian gas field to Gazprom, and squeezed Royal Dutch Shell in the giant Sakhalin Island project. The current dispute between BP and Russian TNK—the only remaining major oil venture in Russia with 50 percent foreign ownership—is also consistent with Russia's continuing commitment to de-privatization.
Yet Russian state control is not limited to natural resources. State control has also been mounting over metals, the arms sector, and the automotive industry. Moreover, despite resistance within the Kremlin, President Medvedev has just approved the transfer of the state's assets in 426 companies to a single "national champion"—state-owned Rostekhnologii or Russian Technologies. As it so happens, Rostekhnologii is run by Sergey Chemezov, Putin's intelligence community comrade. This transfer of assets and the ongoing dispute between British Petroleum and Russian TNK directly contradict Medvedev's rhetoric of liberal economics and legal reform.
In the last 18 months, Chávez has also increased the tempo of nationalizations with several "my way or the highway" deals. By allowing for increased importation, skyrocketing oil prices mask—temporarily—economic mismanagement and the deeper shortcomings of anti-market economic policies. In modern-day Venezuela, crime, corruption, and inflation rise and while the quality of life of the average citizen declines or stagnates.
Crony capitalism, coupled with lack of transparency and accountability, makes life difficult for the ordinary Russian or Venezuelan. Scarce wonder that, according to The Heritage Foundation's 2008 Index of Economic Freedom, Russia stands 134th out of 157 ranked nations, while Venezuela has descended to the bottom 10 at 148th out of 157.
Energy as a Geopolitical Weapon
The Kremlin is skilled at using energy as a foreign policy tool. It has cut off supplies to six countries over the last seven years and uses energy dependence as leverage to divide Europe on key issues. Most recently, after the signing of an agreement between Prague and Washington for an anti-missile defense radar station, a Russian company sharply reduced the flow of oil to the Czech Republic.
Mimicking the Russians, Caracas relishes using oil for geopolitical leverage and influence. In recent months, Chávez has bolstered oil subsidies and a financing facility known as Petrocaribe. Using the oil bonanza, Chávez has pledged assistance that eclipses U.S. aid in the Western Hemisphere. Even democratic Costa Rica cannot resist the seduction of relief at the pump.
At the working level, Russia's energy giant Gazprom and Venezuela' national petroleum company, PDVSA, are cementing an energy partnership in South America. As the chief of PDVSA recently reported, "We want to make [PDVSA] like Gazprom, but with a social role." Chávez seeks to deepen cooperation with the Kremlin and its state-run enterprises. He has invited Russian firms to exploit the Orinoco River basin—potentially the world's largest oil deposit, holding 1.2 trillion barrels of extra-heavy crude. Gazprom is also involved in a proposed Venezuelan initiative to construct an 8,000-kilometer trans–South American gas pipeline that will link Venezuela's oil and gas fields to Argentina via Brazil, with potential spurs going to Bolivia, Paraguay, Uruguay and Argentina. According to Chávez, these Russian state-run firms are part of the vanguard of the Bolivarian revolution.
Arms sales—which Russia uses to gain friends and influence governments—are key components of the Kremlin's relationship with Venezuela. Flush with cash, Chávez is buying as much military hardware as possible. For instance, in 2006, Chávez sealed a $3 billion arms package with Russian state-owned arms trader Rosoboronexport that included 100,000 Kalashnikov AK-103 series automatic rifles, 24 advanced Sukhoi (SU-30) fighter jets, and 53 military helicopters. A Russian Kalashnikov rifle plant and munitions factory should be operational in Venezuela by 2010. Caracas is also interested in Russian air defense systems and diesel submarines.
Chávez increasingly relies on Russia to provide the weaponry he insists is needed to defend Venezuela against the bogey of a U.S. invasion. The July 22 visit will yield more arms, including a possible submarine deal. While Washington tends to focus on Chavez's ties to the FARC or Iran and Hezbollah, Venezuela's rapidly solidifying relationship with Russia opens up previously unexplored avenues for diplomatic, military, and perhaps nuclear cooperation between the two. Whether in Eurasia or the Western Hemisphere, these actors are playing a broad geopolitical game into which they hope to lure China, India, Brazil, and other rising powers.
A Multi-Pronged Strategy
The next administration will have to devote more attention to the Western Hemisphere, as well as to the increasing threat of resource nationalism from Russia, Venezuela, Iran, and other energy-rich countries. Specifically, the next administration must develop a multi-pronged strategy committed to:
Promoting market access and the rule of law among energy producers;
Promoting greater cooperation between energy consumers; and
Developing alternative sources of energy consumers want.
These are trying days for the globe's democracies, yet greater threats were defeated in the past.
Ariel Cohen, Ph.D., is Senior Research Fellow in Russian and Eurasian Studies and International Energy Security and Ray Walser, Ph.D., is Senior Policy Analyst for Latin America in the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, a division of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, at The Heritage Foundation.
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http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-russia20-2008jul20,0,1310868.story
From the Los Angeles Times
A plane, hailed as having the latest in aircraft technology, is only an upgrade on a 20-year model. It symbolizes a sector that needs an overhaul.From the Associated PressJuly 20, 2008ZHUKOVSKY, RUSSIA — At a once-secret airfield outside Moscow, test pilot Sergei Bogdan proudly introduces reporters to what was billed as the latest in Russian military aircraft technology, the Su-35 fighter jet.But the plane is only an upgrade of a 20-year-old model -- and it can't match the speed and stealth of the latest U.S. fighter, the F-22 Raptor, which entered service in 2005.Former President Vladimir V. Putin, now Russia's prime minister, has boasted of new weapons systems and of strengthening the armed forces, raising fears in the West of a Cold War-style military buildup. Flush with oil money, the Kremlin is in the market for new weapons.But Russia's state-run defense industries, experts say, face a crumbling manufacturing base and pervasive corruption; they have produced little in the way of advanced armaments in the Putin era.The Victory Day parade in Red Square in May was intended to showcase the nation's military might. Instead, Russia's arsenal showed its age. Most of the planes, tanks and missiles that rolled past Lenin's tomb dated to the 1980s or were slightly modernized versions of decades-old equipment.Bogdan, affectionately patting his Su-35 in a hangar at Zhukovsky flight test center outside Moscow, hailed its agility, advanced electronics and new engines. "It's very light on controls and accelerates really well," he said.But Alexander Golts, an independent defense analyst, said the Su-35 is just one example of how Russian weapons industries are taking old designs out of mothballs and trying to sell them as new."The Soviet Union saw a tide of new weapons designs in the late 1980s which didn't reach a production stage," Golts said. "They can be described as new only in a sense that they weren't built in numbers."Russian officials have spent two decades trying to build a so-called fifth-generation fighter jet equivalent to Raptor, but the plane hasn't made its maiden flight -- and analysts are skeptical the first test flights will take place next year as promised.Mikhail Pogosyan, the director of the Sukhoi aircraft maker that is developing the new fighter, acknowledged that the company has a long way to go. But he added that the pace of construction could accelerate soon."I don't think that we are lagging behind in a critical way," he said when asked whether Russia was falling behind the U.S. in fighter design.As work to build the new plane drags on, another major weapons program also faces hurdles. The new Bulava intercontinental ballistic missile designed to equip nuclear submarines has failed repeatedly in tests. Prospects for its deployment look dim."The loss of technologies and the brain drain have led to a steady degradation of military industries," said Alexander Khramchikhin, an analyst with the Institute for Political and Military Analysis.Russia's economic meltdown after the Soviet collapse put many subcontractors out of business, rupturing long- established production links. Assembly plants were left to rely on limited stocks of Soviet-built components, or forced to try to crank up their own production."Now when we finally get state orders, plants often can't fulfill them due to the lack of components," Valery Voskoboinikov, a government official in charge of aviation industries at Russia's Ministry of Industry, recently told parliamentary hearings.Despite Putin's pledges to modernize military arsenals, during his eight years as president the military purchased only a handful of new combat jets and several dozen tanks.Commentators say Russia's military technologies have slipped so far behind the United States and other Western nations that the country's share of the global arms market could shrink soon.Russian arms sales have grown steadily in recent years, reaching a post-Soviet record of more than $7 billion last year, according to official statistics. Russia accounted for a quarter of global arms sales from 2003 to 2007, coming a close second after the United States, according to the latest report by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.But Russia already has suffered several recent, highly publicized failures in arms exports, in which the broken subcontractor chain and swelling production costs were widely seen as key factors.Russia recently failed to fulfill China's order for 38 Il-76 transport planes and Il-78 tankers, leading to the suspension of the deal. This year, Algeria returned the MiG-29 fighter jets it bought from Russia, complaining of their poor quality. "The system has been broken all the way down," said Anatoly Sitnov, who oversees aviation industries in the Chamber of Commerce and Industry.Russia's aging work force presents another challenge. Many highly skilled workers left defense industries in the 1990s for higher-paid jobs in the private sector, and the arms industry's meager wages have hampered the recruitment of younger workers. The average age of Russia's aircraft industry workers is now 45, and that figure is rising. "There is an acute shortage of key specialists: turners, welders, millers," Voskoboinikov said.Obsolete equipment has hurt efficiency. The last major modernization of defense plants was in the early 1980s, and many machine tools in these factories are even older.The government has responded by creating huge state-controlled military conglomerates, like the United Aircraft Corp., saying they will streamline manufacturing. Critics say they will stifle competition, encourage corruption and further weaken Russia's arms industry."We built good planes in the past because we had a competition between aircraft makers," Svetlana Savitskaya, a Soviet cosmonaut who is now a lawmaker, said during parliamentary hearings."Pulling all of them together under one roof will end competition and destroy what we had. But it could make it more convenient for some to steal government funds."
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Today Russia and China have settled 40-year territorial dispute, having sealed an agreement on border demarcation. The agreement was signed by Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi and his Russian counterpart Sergei Lavrov in Beijing. Up to now the eastern part of the state border with China has not been determined. According to the present document Russia will return Yinlong Island (known as Tarabarov Island in Russian) and half of Heixiazi Island (Bolshoi Ussuriysky) to China. China can start usung its new territory already in August. "This will end the boundary demarcation work, for which the two countries have been negotiating for more than 40 years," said Russian Foreign Ministry. http://www.gazeta.ru/politics/2008/07/21_kz_2788462.shtml http://www.kommersant.ru/
http://www.russia-ic.com/news/show/6751/
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Russia: Moscow's Energy Protectionism
Stratfor Today » July 18, 2008 2202 GMT
DMITRY ASTAKHOV/AFP/Getty Images
Russian President Dmitri Medvedev
Summary
Dmitri Medvedev signed a law July 18 restricting mineral access in Russia’s continental shelf to state-controlled companies. However, the adverse conditions associated with this type of drilling in this particular region mean Russia’s oil firms — technological laggards — will be restricted as well (if inadvertently).
Analysis
In Moscow’s most recent bid to solidify state control over its energy sector, Russian President Dmitri Medvedev on July 18 signed into law provisions that restrict access to mineral resources in Russia’s continental shelf to state-run entities. The law essentially limits access to this challenging but potentially lucrative territory to energy giants Gazprom and Rosneft. While there are no indications that this would disrupt existing joint ventures, the two Russian firms are now positioned to reap all of the bounty from Russia’s offshore resources. The only question now is whether Russia’s in-house producers can gain the highly technical expertise necessary to exploit them.
Russian oil companies are not known for offshore drilling. They lack the critical technological and intellectual property of Western companies (plus a few in Asia) that have been developing offshore capability for decades. A case in point is Russia’s roughly 900-feet deep Shtokman gas field, which has faced numerous delays and is years from achieving production. In comparison, Western companies were producing subsea oil from depths in excess of 1,000 yards by the mid-1990s and have multiplied their reach several times over.
However, factoring in climate conditions, Russia’s gambit becomes more daunting. Roughly two-thirds of the country’s coastline lies within the Arctic Circle, where frigid temperatures and volatile conditions increase the complexity of any drilling project. Yet, due to high oil prices and dwindling reserves, it is precisely this inhospitable region that has attracted Moscow’s gaze.
Lack of expertise notwithstanding, Russia has indicated that it intends to restrict foreign access to what Medvedev called its “national treasure.” In other words, Russia has no choice but to solidify control over its offshore reserves if it wants to safeguard the most valuable political tool in its arsenal. On the other hand, Russia knows that offshore production is essential to stalling or reversing its production decline. Though the new restriction could prove to be a double-edged sword, inadvertently limiting future domestic production, it sends a clear signal to all interested parties that Russia intends to maintain complete control of its oil and gas deposits.
http://www.stratfor.com/
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The Boston Globe
Sunday, July 20, 2008
The next U.S. president will have to deal with an energy-rich Russia that bears little resemblance to either the vanished Soviet Union or the economic basket case of the immediate post-Soviet years. Though run by a mafia of Kremlin-connected moguls, Russia has an abiding interest in cooperating with the West. Yet so far, John McCain and Barack Obama have paid too little attention to Russia and how it sees its role in the world.
On Tuesday, President Dmitry Medvedev released a document outlining Russia's new foreign policy strategy. There are instructive differences between the new Russian doctrine and the last such statement eight years ago. The old strategy aimed at undoing America's unipolar dominance. The new document calls for "strategic partnership" with Washington and observes that the West has lost "its monopoly on global processes."
But the new formulation also contains a familiar vein of grievance and assertiveness. The new document suggests a resentment of unilateral actions by the United States and a determination to shape a multipolar world order regulated by the United Nations and international law. Medvedev's political patron, former president Vladimir Putin, struck the same themes when he issued his initial foreign policy game plan in 2000.
The similarity is not coincidental. During Putin's two terms, foreign policy was the exclusive domain of the president. No longer. The new czar of foreign policy is not the president but the government cabinet headed by the new prime minister - Putin.
Because the Bush administration's mishandling of relations with Russia may be easier to rectify than some if its other blunders, Obama and McCain ought to be talking about their plans for the future of U.S.-Russian relations. Russia can act either as a crucial partner or a troublesome spoiler on nettlesome security issues - the safeguarding of nuclear weapons and materials, nonproliferation, terrorism and energy security.
Presidents George W. Bush and Bill Clinton both broke promises made to Russia at the end of the Cold War by expanding NATO toward Russia's borders. And Bush insists on deploying a missile defense system in Eastern Europe that is crucially flawed but still frightens the Kremlin.
Bush's successors should relieve these Russian grievances. In return, the next president should be able to count on firm Russian support in preventing Iran from becoming a nuclear power, combating terrorism, and managing the transition to a global economy bereft of cheap oil and natural gas. That should be America's game plan.
http://www.iht.com/bin/printfriendly.php?id=14630417
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1 day ago
MOSCOW (AFP) — The head of British oil giant BP's embattled Russian venture TNK-BP no longer has the right to work in Russia, a spokeswoman for the federal migration service told AFP on Monday.
Robert Dudley "only has a transit visa and therefore doesn't have the right to work" until he presents a valid contract that would allow him to be issued a proper work visa, said the spokeswoman.
Dudley's previous visa ran out on Saturday. He was issued a 10-day visa on Friday just hours before the deadline. If he is not issued a new work visa by July 29 he will have to leave Russia, the spokeswoman said.
Dudley has found himself at the centre of a bitter boardroom battle between BP and its Russian partners in the multi-billion dollar TNK-BP venture, which accounts for a quarter of BP's global oil output.
The dispute is being seen as a test for Russia's foreign investment climate.
Dudley maintains that under Russian law his contract, which officially ran out in December 2007, has been automatically extended. The AAR consortium that groups together the Russian shareholders contends that this is not the case.
http://afp.google.com/article/ALeqM5jXaoO-c4T1L_MyX1BIBrORVfGWrg
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The Moscow Times » Issue 3948 » Frontpage Top
<
By Matt SiegelSELIGER CAMP, Tver Region — Outside a ramshackle cabin on a sun-baked hillside, Eduard Limonov and Garry Kasparov plot the theft of Russia's energy resources. Waving American flags, they stop briefly to consult their American master, a portly businessman in a sports coat and underpants. The tiny crowd gathered to watch seems mildly amused but mostly embarrassed. "I don't believe that most Russian people believe that the Americans are against Russia," said Alexei Moslenikov, 17. "It's mostly just some kind of political idea." Clearly, things are changing for Nashi. Poorly attended and suffering from a lack of direction, Nashi's annual summer camp on the shores of Lake Seliger, dubbed the "Innovation Forum," reflects just how difficult the transition from organizing street protests to running a mainstream youth movement is proving to be following the recent State Duma and presidential elections. "The first idea was to block a possible Orange Revolution, that's why last year was so important. Now, they don't know what to do," said Sergei Markov, a Duma deputy from the United Russia party. Attendance at the annual retreat on the shores of Lake Seliger was only 5,000 this time out, down sharply from the more than 10,000 activists who overran the campground last year. The sprawling grounds felt oddly empty, its numerous political education tents only half full. Trotted out for a visiting contingent of journalists on Friday morning, many of the campers looked bored during their daily run. Many only picked up speed when they thought they were within sight of a camera. To teach the cadres about business, they were given play money called "talanty" and told to spend it wisely at the many stalls hawking cheap wares like custom-made T-shirts. How this was meant to train them for careers as future barons of industry was unclear.
In fact, few of the campers seemed to have drawn much more than a few stock slogans from the message of economic innovation. "If we just keep trying to build our country on oil and gas, we won't have a future," said Ilya Solovyov, 18, from Rzhev. Bright-eyed and articulate, Solovyov stumbled when pressed about what innovation was. The country should develop nanotechnology and high-tech industry, he said. The country needs to innovate. So, in which field does Solovyov want to work after university? "I don't know," he said. "Energy?" Nashi burst onto the political scene in 2005, staging a 50,000-strong rally in Moscow to mark the 60th anniversary of Victory Day and was broadly seen as a response to the youth-led protests that helped bring pro-Western President Viktor Yushchenko to power in Kiev. Since then, the name has become synonymous with raucous street protests against Russia's supposed foreign and domestic enemies. Last year, the group noisily picketed the Estonian Embassy following a feud over the relocation of a Soviet-era war memorial in Tallinn. It has also been accused of harassing former British Ambassador Anthony Brenton and plotting to seize key government buildings in the event of outside attempts to influence the presidential elections in March. But Nashi has lost some of its brightest leaders and perhaps some of its key backers in the administration of late.
In January, Kommersant quoted a high-ranking Kremlin official describing Nashi members as "enthusiastic thugs." In March, activists handed out toilet paper printed with the newspaper's logo and the cell phone number of a Kommersant reporter who co-authored the article. On the same day, the newspaper's web site was attacked by hackers. The group's wildly popular founder, Vasily Yakemenko, left last year to head up the Youth Affairs Committee. Current leader Nikita Borovikov, for whom Seliger was somewhat of a coming out party, seemed desperately outmatched by the throngs of journalists peppering him with questions. A nearby press officer repeatedly intervened to clarify his statements, as he stammered and appeared on the verge of losing his temper. Following the successful presidential transition from Vladimir Putin to Dmitry Medvedev, there is a strong sense among the members of the political elite that, having served its purpose, Nashi is not just a spent force but a potentially destabilizing element. "I don't like Nashi. I think they're sheep and that they are a great danger to the current Russian government," Grigory Dobromelov, a professor of Political Science at St. Petersburg State University, said at the event Friday. The authorities understand full well the danger posed by an unsupervised Nashi, Markov said. Sweeping them under the rug is, at this point, simply not an option. "They will survive, because the Kremlin understands very well that if you give people a political education and then abandon them, they will move on to a different political groups, including the radical opposition," he said.
Sergei Belakovov, a United Russia Duma deputy, disagreed. Speaking to journalists in an almost empty field in front of the camp's large main stage, however, he struggled to explain the group's continuing relevance. "Life changes and so do we," he said. "Now that the country is stable, they're not just standing around with their heads in their hands asking what to do. They all know what to do. They should start businesses." Whatever the youth group's future might be, this year's camp was not without the amusingly offensive hijinks, which they call "actions," that have marked previous events. In a small wooded nook alongside a winding dirt path, Oleg Sokolov, a 23-year-old commissar, keeps watch over his prize pig. The pig, he said, was named after Estonian President Toomas Hendrik Ilves. Next week they will release the pig at the Estonian border, sending him home to where he belongs, Sokolov said. "They [Estonians] think they are a European country, but they're not," he said, standing in a pile of slop next to the porcine Toomas Ilves. "They're absolutely uncivilized." A leader of Nashi's "Steel" section, charged with crowd control during protests, Sokolov seemed confused when asked to explain the camp's economic theme. He deftly maneuvered the conversation back onto familiar ground.
"Soon there will be a new election cycle; it's only two or three years away," he said. "There will be another chance for a Rose or Orange Revolution, and they won't stand in Red Square on our watch." Despite the poor turnout, Nashi is far from a spent force. Many high-ranking political figures were in attendance, including First Deputy Prime Minister Igor Shuvalov, who swooped down in a jet-black helicopter midday on Friday. Although ostensibly in attendance to give a lecture about economics, Shuvalov appeared much more at ease parading around the campgrounds for the media. Dressed in jeans and a tight T-shirt, Shuvalov strutted in front of the cameras, chin out, nodding approvingly while staying as far as possible from the actual campers. But given that previous keynote speakers have included Medvedev and Putin, as well as Chechen strongman Ramzan Kadyrov, the choice of Shuvalov contributed to the sense that some attention had shifted away from the youth group. There was little indication that many of the campers, not least the 35 teenagers from the Chechen capital of Grozny, by far the camp's most enthusiastic attendees, noticed the political undertones. Situated in their own campground, easily distinguishable by the red, white and green flags emblazoned with Kadyrov's smiling face, the group beamed when asked about the situation in their once war-ravaged republic. "Before, things were impossible. Now, we have total security; you can go anywhere. In Chechnya, we have a president whose politics perfectly match ours," said Ismail Saidulhanov, 18. "All praise is due to Ramzan Akhmadovich Kadyrov, a true hero of Russia." Several of the campers said the economic lessons they learned at the Nashi event are key to rebuilding the Chechen economy. For the most part, though, they just appeared to be happy to be out in the woods, among their Russian peers, in a safe place. In the end, the most striking political message may have been the complete absence of posters of Medvedev. Among dozens of campers interviewed, not a single one mentioned Medvedev when asked about Russia's leadership. "They don't know who Medvedev is," said Markov, "and Medvedev doesn't want to know who they are."
http://www.themoscowtimes.com/articles/detail.php?ID=369047&print=Y
==========================================================
19:14 21.07.2008Permanent news address: http://www.regnum.ru/english/1028161.html
Modest Kolerov: Russia’s Foreign Policy Strategy outlines new highlights regarding former USSR republics
Russia’s foreign policy strategy approved by President Dmitry Medvedev contains a few of new public highlights regarding Russia’s policy in the post-Soviet territory.
Firstly, it is announced clearly and unambiguously that the creeping “historic” rehabilitation of Nazism and aggressive nationalism in the post-Soviet territory has nothing to do with interests of science, but is rather a part of a deliberate policy of the West aimed at “Russia’s containment”: “The response to the prospect of the West losing its monopoly for globalization processes is taking shape in particular in the inertia of the political and psychological aim at “containment of Russia,” including attempts to use for this purpose a selective approach to history, first of all to the history of World War Two and the post-war period. (…) It is necessary to provide conditions for researchers to conduct professional work aimed at establishing the historical truth, to prevent from making a historical issue into a tool of practical politics, (…) to show firm resistance to manifestations of neo-fascism, any forms of racial discrimination, aggressive nationalism, anti-Semitism and xenophobia, attempts to revise history and use it for purposes of exacerbating the tension and revanchism in global politics, revise the outcomes of World War Two.”
Secondly, it is noteworthy that the relations with the Baltic and “new European” countries are not fully limited by the frameworks of the relations with the European Union. Noting the bilateral relations with Germany, France, Italy, Spain, Finland, and other “old European” countries parallel to the EU, the strategy also addresses directly to Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia, but (apart from the detailed rejection of rehabilitation of Nazism mentioned above) claims that they only observe the rights of the Russian-speaking population and Kaliningrad Region.
Thirdly, the strategy finally transforms the philosophy of the CIS as a non-political organization, as a “forum for a political dialog” only, and, which is most important, “a mechanism of cooperation with priorities in economy, humanitarian interaction and so on.” The strategy brings the relations with CIS member-countries to market foundations: “Russia regards the trade and economic relations with the CIS member-states, … while observing the market principles as a significant pre-condition for development of truly equal relations …” At the same time, Russia, now as a concept, treats the CIS as a kind of a niche for new, selective integration with those “showing their readiness for strategic partnership and allied relations,” namely with Belarus and Kazakhstan within frameworks of the EurAsEC and other states in the CSTO.
Here a special attention should be drawn to the fact the tasks of establishing the Union State with Belarus are being switched to the market basis, although they sound with less confidence: “to continue a coordinated policy towards forming conditions for effective establishment of the Union State”- “through a gradual transition of the relations between Russia and Belarus to the market principles in the process of forming a shared economic zone.” Meanwhile, the prospect remains unclear of such repeatedly declared goal of the EurAsEC as “a means of promoting major water and energy and infrastructure projects.” While there are no questions regarding infrastructure projects in the context of Russia’s active energy policy in Eurasia, there are rather more questions as far as “water engineering” projects is concerned, which is a complex of problems around the energy balance and water consumption between Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, and, which is most important, about commercial sense of Russia’s participation in them.
Another thing is important too: regarding the CSTO, the strategy focuses upon integration function of the organization, and, which is most important, its priority in Eurasia facing the NATO expansion, the task of “the CSTO turning into the core institution of providing security” in the region. Concern over such way of restoring the CSTO authority is directly stipulated by an extremely unambiguous formula: “Russia remains negative about the NATO extension, particularly about the plans to grant membership to the alliance to Ukraine and Georgia, as well as about moving NATO military facilities to Russian borders in general” (although, there is no response to the evident contradiction between NATO membership prospects of Georgia and Azerbaijan – and membership of Armenia to the CSTO).
Russia’s attitude towards unmentioned GUAM and other Baltic-Black-Sea schemes in the territory of the former USSR is also clear: these “sub-regional organizations and other institutions without Russia’s participation in the CIS territory” will be treated in Moscow not by their declarations, but by “their real contribution to providing good neighborhood and stability, their readiness to take into account Russia’s interests and respect mechanisms of cooperation that already exist, such as the CIS, the CSTO, the EurAsEC, as well as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).” Taking into account that not only the practices, but the off-scaling rhetoric of those GUAMs are tersely anti-Russian and that they were established with a single purpose of leaving less traces of the CIS and the SCO on Earth, it is easy to predict there will be no love and respect for them in Moscow either.
A wish meant in the strategy looks like a true condemnation in this connection: “This will be the way Russia’s approaches to cooperation in the Black-Sea and the Caspian region will be built on the basis of preserving individuality of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) and strengthening the mechanism of Caspian states’ cooperation.” To cut it short, the more they are involved in a kind of “non-individual,” same-type struggle for “values” of transit and anti-Russian “alternative routes,” the less they will be listened to in Moscow.
Fourthly, threats for Russia coming from the former USSR, namely from its south, are more than clearly specified in the strategy: “Priority tasks are to combat terror threat and drug trafficking threat from the territory of Afghanistan, to prevent from destabilization of the situation in Central Asia and Transcaucasus.” It is worth mentioning, REGNUM wrote about it in a recent report “Prospects of war in Transcaucasia and Central Asia”. The strategy resorts twice to establishing the source of the threat: “The deepening crisis in Afghanistan bears a threat to security of CIS southern borders. Russia in cooperation with other interested parties, the United Nations, the CSTO, the SCO and other multilateral institutions will make subsistent effort in order to prevent from export of terrorism and drugs from Afghanistan…”
Fifthly, in my opinion, the strategy is not very substantiated in terms of positioning “the multimillion-people Russian Diaspora, the Russian world, as a partner” of Russia’s foreign policy, “particularly, in extending and strengthening the space of the Russian language and culture.” The matter is that despite the success of the “Russian world” concept, there is no separate and consolidated Russian diaspora, especially with those Russian organizations that pretend to be representing interests of diaspora’s interests, there are no special opportunities, different from powers of a national government, for humanitarian and even more economic and political outcomes. The most effective in this case not the mythical (and risky) Russia’s diasporal policy, but Russia itself with whom it will be profitable to cooperate both to those feeling too narrow within frameworks of an “ethnographic diaspora” and those who do not consider themselves to be a part of the “Russian world,” but rather prefer to be an admirer of Dostoyevsky, Stravinsky, Korolyov, Putin and Russia’s multinational capital. That is why not the support fro the “diaspora” but of all and any compatriots in the CIS regarding protection of their “education, language, social, labor, humanitarian and other rights and freedoms” looks more realistic and important in the strategy. Here, as diplomats say, there is a “potential” meaning a burden of unsettled issues, which is almost unbearable, but still concerns millions instead of single “professional Russians” who nothing behind them apart from their career.
Finally, the fact needs attention that Russia’s leadership is adequate in assessing attempts of political dictate from the West in economic relations, which is more and more often is directed towards defending the “economic egoism” of the transiting neighbors and global consumers of Russian energy resources that contradicts market economy principles. From now on, Russia will not only succumb to those willing to dictate politically one-sided rules of the game to it, but is fully ready to provide for its political sovereignty by economic measures, “in accordance with the international law using all economic levers and resources at hand as well as competitive advantages to protect its national interests.”
To cut it short, as for the post-Soviet territory, the Russian Foreign Policy Strategy, taking into account the needed compromise nature and natural inertia of preparation of such documents, as a rule, gives quite clear responses to current events around Russia. Conflict potential of the events is too far from being exhausted and the conflict logic will increase, but Russia is quite able to provide its response to the Western theory of “Russia’s containment”, which is still a test for the Euro-Atlantic loyalty to young post-Soviet leaders, by its (Russia’s) own national practice of “self-restrained power.”
© 1999-2008 REGNUM News Agency
===============================================
Lithuanian tax office website hit by cyber attack
In fact, few of the campers seemed to have drawn much more than a few stock slogans from the message of economic innovation. "If we just keep trying to build our country on oil and gas, we won't have a future," said Ilya Solovyov, 18, from Rzhev. Bright-eyed and articulate, Solovyov stumbled when pressed about what innovation was. The country should develop nanotechnology and high-tech industry, he said. The country needs to innovate. So, in which field does Solovyov want to work after university? "I don't know," he said. "Energy?" Nashi burst onto the political scene in 2005, staging a 50,000-strong rally in Moscow to mark the 60th anniversary of Victory Day and was broadly seen as a response to the youth-led protests that helped bring pro-Western President Viktor Yushchenko to power in Kiev. Since then, the name has become synonymous with raucous street protests against Russia's supposed foreign and domestic enemies. Last year, the group noisily picketed the Estonian Embassy following a feud over the relocation of a Soviet-era war memorial in Tallinn. It has also been accused of harassing former British Ambassador Anthony Brenton and plotting to seize key government buildings in the event of outside attempts to influence the presidential elections in March. But Nashi has lost some of its brightest leaders and perhaps some of its key backers in the administration of late.
In January, Kommersant quoted a high-ranking Kremlin official describing Nashi members as "enthusiastic thugs." In March, activists handed out toilet paper printed with the newspaper's logo and the cell phone number of a Kommersant reporter who co-authored the article. On the same day, the newspaper's web site was attacked by hackers. The group's wildly popular founder, Vasily Yakemenko, left last year to head up the Youth Affairs Committee. Current leader Nikita Borovikov, for whom Seliger was somewhat of a coming out party, seemed desperately outmatched by the throngs of journalists peppering him with questions. A nearby press officer repeatedly intervened to clarify his statements, as he stammered and appeared on the verge of losing his temper. Following the successful presidential transition from Vladimir Putin to Dmitry Medvedev, there is a strong sense among the members of the political elite that, having served its purpose, Nashi is not just a spent force but a potentially destabilizing element. "I don't like Nashi. I think they're sheep and that they are a great danger to the current Russian government," Grigory Dobromelov, a professor of Political Science at St. Petersburg State University, said at the event Friday. The authorities understand full well the danger posed by an unsupervised Nashi, Markov said. Sweeping them under the rug is, at this point, simply not an option. "They will survive, because the Kremlin understands very well that if you give people a political education and then abandon them, they will move on to a different political groups, including the radical opposition," he said.
Sergei Belakovov, a United Russia Duma deputy, disagreed. Speaking to journalists in an almost empty field in front of the camp's large main stage, however, he struggled to explain the group's continuing relevance. "Life changes and so do we," he said. "Now that the country is stable, they're not just standing around with their heads in their hands asking what to do. They all know what to do. They should start businesses." Whatever the youth group's future might be, this year's camp was not without the amusingly offensive hijinks, which they call "actions," that have marked previous events. In a small wooded nook alongside a winding dirt path, Oleg Sokolov, a 23-year-old commissar, keeps watch over his prize pig. The pig, he said, was named after Estonian President Toomas Hendrik Ilves. Next week they will release the pig at the Estonian border, sending him home to where he belongs, Sokolov said. "They [Estonians] think they are a European country, but they're not," he said, standing in a pile of slop next to the porcine Toomas Ilves. "They're absolutely uncivilized." A leader of Nashi's "Steel" section, charged with crowd control during protests, Sokolov seemed confused when asked to explain the camp's economic theme. He deftly maneuvered the conversation back onto familiar ground.
"Soon there will be a new election cycle; it's only two or three years away," he said. "There will be another chance for a Rose or Orange Revolution, and they won't stand in Red Square on our watch." Despite the poor turnout, Nashi is far from a spent force. Many high-ranking political figures were in attendance, including First Deputy Prime Minister Igor Shuvalov, who swooped down in a jet-black helicopter midday on Friday. Although ostensibly in attendance to give a lecture about economics, Shuvalov appeared much more at ease parading around the campgrounds for the media. Dressed in jeans and a tight T-shirt, Shuvalov strutted in front of the cameras, chin out, nodding approvingly while staying as far as possible from the actual campers. But given that previous keynote speakers have included Medvedev and Putin, as well as Chechen strongman Ramzan Kadyrov, the choice of Shuvalov contributed to the sense that some attention had shifted away from the youth group. There was little indication that many of the campers, not least the 35 teenagers from the Chechen capital of Grozny, by far the camp's most enthusiastic attendees, noticed the political undertones. Situated in their own campground, easily distinguishable by the red, white and green flags emblazoned with Kadyrov's smiling face, the group beamed when asked about the situation in their once war-ravaged republic. "Before, things were impossible. Now, we have total security; you can go anywhere. In Chechnya, we have a president whose politics perfectly match ours," said Ismail Saidulhanov, 18. "All praise is due to Ramzan Akhmadovich Kadyrov, a true hero of Russia." Several of the campers said the economic lessons they learned at the Nashi event are key to rebuilding the Chechen economy. For the most part, though, they just appeared to be happy to be out in the woods, among their Russian peers, in a safe place. In the end, the most striking political message may have been the complete absence of posters of Medvedev. Among dozens of campers interviewed, not a single one mentioned Medvedev when asked about Russia's leadership. "They don't know who Medvedev is," said Markov, "and Medvedev doesn't want to know who they are."
http://www.themoscowtimes.com/articles/detail.php?ID=369047&print=Y
==========================================================
19:14 21.07.2008Permanent news address: http://www.regnum.ru/english/1028161.html
Modest Kolerov: Russia’s Foreign Policy Strategy outlines new highlights regarding former USSR republics
Russia’s foreign policy strategy approved by President Dmitry Medvedev contains a few of new public highlights regarding Russia’s policy in the post-Soviet territory.
Firstly, it is announced clearly and unambiguously that the creeping “historic” rehabilitation of Nazism and aggressive nationalism in the post-Soviet territory has nothing to do with interests of science, but is rather a part of a deliberate policy of the West aimed at “Russia’s containment”: “The response to the prospect of the West losing its monopoly for globalization processes is taking shape in particular in the inertia of the political and psychological aim at “containment of Russia,” including attempts to use for this purpose a selective approach to history, first of all to the history of World War Two and the post-war period. (…) It is necessary to provide conditions for researchers to conduct professional work aimed at establishing the historical truth, to prevent from making a historical issue into a tool of practical politics, (…) to show firm resistance to manifestations of neo-fascism, any forms of racial discrimination, aggressive nationalism, anti-Semitism and xenophobia, attempts to revise history and use it for purposes of exacerbating the tension and revanchism in global politics, revise the outcomes of World War Two.”
Secondly, it is noteworthy that the relations with the Baltic and “new European” countries are not fully limited by the frameworks of the relations with the European Union. Noting the bilateral relations with Germany, France, Italy, Spain, Finland, and other “old European” countries parallel to the EU, the strategy also addresses directly to Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia, but (apart from the detailed rejection of rehabilitation of Nazism mentioned above) claims that they only observe the rights of the Russian-speaking population and Kaliningrad Region.
Thirdly, the strategy finally transforms the philosophy of the CIS as a non-political organization, as a “forum for a political dialog” only, and, which is most important, “a mechanism of cooperation with priorities in economy, humanitarian interaction and so on.” The strategy brings the relations with CIS member-countries to market foundations: “Russia regards the trade and economic relations with the CIS member-states, … while observing the market principles as a significant pre-condition for development of truly equal relations …” At the same time, Russia, now as a concept, treats the CIS as a kind of a niche for new, selective integration with those “showing their readiness for strategic partnership and allied relations,” namely with Belarus and Kazakhstan within frameworks of the EurAsEC and other states in the CSTO.
Here a special attention should be drawn to the fact the tasks of establishing the Union State with Belarus are being switched to the market basis, although they sound with less confidence: “to continue a coordinated policy towards forming conditions for effective establishment of the Union State”- “through a gradual transition of the relations between Russia and Belarus to the market principles in the process of forming a shared economic zone.” Meanwhile, the prospect remains unclear of such repeatedly declared goal of the EurAsEC as “a means of promoting major water and energy and infrastructure projects.” While there are no questions regarding infrastructure projects in the context of Russia’s active energy policy in Eurasia, there are rather more questions as far as “water engineering” projects is concerned, which is a complex of problems around the energy balance and water consumption between Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, and, which is most important, about commercial sense of Russia’s participation in them.
Another thing is important too: regarding the CSTO, the strategy focuses upon integration function of the organization, and, which is most important, its priority in Eurasia facing the NATO expansion, the task of “the CSTO turning into the core institution of providing security” in the region. Concern over such way of restoring the CSTO authority is directly stipulated by an extremely unambiguous formula: “Russia remains negative about the NATO extension, particularly about the plans to grant membership to the alliance to Ukraine and Georgia, as well as about moving NATO military facilities to Russian borders in general” (although, there is no response to the evident contradiction between NATO membership prospects of Georgia and Azerbaijan – and membership of Armenia to the CSTO).
Russia’s attitude towards unmentioned GUAM and other Baltic-Black-Sea schemes in the territory of the former USSR is also clear: these “sub-regional organizations and other institutions without Russia’s participation in the CIS territory” will be treated in Moscow not by their declarations, but by “their real contribution to providing good neighborhood and stability, their readiness to take into account Russia’s interests and respect mechanisms of cooperation that already exist, such as the CIS, the CSTO, the EurAsEC, as well as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).” Taking into account that not only the practices, but the off-scaling rhetoric of those GUAMs are tersely anti-Russian and that they were established with a single purpose of leaving less traces of the CIS and the SCO on Earth, it is easy to predict there will be no love and respect for them in Moscow either.
A wish meant in the strategy looks like a true condemnation in this connection: “This will be the way Russia’s approaches to cooperation in the Black-Sea and the Caspian region will be built on the basis of preserving individuality of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) and strengthening the mechanism of Caspian states’ cooperation.” To cut it short, the more they are involved in a kind of “non-individual,” same-type struggle for “values” of transit and anti-Russian “alternative routes,” the less they will be listened to in Moscow.
Fourthly, threats for Russia coming from the former USSR, namely from its south, are more than clearly specified in the strategy: “Priority tasks are to combat terror threat and drug trafficking threat from the territory of Afghanistan, to prevent from destabilization of the situation in Central Asia and Transcaucasus.” It is worth mentioning, REGNUM wrote about it in a recent report “Prospects of war in Transcaucasia and Central Asia”. The strategy resorts twice to establishing the source of the threat: “The deepening crisis in Afghanistan bears a threat to security of CIS southern borders. Russia in cooperation with other interested parties, the United Nations, the CSTO, the SCO and other multilateral institutions will make subsistent effort in order to prevent from export of terrorism and drugs from Afghanistan…”
Fifthly, in my opinion, the strategy is not very substantiated in terms of positioning “the multimillion-people Russian Diaspora, the Russian world, as a partner” of Russia’s foreign policy, “particularly, in extending and strengthening the space of the Russian language and culture.” The matter is that despite the success of the “Russian world” concept, there is no separate and consolidated Russian diaspora, especially with those Russian organizations that pretend to be representing interests of diaspora’s interests, there are no special opportunities, different from powers of a national government, for humanitarian and even more economic and political outcomes. The most effective in this case not the mythical (and risky) Russia’s diasporal policy, but Russia itself with whom it will be profitable to cooperate both to those feeling too narrow within frameworks of an “ethnographic diaspora” and those who do not consider themselves to be a part of the “Russian world,” but rather prefer to be an admirer of Dostoyevsky, Stravinsky, Korolyov, Putin and Russia’s multinational capital. That is why not the support fro the “diaspora” but of all and any compatriots in the CIS regarding protection of their “education, language, social, labor, humanitarian and other rights and freedoms” looks more realistic and important in the strategy. Here, as diplomats say, there is a “potential” meaning a burden of unsettled issues, which is almost unbearable, but still concerns millions instead of single “professional Russians” who nothing behind them apart from their career.
Finally, the fact needs attention that Russia’s leadership is adequate in assessing attempts of political dictate from the West in economic relations, which is more and more often is directed towards defending the “economic egoism” of the transiting neighbors and global consumers of Russian energy resources that contradicts market economy principles. From now on, Russia will not only succumb to those willing to dictate politically one-sided rules of the game to it, but is fully ready to provide for its political sovereignty by economic measures, “in accordance with the international law using all economic levers and resources at hand as well as competitive advantages to protect its national interests.”
To cut it short, as for the post-Soviet territory, the Russian Foreign Policy Strategy, taking into account the needed compromise nature and natural inertia of preparation of such documents, as a rule, gives quite clear responses to current events around Russia. Conflict potential of the events is too far from being exhausted and the conflict logic will increase, but Russia is quite able to provide its response to the Western theory of “Russia’s containment”, which is still a test for the Euro-Atlantic loyalty to young post-Soviet leaders, by its (Russia’s) own national practice of “self-restrained power.”
© 1999-2008 REGNUM News Agency
===============================================
Lithuanian tax office website hit by cyber attack
Mon Jul 21, 2008 9:41am EDT
VILNIUS, July 21 (Reuters) - Lithuania said it suffered another foreign cyber attack over the weekend when the state tax office's website was swamped with requests, but no damage was sustained.
"It is likely that these attacks were planned in advance," Gediminas Vysniauskis, deputy head of the tax inspectorate said in a statement on Monday.
The tax office took its service off-line to prevent damage and blocked access from some servers. Access to online tax filing was disrupted for several hours, but no data was lost.
"Addresses of servers, which generated the requests, were blocked immediately... the preliminary analysis shows the servers were located in Romania," the tax office said.
Cyber attacks are often routed through different countries in an attempt to disguise their true origin.
In June a number of Lithuania official websites were hacked into and defaced with Soviet signs and anti-Lithuanian slogans, after the country's parliament banned the use of Nazi and Soviet symbols, such as the hammer and sickle, and the playing the Soviet Union anthem at public gatherings.
The Internet assaults are similar to those suffered by near neighbour Estonia when its servers were hit in April and May last year.
Estonia's head of Internet security linked those attacks to a decision by Estonia to remove a bronze statue of a Red Army soldier from the centre of the capital Tallinn. The decision triggered a protest from Moscow and sparked rioting by mainly Russian-speaking youth.
Internet attacks from criminals, activists, protest groups or others are becoming more prevalent and can have a damaging impact given how pervasive the Web has become in everyday life. (Reporting by Nerijus Adomaitis; Editing by Matthew Jones) .
http://www.reuters.com/article/rbssTechMediaTelecomNews/idUSMAR14153920080721
=========================================================
Lithuania confirms willingness to host U.S. missile shield
19/07/2008 13:03 BUENOS AIRES, July 19 (RIA Novosti) - Lithuania's president, currently on a visit to Argentina, told a national paper that his country is willing if necessary to host elements of a U.S. missile shield.
The United States said earlier this month that tentative discussions had been held with the Baltic country on hosting an interceptor missile base, after talks with Poland, Washington's first choice of host country, stalled.
Nacion quoted Valdas Adamkus as saying: "Lithuania is not currently engaged in negotiations with the United States on deploying a missile shield on our territory. However, we believe that this anti-missile system is an important element of European and international security. Therefore, if necessary, we are ready to work with our partners to deploy it."
The president declined RIA Novosti's request for a comment on the interview.
Moscow strongly opposes the possible deployment by the U.S. of 10 interceptor missiles in Poland and a radar in the Czech Republic as a threat to its national security. Washington says the missile defense system is needed to deter possible strikes from Iran.
Poland has taken a tough stance in talks with the U.S., demanding that Washington upgrade the country's air defense systems as a condition for the deployment of an anti-missile base.
Ex-Soviet Lithuania joined the European Union and NATO in 2004.
http://en.rian.ru/world/20080719/114419408.html
Lithuania ready to host missile shield
(UPI Top Stories Via Acquire Media NewsEdge) Lithuanian President Valdas Adamkus says his country is ready to conduct talks with the United States about hosting elements of a missile defense system. Negotiations between the United States and Poland to deploy 10 anti-missile missiles in the country as part of an eastern European missile shield have stalled, and Adamkus says his country is willing to step into the breach, RIA Novosti reported Saturday. While visiting Buenos Aires, Adamkus told the Argentine newspaper La Nacion he's open to such discussions.Lithuania is not currently engaged in negotiations with the United States on deploying a missile shield on our territory, he reportedly said. However, we believe that this anti-missile system is an important element of European and international security. Therefore, if necessary, we are ready to work with our partners to deploy it. RIA Novosti said Poland is driving a hard bargain in talks with the United States. It wants generous upgrades to its air defense systems in return for hosting the anti-missile base, the Russian news agency said.
http://www.tmcnet.com/usubmit/2008/07/19/3556006.htm
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Eurovision 2009 Will Be in Moscow
Final of Eurovision 2009 will take place in Moscow on May 16. Such a decision has been taken at the government session and announced by the Russian Premier. The plan of preparation and carrying out of the international song contest will be developed by the Vice-Premier Alexander Zhukov. He believes that the best venue would be the Olympian Sports Complex. According to him this sports complex can seat twenty five thousand spectators, which allows holding the competition “under the same roof”. The final of Eurovision is planned to take place on May 16. It is expected that 43 countries will take part in the contest, which will be covered by more than two thousand reporters and viewed on television by more than 100 million people. Source: echo.msk.ru rg.ru
http://www.russia-ic.com/news/show/6750/
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MARIASCHIN: Lithuania's new Jewish concerns
COMMENTARY:
Lithuania, a NATO ally with a Jewish history in turn glorious and tragic, has once again become a cause for Jewish concern more than 60 years after the Holocaust. Full commentary via link: http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2008/jul/20/lithuanias-new-jewish-concerns/
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