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August 27, 2008
2008 Threat Season Heats Up


By Fred Burton and Scott Stewart
Summer has arrived, bringing with it rumors of attacks against the U.S. homeland. Currently, we are hearing unconfirmed word of plans in place for jihadists to be dispatched from Pakistan to conduct coordinated suicide attacks against soft targets in as many as 10 U.S. cities.
This year, the rumors seem to be emerging a little later and with a little less fanfare than last year, when we saw a number of highly publicized warnings, such as that from Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff and a National Intelligence Estimate saying al Qaeda was gaining strength. Last year also brought warnings from a former Israeli counterterrorism official that al Qaeda was planning a simultaneous attack against five to seven American cities, and of a dirty bomb attack against New York.
These warnings were followed by the Sept. 7, 2007, release of a video message from Osama bin Laden, who had been unseen on video since October 2004 or heard on audiotape since July 2006. Some were convinced that his reappearance — and veiled threat — signaled a looming attack against the United States, or a message to supporters to commence attacks.
However, in spite of all these warnings — and bin Laden’s reappearance — no attack occurred last summer or autumn on U.S. soil. As we discussed last October, there are a number of reasons why such an attack did not happen.
We are currently working to collect more information regarding this summer’s rumors. So far we cannot gauge their credibility, but they pique our interest for several reasons. First is the issue of timing, and second is the ease with which such attacks could be coordinated.
Timing is Everything
It is a busy time in U.S. politics. The Democratic National Convention (DNC) takes place this week in Denver, and the Republican National Convention (RNC) takes place next week in St. Paul, Minn. After these conventions, politics will be on the front page until the November elections. In addition, Americans are returning from summer vacations, with schools and universities resuming classes. The anniversary of the 9/11 attacks is also coming up.
While the al Qaeda core generally conduct operations when they are ready — rather than according to external calendars and anniversaries — their pattern of releasing statements on the 9/11 anniversary demonstrates their awareness of its significance and the painful emotions it evokes in the American psyche.
In 2004, just days before the U.S. presidential election, Osama bin Laden made a rare video appearance. In the video, he said al Qaeda’s problem was not with the two candidates, George Bush or John Kerry, but with U.S. policy regarding the Muslim world and the situations in Iraq and Israel. Bin Laden also pointed out that neither Bush nor Kerry could be trusted to keep the United States secure from more attacks. By creating such a message and releasing it at that time, bin Laden was demonstrating his organization’s understanding of the U.S. presidential election dynamic.
Furthermore, the al Qaeda core has historically planned or supported substantial operations in advance of elections. In 2004 we saw this with the Madrid train bombings, which took place prior to Spanish elections. Several other plots might also fall into category. In the summer of 2004, for example, we saw a plot to target a number of financial targets in the U.S. thwarted.
Another election-year attempt was the 2006 al Qaeda-tied plot against a series of airline flights originating from London’s Heathrow airport. While the plot was hatched in the United Kingdom, the selection of flights bound for Washington, Chicago, San Francisco and New York meant that the attack was actually targeted primarily against the United States. For perspective, we look at Operation Bojinka in the mid-1990s, the predecessor to the 2006 plot. Although planned to be launched from Asia, the plot was clearly an attack against the United States.
In another example, Jose Padilla was arrested in May 2002, a congressional election year, as he attempted to enter the United States. Padilla, according to the interrogation of captured al Qaeda member Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, had been sent to there to conduct attacks.
Attacks certainly occur in non-election years (and plots have been thwarted in off years), but the fact remains that jihadists appear mindful of election cycles in the United States. And al Qaeda is not alone in this thinking. Grassroots al Qaeda sympathizers have also attempted to interfere in election-related events. In August 2004, on the eve of the RNC in New York, authorities arrested a Pakistani man and his Pakistan-born U.S. citizen accomplice who claimed they were planning to attack a subway station in Manhattan two blocks from RNC site. The men were later convicted for the plot, with the main organizer receiving a 30-year sentence.
Speaking of elections, it is also interesting to consider that the last two U.S. presidents were forced to deal with jihadist strikes on American soil shortly after assuming office. Bill Clinton was inaugurated in January 1993, and the World Trade Center was bombed in late February 1993. George W. Bush was inaugurated in January 2001, and the World Trade Center and Pentagon were attacked in September 2001. In all likelihood this is a coincidence, but it is worth watching to see if the trend continues in 2009.
Of course, let’s put this in perspective. In the last 15 years — election year or not –- there has rarely been a time when some jihadist somewhere was not planning an attack against the United States. However, the al Qaeda core organization clearly attempted to conduct major attacks in 2002, 2004 and 2006, all of which were election years. These attempts (other than Madrid) were all thwarted. The fact that we haven’t seen an attempt during this year’s election cycle has us watchful — we sense that there must be plot out there somewhere.
Ease of Attack
Another thing that interests us about recent rumors is the concept behind the alleged plot: the simple and elegant idea of sending 10 independent actors to 10 cities. One factor that has sunk many past jihadist plots against the United States has been poor operational security and poor terrorist tradecraft. These mistakes have allowed U.S. authorities to identify and shut down the militant networks involved.
By using compartmentalized operatives, militants could more easily circumvent counterterrorist efforts. Furthermore, even if one or more of the operatives were detected and arrested by authorities, details of the operation at large would not be compromised. Each operative would only know about his own particular targeting instructions and would be unable to provide other details if captured.
In such a case, al Qaeda would most likely attempt to dispatch 10 “clean skin” operatives (those not obviously associated with the group) who are trained to construct improvised explosive devices using readily available materials and ultimately willing to undertake martyrdom missions. Due to changes in the immigration processes since the 2001 attacks, these operatives will likely be Westerners — U.S., Canadian or European citizens able to travel to the United States without the need to obtain a visa.
Recruiting such operatives could be easier that one might expect. Thousands of potential candidates who currently attend militant madrassas in Pakistan (including somewhere from 500 to 1,000 U.S. citizens) fit this description. In fact, no one really knows how many of these potential jihadist operatives exist at present. The government of Pakistan has not been forthcoming in answering requests from the United States and United Kingdom for lists of their citizens currently attending these institutions. Regardless, the idea of al Qaeda recruiting 10 “clean skins” for such an operation is not beyond the realm of possibility. Consider past recruits such as Mohammad Siddique Khan, the leader of the cell behind the July 7, 2005, London bombing, shoe bomber Richard Reid and Adam Gadahn (aka Azzam al-Amriki), or even the warnings o f German Muslims planning to conduct attacks in the West.
Levels of Severity
If this rumored operation is in fact legitimate, it would be the first one conducted using only operatives sent from the core al Qaeda group in Afghanistan or Pakistan since the 9/11 attacks. This is what we refer to as an al Qaeda 2.0 operational model. However, while sending operatives to work solo rather than in a group or with local grassroots jihadists increases operational security, it also reduces operational ability. Quite simply, it is more difficult for an individual to arrange a large attack than it is for a group working together. This means that lone operatives are unlikely to assemble major explosive devices like the truck-borne IED used in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing. Instead we would anticipate attacks similar in scope to grassroots undertakings; suicide bombings such as the July 7, 2005, London bombings or the 2002 armed assault on the El Al Ticket counter in Los Angeles. These the oretical attacks also would likely be conducted against soft targets such as buses, subways or shopping malls, where they can create a high number of casualties, rather than harder targets like the White House or Pentagon, where they would prove ineffective.
The October 2005 incident in Norman, Okla., in which a University of Oklahoma student detonated an IED outside a packed football stadium highlights the ease with which a device can be manufactured from readily available items without detection. But suicide operatives could undertake a number of different types of attacks. Recently we have seen Palestinian suicide operatives embarking on extremely simple plots, such as driving heavy vehicles into crowds.
While the individual attacks themselves would likely be small in magnitude, when combined and spread across the country they could have a far larger impact, similar to past attacks in places such as Madrid, London, Amman in Jordan, the Sinai Peninsula and Bali, Indonesia. Although the botched attacks in London and Glasgow last summer were conducted by the same cell, the planners also clearly sought to use multiple devices in geographically diverse locations. While such attacks would not be a strategic threat to U.S. existence, they would certainly kill people and create a great deal of fear and confusion.
We are not attempting to hype anything here and we do not want to create any kind of panic. These are just rumors, and unconfirmed ones at that. We have not seen any formal announcements from the U.S. government raising the alert level. However, it certainly seems to us to be a prudent time to increase situational awareness and update contingency plans in anticipation of the worst.
Tell Stratfor What You Think
This report may be forwarded or republished on your website with attribution to http://www.stratfor.com/
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Russia may cut off oil flow to the West


By Ambrose Evans-Pritchard
Last Updated: 4:02pm BST 29/08/2008
Fears are mounting that Russia may restrict oil deliveries to Western Europe over coming days, in response to the threat of EU sanctions and Nato naval actions in the Black Sea. Any such move would be a dramatic escalation of the Georgia crisis and play havoc with the oil markets. Reports have begun to circulate in Moscow that Russian oil companies are under orders from the Kremlin to prepare for a supply cut to Germany and Poland through the Druzhba (Friendship) pipeline. It is believed that executives from lead-producer LUKoil have been put on weekend alert. "They have been told to be ready to cut off supplies as soon as Monday," claimed a high-level business source, speaking to The Daily Telegraph. Any move would be timed to coincide with an emergency EU summit in Brussels, where possible sanctions against Russia are on the agenda.

Russian President Dmitry Medvedev may use the oil weapon
The latest from Georgia
Should we fear a new Cold War?
Edward Lucas: The new Cold War didn't start in Georgia
Any evidence that the Kremlin is planning to use the oil weapon to intimidate the West could inflame global energy markets. US crude prices jumped to $119 a barrel yesterday on reports of hurricane warnings in the Gulf of Mexico, before falling back slightly.
Global supplies remain tight despite the economic downturn engulfing North America, Europe and Japan. A supply cut at this delicate juncture could drive crude prices much higher, possibly to record levels of $150 or even $200 a barrel.
With US and European credit spreads already trading at levels of extreme stress, a fresh oil spike would rock financial markets. The Kremlin is undoubtedly aware that it exercises extraordinary leverage, if it strikes right now.
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Such action would be seen as economic warfare but Russia has been infuriated by Nato meddling in its "backyard" and threats of punitive measures by the EU. Foreign minister Sergei Lavrov yesterday accused EU diplomats of a "sick imagination".
Armed with $580bn of foreign reserves (the world's third largest), Russia appears willing to risk its reputation as a reliable actor on the international stage in order to pursue geo-strategic ambitions.
"We are not afraid of anything, including the prospect of a Cold War," said President Dmitry Medvedev.
The Polish government said yesterday that Russian deliveries were still arriving smoothly. It was not aware of any move to limit supplies. The European Commission's energy directorate said it had received no warnings of retaliatory cuts.
Russia has repeatedly restricted oil and gas deliveries over recent years as a means of diplomatic pressure, though Moscow usually explains away the reduction by referring to technical upsets or pipeline maintenance.
Last month, deliveries to the Czech Republic through the Druzhba pipeline were cut after Prague signed an agreement with the US to install an anti-missile shield. Czech officials say supplies fell 40pc for July. The pipeline managers Transneft said the shortfall was due to "technical and commercial reasons".
Supplies were cut to Estonia in May 2007 following a dispute with Russia over the removal of Red Army memorials. It was blamed on a "repair operation". Latvia was cut off in 2005 and 2006 in a battle for control over the Ventspils terminals. "There are ways to camouflage it," said Vincent Sabathier, a senior fellow at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies in Washington.
"They never say, 'we're going to cut off your oil because we don't like your foreign policy'."
A senior LUKoil official in Moscow said he was unaware of any plans to curtail deliveries. The Kremlin declined to comment.
More from Ambrose Evans-Pritchard
More oil news
London-listed LUKoil is run by Russian billionaire Vagit Alekperov, who holds 20pc of the shares. LUKoil produces 2m barrels per day (b/d), or 2.5pc of world supply. It exports one fifth of its output to Germany and Poland.
Although Russia would lose much-needed revenue if it cut deliveries, the Kremlin might hope to recoup some of the money from higher prices. Indeed, it could enhance income for a while if the weapon was calibrated skilfully. Russia exports roughly 6.5m b/d, supplying the EU with 26pc of its total oil needs and 29pc of its gas.
A cut of just 1m b/d in global supply – and a veiled threat of more to come – would cause a major price spike.
It is unclear whether Saudi Arabia, Kuwait or other Opec producers have enough spare capacity to plug the shortfall. "Russia is behaving in a very erratic way," said James Woolsey, the former director of the CIA. "There is a risk that they might do something like cutting oil to hurt the world's democracies, if they get angry enough."
Mr Woolsey said the rapid move towards electric cars and other sources of power in the US and Europe means Russia's ability to use the oil weapon will soon be a diminishing asset. "Within a decade it will be very hard for Russia to push us around," he told The Daily Telegraph.
It is widely assumed that Russia would cut gas supplies rather than oil as a means of pressuring Europe. It is very hard to find alternative sources of gas. But gas cuts would not hurt the United States. Oil is a better weapon for striking at the broader Western world.
The price is global. The US economy could suffer serious damage from the immediate knock-on effects.
While the Russian state is rich, the corporate sector is heavily reliant on foreign investors. The internal bond market is tiny, with just $60bn worth of ruble issues.
Russian companies raise their funds on the world capital markets. Foreigners own half of the $1 trillion debt. Michael Ganske, Russia expert at Commerzbank, said the country was now facing a liquidity crunch. "Local investors are scared. They can see the foreigners leaving, so now they won't touch anything either. The impact on the capital markets is severe," he said.
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/core/Content/displayPrintable.jhtml;jsessionid=YPXFJR4IZCT3VQFIQMGCFGGAVCBQUIV0?xml=/money/2008/08/29/cnrussia129.xml&site=1&page=0

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From The Times
August 28, 2008
Russian-backed paramilitaries 'ethnically cleansing villages'


Russian-backed paramilitaries are “ethnically cleansing” villages on Georgian soil, refugees and officials told The Times yesterday.
South Ossetian militiamen have torched houses, beaten elderly people and even murdered civilians in the lawless buffer zone set up by the Russian Army just north of Gori. The violence, close to the border with the breakaway republic recognised by Russia this week as independent, has prompted a new wave of refugees into Gori, 40 miles north of Tbilisi.
People who had started to return to their villages in the area are now fleeing for a second time, joined by many elderly people who had refused to leave their homes when the Russians invaded two weeks ago.
A straggle of refugees gathered yesterday at the feet of a giant statue of Josef Stalin, Gori’s infamous native son, to register with the local authorities and the UN refugee agency, the UNHCR, for emergency supplies and accommodation in three tent cities being built near a football stadium.
“They had no uniform — I think they were Ossetians,” said Siyala Sereteli, 73, who fled her village of Irganeteye the previous day when irregular forces arrived. Weeping, she lifted her sleeve to show a deep bruise inflicted by a blow from a rifle stock. “They took everything they wanted, even the fans. They beat up a man using sticks and a chair and then threw him in the river,” she said.
Other refugees were clustered in the shabby city hall, trying to glean news of relatives still inside the buffer zone, which Russia said it had established to prevent Georgian attacks on South Ossetians, many of whom hold Russian passports. A look of deep shock froze the face of Oliko Gnolidze when she managed to make contact on her mobile phone with an uncle, Nodari Jashiashvili, in Tkviai, about a 20-minute drive away.
“There is panic here, they are burning houses,” came the crackly voice of her uncle. “I don’t know what to do. Ossetians are in the village.” Ms Gnolidze, 38, said that in earlier conversations her uncle had told her that only a few people remained in the village, with Ossetian irregulars looting under the noses of Russian troops, described by Moscow as “peacekeepers”. She said the Russians had forced her uncle to cook a meal for them, after which he had fled and hidden in nearby woods.
Shorta Kharadze, a 45-year-old lorry driver, returned to Gori from Tbilisi, where he had sheltered during the fighting, after his mother’s neighbours from the village of Megheverizkevi told him that she had been murdered by South Ossetian militiamen.
Looking gaunt, Mr Kharadze said the neighbours had telephoned him to say that two men in uniform had come to the home of his 77-year-old mother, Oliya, and demanded to know why she hadn’t left the village. She had been wounded in the arm during the fighting in the area but had refused to leave.
“They beat her with an axe handle. There’s a pond in our yard — she fell near it and they pushed her in. I don’t know if she was still alive when they pushed her in or if she drowned,” Mr Kharadze said.
“It’s like ethnic cleansing, genocide,” said Koba Tlashadze, a council official in Gori, which was itself briefly occupied by Russian forces before last week’s ceasefire. “It’s a special operation codenamed Clean Field, because they are emptying the villages.”
The UNHCR has voiced its concern about reports of “new forcible displacement caused by marauding militias north of Gori near the boundary with South Ossetia”. It said as many as 400 displaced people had gathered on Gori’s square on Tuesday “after being forced to flee their villages by marauders operating in the so-called buffer zone established along the boundary with South Ossetia”.
Alessandra Morelli, a UNHCR co-ordinator in Gori, said that confirming the stories was impossible because Russian checkpoints had sealed off the buffer zone.
Farther west, in Borjomi, Georgia’s Environment Minister accused Russia of having deliberately started extensive forest fires in the country’s main natural park by firing incendiary flares into tinder-dry mountains. After a helicopter inspection of the still-smouldering area, Irakli Ghvaladze said an investigation was being set up into Russian strikes on the park — far from military operations — for almost a week during the conflict. “We have begun to investigate this ecocide,” he said. The fires had destroyed hundreds of hectares of forest, with fire-fighting helicopters unable to operate for fear of being shot down. “Who knows why the Russians did this? They destroy everything,” he said.
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/europe/article4621592.ece

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Russia's DelusionA flurry of presidential statements on Georgia mix lies with a dangerous new doctrine.


Thursday, August 28, 2008; A18
Washington Post
IN TIME WITH Russia's unilateral recognition of the independence of the two Georgian provinces it invaded this month, President Dmitry Medvedev issued a statement, penned an op-ed and granted an unusual flurry of interviews. His intent was to justify Moscow's latest provocation of the West, which has been united in condemnation -- as was demonstrated yesterday by a statement by the Group of Seven industrial nations. Instead Mr. Medvedev merely revealed the dangerously arrogant and reckless mood that seems to have overtaken the Kremlin in recent weeks.
What's striking, first of all, is the spectacle of a leading head of state making statements that not only are lies but that are easily shown to be such. Over and over, Mr. Medvedev told interviewers that Georgian forces were guilty of "genocide" in South Ossetia. Yet by the count of an official Russian commission, the Ossetian dead numbered 133. In contrast, independent human rights groups have reported that Georgian villages both in and outside Ossetia have been subject to a violent ethnic cleansing campaign, and that thousands of civilians have been killed or driven from their homes by the Russian military offensive.
Mr. Medvedev flatly asserted that Russia had not violated the cease-fire deal he signed two weeks ago. But that agreement contains a provision calling for international talks about the status of South Ossetia and Abkhazia -- and those talks had not begun when Mr. Medvedev abruptly issued the decree recognizing the provinces' independence. The president insisted that Russian troops had withdrawn from Georgia and were not blockading the port of Poti, though any observer can see the checkpoints Russian troops continue to operate there and throughout the country. He also claimed that U.S. ships that have been delivering humanitarian supplies were delivering weapons, a statement quickly dismissed as ludicrous by the White House.
The gross misstatements were accompanied by the assertion of a breathtakingly belligerent doctrine toward Russia's neighbors. Mr. Medvedev was asked by more than one journalist whether Russia's aggression might be directed at other neighboring states, such as Ukraine, Moldova or the Baltic members of NATO. He answered by noting that millions of Russians live outside the country, and he asserted the right as "commander in chief" to "protect the lives and dignity of our citizens." He stated to the BBC: "In certain cases I have no choice but to take these kinds of actions."
Those in the West who persist in blaming Georgia or the Bush administration for the present crisis ought to carefully consider those words -- and remember the history in Europe of regimes that have made similar claims. This is the rhetoric of an isolated, authoritarian government drunk with the euphoria of a perceived victory and nursing the delusion of a restored empire. It is convinced that the West is too weak and divided to respond with more than words. If nothing is done to restrain it, it will never release Georgia -- and it will not stop there.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/08/27/AR2008082702996_pf.html
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How the Georgian Conflict Really Started
By MELIK KAYLANAugust 28, 2008; Page A15
Tbilisi
'Anybody who thinks that Moscow didn't plan this invasion, that we in Georgia caused it gratuitously, is severely mistaken," President Mikheil Saakashvili told me during a late night chat in Georgia's presidential palace this weekend.
"Our decision to engage was made in the last second as the Russian tanks were rolling -- we had no choice," Mr. Saakashvili explained. "We took the initiative just to buy some time. We knew we were not going to win against the Russian army, but we had to do something to defend ourselves."
I had just returned from Gori, which was still under the shadow of Russian occupation. I'd learned there on the ground how Russia has deployed a highly deliberate propaganda strategy in this war. Some Georgian friends sneaked me into town unnoticed past the Russian armored checkpoints via a little used tractor path. We noted that, during the day, the tanks on Gori's streets withdrew from the streets to the hills. Apparently, the Russians thought this gave the impression, to any foreign eyewitnesses they chose to let through, of a town not so much occupied as stabilized and made peaceful.
However, if you stayed overnight after observers left, as I did with various locals, you could hear and glimpse the tanks in the dark growling back into town and roaming around. A serious curfew kicked in at sundown, and the streets turned instantly lethal, not least because the tanks allowed in marauding irregulars -- Cossacks, South Ossetians, Chechens and the like -- to do the looting in a town that the Russians had effectively emptied. Now that the Russians have made a big show of moving out in force -- but only to a point some miles to the other side of Gori toward South Ossetia -- they've left behind a resonating threat in the population's memory, a feeling they could return at any moment.
The damage in Gori's civilian areas, like the Stalin-era neighborhood of Combinaty, give the lie to claims made by Russia's Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov in these pages that Russian forces "acted efficiently and professionally" to achieve "clear and legitimate objectives." Either that, or they fully intended -- as a "legitimate" objective -- to flatten civilian streets in order to sow fear, drive out innocents and create massive refugee outflows.
Gori's refugees are now flooding back. Many have returned also to Poti, a port city near Abkhazia, and far more strategic than Gori because it serves as a trading lifeline for Georgia and potentially offers future access to NATO ships. The Russians are digging in around the town and in the port area itself, and refusing to budge as the world looks on.
"I got a call from the minister of defense that Russian tanks, some 200, were massing to enter Tskhinvali from North Ossetia," Mr. Saakashvili told me. "I ignored it at first, but reports kept coming in that they had begun to move forward. In fact, they had mobilized reserves several days ahead of time."
This was precisely the kind of information that the Russians have suppressed and the world press continues to ignore, despite decades of familiarity with Kremlin disinformation methods. "We subsequently found out from pilots we shot down," said Mr. Saakashvili, "that they'd been called up three days before from places like Moscow. We had intelligence coming in ahead of time but we just couldn't believe it. Also, in recent weeks, the separatists had intensified artillery barrages and were shooting our soldiers. I'd kept telling our guys to stay calm. Actually we had most of our troops down near Abkhazia where we expected the real trouble to start. I can tell you that if we'd intended to attack, we'd have withdrawn our best-trained forces from Iraq up front."
According to the Georgian president, the Russians had been planning an invasion of his country for weeks -- even months -- ahead of time: "Some months ago, I was warned by Western leaders in Dubrovnik to expect an attack this summer," he explained. "Mr. Putin had already threatened me in February, saying we would become a protectorate of Russia. When I met Mr. Medvedev in June, he was very friendly. I saw him again in July and he was a changed man, spooked, evasive. He tried to avoid me. He knew something by then. I ask everyone to consider, what does it mean when hundreds of tanks can mobilize and occupy a country within two days? Just the fuelling takes that long. They were on their way. Would we provoke a war while all our Western friends are away on vacation? Be sensible."
I put it to Mr. Saakashvili that there was also the question of why now? Why did the Russians not act before or later? It was a matter, he said, of several factors coming together: the useful distractions of the Beijing Olympics and the U.S. elections, the fact that it took Mr. Putin this long to consolidate power, the danger that tanks would bog down in the winter.
But two factors above all sealed Georgia's fate this summer, it seems. In April, NATO postponed the decision to admit Georgia into the organization until its next summit in October. Mr. Saakashvili believes Moscow felt it had one last chance to pre-empt Georgia's joining NATO.
Finally, he says, the invasion had to be done before the situation in Iraq got any better and freed up U.S. forces to act elsewhere -- a matter not simply of U.S. weakness but of increasing U.S. strength. "If America thinks it is too weak to do anything about Georgia," said Mr. Saakashvili, "you should understand how the Russians see it, how much Moscow respects a strong United States -- or at least a U.S. that believes in its own strength."
Mr. Kaylan is a New York-based writer who has reported often from Georgia.
http://online.wsj.com/public/article_print/SB121988657412478425.html
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Putin maps the boundaries of greater Russia


By Philip Stephens
Published: August 28 2008 18:37 Last updated: August 28 2008 18:37
We need to get this straight. Vladimir Putin’s Russia has invaded a neighbour, annexed territory and put in place a partial military occupation. It seeks to overthrow the president of Georgia and to overturn the global geopolitical order. It has repudiated its signature on a ceasefire negotiated by France’s Nicolas Sarkozy and disowned its frequent affirmations of Georgia’s territorial integrity. Most importantly: all of this is our fault.
The “our” in this context, of course, refers to the US and the more headstrong of its European allies such as Britain. If only Washington had been nicer to the Russians after the fall of the Berlin Wall. If only the west had not humiliated Moscow after the break-up of the Soviet Union.
Surely we can see now what a provocation it was to allow the former vassal states of the Soviet empire to exercise their democratic choice to join the community of nations? And what of permitting them to shelter under Nato’s security umbrella and to seek prosperity for their peoples in the European Union? Nothing, surely, could have been more calculated to squander the post-cold-war peace.
Such is the cracked record played over and over again by the Russian prime minister and recited now by Dmitry Medvedev, Russia’s notional president. Sadly, it also finds echoes among those in Europe who prefer appeasing Mr Putin to upholding the freedoms of their neighbours.
This Russian claim to victimhood is as vacuous as it is dishonest.
Mr Putin has said the collapse of the Soviet Union was the great geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th century. Now he wants to subjugate his country’s neighbours in the cause of a greater Russia. The aim is to turn back the clock: to extend his country’s borders to create the greater Russia sought by the leaders of the abortive coup against Boris Yeltsin in 1991. The west must not collude with Mr Putin’s falsified version of history.
There is no doubt that Russians feel they suffered great hurt and indignity during the 1990s. They did. But it is a misreading of events to blame the US, the west, the EU or Nato.
The blindingly obvious point is that humiliation was inevitable and unavoidable. Until the collapse of communism the world belonged to Washington and Moscow. Suddenly almost everything was lost to Russia. The political and economic system that had once aspired to global domination was reduced to dust.
Open a history book. Humiliation is what happens when nations lose their empires. Ask the British. Half a century after Suez, part of the British psyche still laments this retreat from the world. You could say the same about the French.
The implosion of the Soviet Union could not stir anything but a sense of shame among Russians. But ah, you hear Mr Putin’s apologists say, the west fed Russian paranoia. For half a century central and eastern Europe had been signed over to Moscow. Now the west’s institutions rolled like tanks up to Russia’s borders.
The problem is that this account does not fit the facts. George H.W. Bush was anything but triumphalist in his response to the fall of the Berlin Wall. Indeed, the then US president faced sharp criticism from many Americans for refusing to dance on communism’s grave.
It is true Bill Clinton’s presidency began with some rhetorical flourishes about spreading democracy. And the US administration did press hard for the expansion of Nato, in part because the EU dragged its feet about opening its doors. Some doubted the wisdom of the Nato policy. George Kennan, the author of the cold war doctrine of containment, was among those arguing against Mr Clinton. But then, the revered Mr Kennan was not infallible. He had, after all, opposed the creation of the alliance.
Doubtless there were moments when the US, and Europe for that matter, could have been more tactful. The disciples of free markets dispatched to Moscow by the International Monetary Fund probably bear some blame for the catastrophic melt-down of Russia’s economy. But no, the historical record does not show a deliberate or concerted effort by the US or anyone else to mock or multiply Russia’s misfortunes.
When Mr Putin talks about humiliation, he means something else. Washington’s crime was to assume that the Yalta agreement had fallen along with the Berlin Wall, and that the peoples and nations of the erstwhile Soviet empire should thus be free to make their own choices.
In the Kremlin’s mindset, showing due respect for Russia would have meant allowing it to continue to hold sway over its near-abroad. The most that the citizens of Ukraine and the Baltic states should have expected was the ersatz independence now bestowed on South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Poles, Hungarians, Czechs and the rest should have been locked out of western institutions.
Mr Putin has reopened the issue that seemed to have been settled in 1991 when Yeltsin saw off the tanks at the doors of the Russian White House. Yeltsin decided that the borders of the Russian Federation should follow those of the Soviet republics. That left the Crimea as part of Ukraine, Ossetia and Abkhazia as part of Georgia. Mr Putin’s doctrine is calculated to reclaim Moscow’s sovereignty over ethnic Russians in neighbouring states. This is a greater Russia by another means.
The doctrine overturns one of the central geopolitical assumptions of the past two decades: that, for all its hurt pride, Russia saw its role as a powerful player within a post-cold-war geopolitical order. Mr Medvedev, speaking with his master’s voice, now repudiates the laws and institutions of that order.
For all the occasional bluster about a new authoritarian axis between Moscow and Beijing, the contrast that has most struck me in recent weeks has been between China and Russia. Beijing saw the Olympics as a celebration of China’s return as a great power. China has by no means signed up to the norms and assumptions of liberal democracy; it has still to decide whether it wants to be a free rider or a stakeholder in the international system. But it has concluded that its future lies with integration into a stable world order.
Moscow’s invasion of Georgia and its public scorn at the likely international response speaks to an entirely different mindset: a retreat from integration and a preference for force over rules. Russia’s neighbours are told they can be vassals or enemies. Mr Medvedev boasts Russia is ready for another cold war.
I struggle to see what Russia will gain. It is friendless. Governments and foreign investors alike now know that Moscow’s word is worthless. The price of aggression will be pariah status. Mr Putin, of course, will blame the west.
philip.stephens@ft.com
More columns at http://www.ft.com/comment/columnists/philipstephens
Copyright The Financial Times Limited 2008
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/128428e4-7517-11dd-ab30-0000779fd18c,dwp_uuid=70662e7c-3027-11da-ba9f-00000e2511c8.html

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Russia: Levers in the Baltic States
Stratfor Today » August 27, 2008 2050 GMT
ILMARS ZNOTINS/AFP/Getty Images
Russian nationalists protesting in 2007 while Latvian nationalists celebrate a day of tribute to World War II veterans who fought in a Nazi unit
Summary
After the Russo-Georgian war, many former Soviet countries — including the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania — began assessing their own internal security. While the newly assertive Russia is not likely to take military action against the Baltics, because they are NATO members, Moscow could well use existing levers to foment internal instability there.
Analysis
After Russia’s Aug. 8 invasion of the Georgian breakaway region of South Ossetia, many former Soviet states, including the Baltic countries of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, have begun assessing their own internal security. These countries all have significant ties to Russia and host considerable Russian-speaking populations — similar to South Ossetia.
Russia has levers to pull in the Baltics to effect change should it feel the need to. While Russian military action like that seen in South Ossetia is unlikely in the Baltic countries due to their membership in NATO, internal political meddling or support for increased ethnic tensions are very much within the Kremlin’s capability.
Russia has already shown that it can act in the Baltics. Over the past few years, Russia has disrupted energy supplies flowing through the Druzhba pipeline, instigated protests and riots over the removal of a World War II statue and is believed to have been behind cyberattacks on Estonia and Lithuania in 2007. However, the Baltics’ Russophone population is perhaps the strongest lever Russia can use against the states’ governments.
The Baltic countries have a long and bitter history with Russia because of Soviet-era events. Josef Stalin sent Russians to the Baltics as a way to increase Soviet influence there. The Russian population there grew throughout the second half of the 20th century, and today Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania have Russophone populations of 40 percent, 30 percent and 9 percent respectively. The Baltic countries were also the first countries to claim independence from the Soviet Union, and they quickly turned to the West by joining NATO and, in 2005, the European Union.
The Baltic governments have always been slightly paranoid about their Russian-speaking populations. Latvia and Estonia in particular have imposed draconian citizenship standards, essentially disenfranchising the Russian populations there. Many Russian speakers there must rely on a Russian passport to travel, are discriminated against in the workplace and are kept from political participation.
Because of Russian disenfranchisement in the Baltic countries, there are quite a few political groups and Russophone organizations that support Russian equality in Estonia and Latvia, and to a lesser degree in Lithuania. These groups include the Russian Nationalist Movement of Estonia, the Union of Associations of Russian Compatriots in Estonia and the Russian Community of Latvia. Russian nationalist groups criticize Baltic governments over anti-Russian policies and have taken part in violent protests, like those concerning the World War II memorial. Acts of aggression also have occurred, such as the 2004 murder of a Lithuanian border guard (accompanied by a message written in blood reading “Lithuania for Russia”) on a contentious railway that links Kaliningrad to the rest of Russia via Lithuania. But such attacks appear to be fairly isolated and not necessarily connected to Russian nationalist groups. There are plenty of aggressive, pro-Kremlin Russophones in the Baltic states, and there are organizations that support Russian nationalism, but the fusion of aggressive violence and the organizations does not appear to be solidified.
However, a lack of organization among aggressive Russophones would not prevent the Kremlin from having a lever in the Baltic countries. Because Russophones make up such a large percentage of the population (especially in Latvia and Estonia), the Russians would certainly have a large pool of potential recruits if they did want to stir up conventional trouble like bombings, shootings or other disruptive/destructive attacks. There have been no real significant threats suggesting that Russian nationalists have any serious conventional capabilities, but the Kremlin could easily inject the resources, skill and organizational power to assist — if it hasn’t already.
Perhaps an even bigger and more diabolical lever that the Kremlin could use is found in Baltic nationalist and neo-Nazi groups. Existing groups like the Latvian National Front and the National Force Union have been involved in violent attacks against minorities, including Japanese nationals and gay rights groups. Neo-Nazi groups in Estonia and Latvia have carried out re-enactments of World War II events and have staged parades celebrating Baltic Nazi units that fought against the Russians in World War II. Although these groups have not launched significant attacks on the Russian population, pro-Kremlin Russophones certainly fit into their target set. If they were to start targeting Russophone neighborhoods, businesses or other interests, this would be a spark that could provoke a Russian excuse for broader action.
Russian intelligence capabilities certainly include the ability to infiltrate foreign nationalistic groups and goad Estonian or Latvian nationalists into creating a justification for broader Russian action. With the trigger primed, the Kremlin could stir up its sympathizers in Riga, Tallinn and Vilnius to create political tension and violence in the Baltics.
http://www.stratfor.com/
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August 28, 2008


By CLIFFORD J. LEVY
MOSCOW — Here is one measure of the aggressive shift in Russian foreign policy in recent weeks: Dmitri O. Rogozin, Russia’s representative to NATO, a finger-wagging nationalist who hung a poster of Stalin in his new ambassadorial office, is not sounding so extreme any more.
“There are two dates that have changed the world in recent years: Sept. 11, 2001, and Aug. 8, 2008,” Mr. Rogozin said in an interview, explaining that the West has not fully grasped how the Georgia conflict has heightened Russians’ fears about being surrounded by NATO. “They are basically identical in terms of significance.”
“Sept. 11 motivated the United States to behave really differently in the world,” he said. “That is to say, Americans realized that even in their homes, they could not feel safe. They had to protect their interests, outside the boundaries of the U.S. For Russia, it is the same thing.”
Only a few months ago, the blustery Mr. Rogozin, 44, was regarded even in the Kremlin as more performance artist than diplomat. Established officials sometimes rolled their eyes when he was mentioned, as if to acknowledge that Vladimir V. Putin, president at the time, had sent him to NATO to do a little trash-talking to rattle the West.
Yet Mr. Rogozin’s arrival at alliance headquarters in Brussels in January might be seen as an omen of the crisis to come. He quickly scorned what he called the “blah, blah, blah” diplomatic niceties and pounded away at a single theme: after years of affronts, Russia had had enough.
Its invasion of Georgia three weeks ago made that apparent, as did its decision on Tuesday to recognize the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, the breakaway enclaves at the center of the hostilities. Now the rising stature of Mr. Rogozin, who called NATO criticism of Russia’s military action “bigoted and indecent,” underscores Russia’s new tone — one adopted by both Mr. Putin, now prime minister, and President Dmitri A. Medvedev.
Mr. Rogozin has become a prominent Russian voice even as he remains a provocative figure in Moscow who led a political party that espoused anti-immigrant appeals — including an ad showing dark-skinned immigrants throwing watermelon rinds on the ground — described by some opponents as racist.
After the Georgia conflict broke out, NATO said there would be no “business as usual” in relations with Russia, and Russia in turn suspended some military cooperation. The Kremlin refrained from canceling all ties, saying it would continue to provide assistance in Afghanistan. Still, Mr. Medvedev has assumed a tough stance.
“We do not need illusions of partnership,” he said Monday in a nationally televised appearance with Mr. Rogozin. “When we are being surrounded by bases on all sides, and a growing number of states are being drawn into the North Atlantic bloc and we are being told, ‘Don’t worry, everything is all right,’ naturally we do not like it.”
“If they essentially wreck this cooperation, it is nothing horrible for us,” he said “We are prepared to accept any decision, including the termination of relations.”
Mr. Rogozin is a charismatic orator with a rascally sense of humor, and he at times has succeeded in charming his rivals in Brussels even as he was upbraiding them. More than once in the interview, he ended long discourses in Russian about his views on relations with the West by uttering a single English word that captured how he likes to be viewed: “Troublemaker!”
Mr. Rogozin speaks several languages — he judges English to be his fifth best — but said he shunned some of the diplomatic trappings of life in Brussels, preferring a BMW motorcycle to a chauffeur. He lives there with his wife, and he has a son and two young grandchildren in Moscow.
Despite his harsh words for NATO governments, he expressed fondness for the time he had spent traveling in the United States, noting that his wife lived in New York City for seven years when she was a child and her father was a Soviet diplomat there.
“She simply understands Americans,” Mr. Rogozin said. “Sometimes I say to her, ‘How come they do not understand me?’ and she says, ‘Look,’ and she explains. She helps decode for me.”
He said that when he was in the United States recently, he met many officials and was pleased to meet one particular former cold-war foe, Henry A. Kissinger.
Mr. Rogozin said that in the West, the current crisis might be considered an ethnic spat between Georgia and South Ossetia that got out of hand, but in Russia, it was seen quite differently. He said Russians now understood that the United States was trying to encircle them, in part by siding with the Georgian president, Mikheil Saakashvili, whom he called unstable.
A poll released last week by the Levada Center, a polling institute in Moscow, backed up his assertions, showing that 74 percent of Russians polled believed that Georgia was a pawn of the United States. Asked the cause of the crisis, 49 percent cited Washington’s policies in the region, while 32 percent blamed Georgia. Only 5 percent held Russia responsible.
Mr. Rogozin added that the West had not understood Russian feelings of resentment over Kosovo, which the West recognized this year as independent from Serbia, an ally of Moscow, despite Russian objections. He said the Kremlin bristled at NATO criticism of the Russian military action as not “proportional” because it was far more restrained than the NATO bombing of Belgrade, Serbia’s capital, in 1999.
“Listen, you in Yugoslavia, you did something normal?” he said. “You have no moral right to say it is not proportional. If we did proportionally in the Caucasus what you did in Serbia, then Tbilisi would have been demolished.” Tbilisi is Georgia’s capital.
Perhaps Mr. Rogozin was fated to be a player in this conflict — he shares a birth date, Dec. 21, with Russia’s nemesis, Mr. Saakashvili. Yet before he went to Brussels, he was considered a political has-been, having alienated the Kremlin by making staunchly nationalist statements when he was a member of Parliament.
His former party, Rodina, campaigned on a platform opposing the immigration of people from the Caucasus (including Georgia) and Central Asia.
In 2005, Rodina produced the commercial with the immigrants and watermelon rinds. Mr. Rogozin appears, as does text that says, “Let’s clear the city of garbage.” He denied at the time that the commercial was racist, but the party was banned from local Moscow elections for promoting ethnic hatred. Soon after, he published a political autobiography, “Enemy of the People.”
He thus remains a polarizing figure in Russia, even as the foreign policy establishment moves closer to his hard-line views.
“I myself was perplexed when I heard of this appointment,” said Pavel S. Zolotaryov, deputy director of the Institute for the U.S. and Canada Studies at the Russian Academy of Sciences.
American officials at NATO would not comment on Mr. Rogozin. Georgia’s representative to NATO, Revaz Beshidze, said that no matter how outlandishly Mr. Rogozin acted, his behavior had served a purpose.
“He is implementing strict instructions from Moscow,” Mr. Beshidze said.
Mr. Rogozin said he regretted his conduct as a politician and was hoping to rehabilitate his reputation through his work in Brussels. He argued that a little-noticed effect of the Georgia conflict was that it had brought together ethnic Russians and other groups in Russian areas of the Caucasus, like Chechens. All now have joined to oppose Mr. Saakashvili, he said.
“We have a unique chance to overcome this ethnic nationalism in Russia, to stop entering into internal conflicts in Russia,” Mr. Rogozin said.
Still, sometimes he cannot help himself. After arriving in Brussels, he put up in his office a patriotic World War II poster with Soviet soldiers, weapons in hand, next to an adoring portrayal of Stalin. He fancied it as a piece of history. Others at NATO headquarters were not as amused.
Mr. Rogozin relented and removed it. He recounted in the interview how he took it to the United States on his recent visit and gave it to Mr. Kissinger. Then he paused and grinned. “Troublemaker!” he said.
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/28/world/europe/28moscow.html?_r=1&th=&oref=slogin&emc=th&pagewanted=print
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The Truth About Russia in Georgia
TBILISI, GEORGIA – Virtually everyone believes Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili foolishly provoked a Russian invasion on August 7, 2008, when he sent troops into the breakaway district of South Ossetia. “The warfare began Aug. 7 when Georgia launched a barrage targeting South Ossetia,” the Associated Press reported over the weekend in typical fashion.

Full Story via link: http://www.michaeltotten.com/archives/2008/08/the-truth-about-1.php


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West tells Russia to keep out of Ukraine
By Stefan Wagstyl and James Blitz in London and Roman Olearchyk in Kiev
Published: August 27 2008 14:53 Last updated: August 27 2008 22:54
Financial Times
Britain led a chorus of support for Ukraine on Wednesday as western fears rose of possible Russian attempts to build on its victory in Georgia by threatening neighbouring states.
Speaking during a visit to Kiev, David Miliband, the UK foreign secretary, called on the European Union and Nato to prepare for “hard-headed engagement” with Moscow following its military action in Georgia.
“Russia must not learn the wrong lessons from the Georgia crisis. There can be no going back on fundamental principles of territorial integrity, democratic governance and international law,” he said.
Mr Miliband’s remarks coincided with warnings from Bernard Kouchner, French foreign minister, and Carl Bildt, Swedish foreign minister.
In an unprecedented step, the foreign ministers of the Group of Seven industrialised countries also issued a joint statement on Wednesday to condemn “Russia’s excessive use of military force in Georgia and its continued occupation of parts” of the country.
The warnings came after Moscow recognised the independence of the breakaway Georgian territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia on Tuesday in the first effort to redraw international borders in the former Soviet Union since its 1991 collapse.
Mr Kouchner warned that the situation was “very dangerous” because Russia might now be considering other targets such as the divided state of Moldova and Ukraine, with its strategically important Crimean peninsula.
EDITOR’S CHOICE
In depth: South Ossetia crisis - Aug-14
EU leaders step up criticism of Russia - Aug-27
Comment: Moscow’s plan to redraw Europe map - Aug-27
Comment: Russia could push China closer to west - Aug-27
US avoids face-off over Black Sea ship - Aug-27
West will need to review oil routes - Aug-27
The comments came as the EU prepared for an emergency Georgia summit on Monday.
The US welcomed Mr Miliband’s remarks but there was no immediate response from Moscow, which adopted a conciliatory tone urging the west not to damage broad mutual ties. Dmitry Medvedev, Russian president, was in Tajikistan, at a summit of central Asian states including China, seeking support for his actions in Georgia.
Mr Bildt, in a Financial Times interview, criticised Russia as “a 19th century power”.
Viktor Yushchenko, Ukraine’s pro-west president, highlighted the potential for conflict by questioning the agreement under which Russia uses the Ukrainian port of Sevastopol, in Crimea, for its Black Sea fleet. He said Russia’s actions were “a threat to everyone, not just for one country”.
His remarks were echoed by Mikheil Saakashvili, Georgian president. In Thursday’s Financial Times, Mr ­Saakashvili writes: “This story is no longer about my small country, but the west’s ability to stand its ground to defend a principled approach to international security.”
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/54acc1fc-743d-11dd-bc91-0000779fd18c.html

Meanwhile, the US avoided a potential clash with Russia by diverting a navy ship carrying aid to the Georgian-controlled Batumi instead of the Moscow-controlled Georgian port of Poti.

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