Thursday, September 11, 2008

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Let Us Never Forget
Dear Friends,

It seems hard to believe that it’s been seven years since the horrendous attack on America by Islamic terrorists. On the one hand, it seems like ages ago. On the other, I remember exactly where I was and what I was doing, and it seems like only yesterday. As I reflect on that day seven years ago, tears well up in my eyes. Let us never forget the lives and families that were shattered. Let us never forget the courage and the tenacity of the first responders, many of whom were killed or injured. Let us never forget the cost our country endured. Let us never forget how we as a nation pulled together and overcame this tragedy. Let us never forget that we have a sworn enemy who wants us either dead or subjugated. And let us never forget that the price of liberty is eternal vigilance. Always devoted, Brigitte

ACT for America P.O. Box 6884 Virginia Beach, VA 23456
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Plunging Russian Shares Start to Concern Kremlin
Medvedev Forecast Of Rebound Fizzles; Foreign Funds Flee
By GREGORY L. WHITESeptember 11, 2008; Page C2
MOSCOW -- With stock prices plunging to two-year lows, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev sought to boost investor confidence, predicting an impending rebound. But his assurances had little impact amid concerns about the outlook for Russia's economy.
Over the past few weeks, Russian share prices have fallen more than 40% from their May highs, battered by fears about Kremlin pressure on companies as well as the surge in tensions between Moscow and the West after the war in Georgia.
Russia's dollar-denominated RTS index fell 4.4% Wednesday to 1334.33 as foreign funds continued to unload Russian shares in what Ron Smith, a strategist at Alfa Bank in Moscow, described as "capitulation on the country."
Russian officials, including Mr. Medvedev, initially brushed off the past weeks' declines as transitory, driven mainly by weak global markets. But as stock prices and the ruble's exchange rate against the dollar have continued to slide, official concern appears to be growing.
In a meeting with the country's top securities regulator, shown on state TV, Mr. Medvedev called Russian stocks "undervalued" and predicted "the situation will straighten itself out and return to the levels seen at the beginning of the year." Mr. Medvedev endorsed a series of steps proposed by the regulator to shore up the market over the medium term by attracting new domestic investors and issuers.
Though relatively few Russians own stocks or investment funds, market performance is a sensitive political issue beyond the business elite. For years, Mr. Medvedev and other top officials touted the surging market capitalizations of big state-controlled companies such as OAO Gazprom as evidence of Russia's growing might.
The government also pitched shares in state companies such as bank OAO VTB to ordinary Russians in "people's IPOs."
Now, those companies' shares have dropped sharply. Gazprom, whose executives this past spring predicted a $1 trillion market capitalization, is valued at less than $200 billion.
Many investors and analysts share Mr. Medvedev's view that Russian shares are cheap, but they are more cautious about a rebound. "It's probably true, but it might not be until 2011," Alfa Bank's Mr. Smith said. Mr. Medvedev blamed Russia's troubles on the U.S. "Let the Americans solve the problems with their mortgage system," he said. "To put it simply, they let almost everyone else down."
But investors and analysts say that while the Russian market's swoon has occurred in part because of the global credit crunch and weak foreign markets, Moscow's behavior has been a big contributor.
Even before the Georgia crisis, a public attack by Prime Minister Vladimir Putin against a major steelmaker spooked investors, as did a conflict involving BP PLC and its Russian partners in their TNK-BP Ltd. joint venture.
With prices falling for oil, metals and other commodities that are vital Russian exports, analysts question the outlook for the Russian economy. Growth began to slow in the second quarter, according to government data released Wednesday that showed gross domestic product increased at an annual rate of 7.5% over the period.
That was down from 8.5% in the first quarter, a level that had prompted fears the economy was overheating. Data on industrial output from June and July have shown an even deeper slowdown, especially in the red-hot construction sector.
Asia, Europe Pull Back;
Jarkata Slides 3.8%
Falling commodity prices helped drag down Asian stock markets, and Hong Kong's Hang Seng index once again dropped below 20000. Banking stocks were generally weaker as talks between Korea Development Bank, which isn't traded, and Lehman Brothers Holdings were called off, reawakening concerns about the damage the credit crunch has done to balance sheets.
In JAKARTA, the selloff in commodity prices hit stocks particularly hard. The main index fell 3.8% to 1885.04, its lowest close since April 2007. Big decliners included coal miner Bumi Resources, which tumbled 12% and palm-oil company Astra Agro Lestari, down 9.5%.
In SYDNEY, Australia's resource-laden S&P/ASX 200 index shrank 1.5% to 4905.50.
In HONG KONG, the Hang Seng Index fell 2.4% to 19999.78, hurt by Tuesday's big decline on Wall Street. Leading the day's blue-chip declines was property developer China Overseas Land, which skidded 11% to its lowest close since May 2007 after it reported that August property sales had dropped 28% from a year earlier.
In TOKYO, the Nikkei Stock Average shed 0.4% to 12346.63. Inpex Holdings and commodity trader Mitsubishi each fell 2.7% on Tuesday's drop in the price of oil in New York.
In MUMBAI, India's 30-stock Sensitive Index fell 1.6% to 14662.61. Metals, led by steel shares, fell on worries that prices might fall amid a slowdown in global economic growth. A strengthening U.S. dollar also weighed on the sector. Tata Steel fell 5.2%.
In Europe, banking stocks pushed down markets after Lehman Brothers' hefty third-quarter loss reignited worries about the health of the sector. The pan-European Dow Jones Stoxx 600 index fell 0.8% to 277.35. Among the big decliners were Barclays, down 5.3% in London, and Natixis, down 6% in Paris.
In LONDON, shares of Old Mutual fell 3.5% after the insurer said earnings will be hit by a write-down in the value of preferred shares of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and by the need to strengthen reserves at its U.S. arm. Miners fell as gold prices tumbled. Kazakhmys dropped 8.8% and Rio Tinto shed 2.7%. The U.K. FTSE 100 index fell 0.9% to 5366.20.
In PARIS, shares of Sanofi-Aventis jumped 7.2% in Paris after the drug maker said Chris Viehbacher, a former GlaxoSmithKline executive, will become its chief executive. The CAC-40 index shed 0.2% to 4283.66.
Write to Gregory L. White at greg.white@wsj.com
'
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122107452709820381.html?mod=googlenews_wsj



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Brussels vs. Moscow
By ANDRZEJ OLECHOWSKI and PAWEL SWIEBODA FROM TODAY'S WALL STREET JOURNAL EUROPESeptember 9, 2008
The European Union is finally getting a decent grip on its foreign policy, courtesy of Russia's engagement in Georgia. Some commentators said last week's EU summit failed to show enough resolve in the face of Russian aggression. But these critics are missing the point. The meeting in Brussels showed that EU leaders have finally begun to think in strategic terms, recognizing that we face a new problem in Europe: a resurgent nuclear power prepared to use military force in pursuit of its interests.
Much still needs to be done to consolidate European foreign policy given the different traditions, historical experiences, interests and perceptions of EU member states. But last week's summit resulted in the promising beginnings of a common view. For years, Russia was the issue on which EU leaders differed the most. Now they all subscribe to a loud and clear message that calls on Moscow to come to its senses.
The main point is not to prevent Russia from recovering its position as a global power, a position it certainly deserves. The challenge is to convince Moscow that instead of using the barrel of the gun to achieve its goal, it should use the irresistible power of attraction.
Given its vast reserves of natural resources, Russia will of course play a major role in the world. But it has chosen the wrong model, repeating the bankrupt patterns from past centuries: tightly controlling its neighborhood; building spheres of influence; taking unilateral action; and aggressively pursuing national interests, including with the use of force. Russia's anachronistic principles and objectives pose a threat for Europe and the international order.
If Russia succeeds in re-establishing its dominance over much of the former Soviet empire, we will have two competing blocs on the continent. The Russia of Vladimir Putin and Dmitry Medvedev is about a return to the confrontation of the past. To meet this challenge, the EU would be increasingly pressed to contradict itself. It would have to depart from the very policies and principles that are at its core. Instead of seeking cooperation with its neighbors, if not outright enlargement, the EU would have to build new walls. We must stop this bleak outlook.
Former Georgian Foreign Minister Salome Zurabishvili is right when she says it is possible to "win over Russia with the help of intelligence and political experience but not with a demonstration of strength."
What needs to happen is threefold: First, while Europe must continue to talk with Russia, the dialogue cannot be as open and romantic as in the past. We need strategic discipline, distance and caution. The EU should monitor the behavior of Russian enterprises on its markets to ensure they are not pursuing any hidden agendas on behalf of the Kremlin. Brussels must also warn European investors against excessive engagement in Russia and do its homework on energy policy.
Energy security has to be factored into the equation when the EU considers its climate change package, the flagship project of the current European Commission. To achieve Brussels' emissions targets, Europe would have to switch around 430 terawatt-hours, 13% of its energy production, from coal-fired to gas-powered plants, according to Swiss bank UBS. This would enormously increase our dependency on Russian gas.
If the European Union is serious about dealing with Moscow with self-confidence, it needs to introduce safety mechanisms, such as price ceilings and floors, into the emissions trading system. This would prevent an excessive rise of the price of carbon, which would only further fuel the demand for Russian gas.
Second, EU accession must become a credible perspective for our eastern neighbors, especially Ukraine. Only a tangible "Western option" can convince public opinion in the region that their fate is not irrevocably linked to Russia. Such a European perspective does not mean immediate membership but a binding promise of membership once these countries meet all the criteria. Europe's leaders need to make the region a strategic priority and reject the logic of division.
Third, we should edge toward defining a place for Russia in the European architecture. Today we are incapable of conceptualizing a role for Moscow that would be both satisfactory for Russia and useful for Europe. That lack of a concept is one of the reasons for our policy failure.
Without such a concept, Europe has little to offer to Russia, which in turn will find it hard to think of a different role for itself than that of a separate power without any allies. As opposition politician and Putin critic Boris Nemtsov has put it, unless Russia can be embedded in some sort of Western security concept, Moscow will "venture around threatening everybody in search for an enemy."
Much of Russia's resurgent self-confidence is built on a weak foundation. Russia's economic growth is largely based on raw materials. Its infrastructure and industry is in desperate need of modernization. Russia's population is aging rapidly. To solve its problems, Moscow needs cooperation with the West. It can't afford to be isolated and lose its standing in global political and economic institutions and among investors -- as the withdrawal of foreign funds and the fall of Russia's stock market since the invasion of Georgia illustrates.
Russia's self-perception as a country without friends and allies has become a self-fulfilling prophecy. The war in Georgia has led to Moscow's total isolation. No one supported its blitzkrieg.
There is much for Russians and their leaders to reflect upon. A united and principled European Union with a strategy for the whole continent would be able to help Russia choose cooperation over confrontation.
Mr. Olechowski is a former foreign and finance minister of Poland. Mr. Swieboda is president of demosEuropa -- Center for European Strategy.
See all of today's editorials and op-eds, plus video commentary, on Opinion Journal1.

URL for this article:http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122090684786811593.html
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CAIR Attempts to Sabotage Law Enforcement Terrorism Training


September 09, 2008 10:40 AM EST
by Jim Kouri, CPP - (The following is based on material obtained by the National Association of Chiefs of Police.)The Council for American Islamic Relations has been trying in vain to stop a counter- terrorism program in Sarasota Florida, aimed at providing first responders with information on subjects such as building safety, suicide terrorism, technologies against terrorism and more.
This is part of CAIR's program to stop Security Solutions International (SSI) -- an organization that has trained more than 500 Federal, State and Local agencies since 2004. SSI officials, CAIR attempted to stop a training program for cops and security personnel in Seattle last Memorial Day. Fortunately, they failed."As Americans, we can not allow the civil liberties of our great country to be exploited by groups that are intent on creating a fundamentalist Islamic regime here in the USA", says Sol Bradman, CEO of Security Solutions International, the organizers of the Sarasota Sheriffs 3rd Annual Gulf Coast Terrorism conference being held in Sarasota from the 15th to the 19th of September for the benefit of Homeland Security professionals -- coming from as far as Australia to attend what is being called the most innovative terrorism prevention conference in the USA."This is not about incitement against Muslims, as CAIR wants us to believe. Our mission is to protect all Americans against terrorism but also against the abuse of our laws." This is Lawfare against US First Responders and therefore against the USA by the pseudo legal wing of the Global Jihad in America," says Bradman. "The modus operandi is simple; use the freedoms and loopholes of the most liberal nation on earth to help finance and direct the world's most violent international terrorism cells," he added.Daniel Pipes, the Harvard Professor, publisher and head of the Middle East Forum, has consistently pointed out that CAIR is riddled with extremists and has been closely linked to organizations that have been convicted or individuals convicted of terrorism. The group, that claims to represent US Muslims but is cited by many US Muslims as being a thinly veiled cover group for extremists, is losing membership. Nonetheless, they mount campaigns to get training and other valuable help to US First Responders stopped, canceled, delegitimized and several jurisdictions have folded attempts to hold counter terror training. On September 3rd, a Sarasota blog published an article claiming that sources have produced solid information that Morris Days, the Manager for Civil Rights at the CAIR MD/VA chapter, who was widely publicized by CAIR as one of its civil rights attorneys, was in fact not an attorney, and failed to provide services for Muslim American clients who came to CAIR for assistance and who paid for Days' services. Not only has CAIR not revealed the facts about Days and his fraudulent, criminal behavior, but as of yesterday, September 2, 2008, the CAIR National office in Washington, D.C. continued to post articles at its website naming Days as an attorney.The Florida representative of CAIR has been sending everyone in Sarasota pleas to stop the program under the argument that it represents an attempt to stereotype all Muslims as Terrorists. SSI is well known for fair and balanced training at a highly professional level and actively discourages racial and ethnic profiling because this bad counter terrorism practice. Not only was CAIR Florida actively touting the innocence of convicted Terrorist, Sami Al-Arian but CAIR Florida also claimed that two students at South Florida University in Tampa were carrying 4th of July firecrackers in the trunk of their car but later the two admitted to carrying explosives for the purposes of committing terrorist acts. Tampa has often suffered from the effects of Radical Islam.To counter this, SSI is offering a special day: "Allah in America". Speakers such as Andrew Whitehead, the founder of Anti-Cair will attend and speak as a result of his ceaseless dedication in fighting radical extremism in the US,channeled through the Anti-CAIR organization including frequent posts based on investigative reporting that exemplify the very essence of Islamic radicalism, including repeated attempts to threaten our constitutional freedoms. SSI's program, the Threat of Radical Jihadist to the World, prepared by a Muslim counter terror law enforcement officer from California will also be presented with an emphasis on CAIR and other extremist groups that operate under the guise of civil rights. So-called anti-terrorist organizations, aligned with Islamic extremism, blatantly abuse the laws, freedoms and loopholes of the most liberal nation on earth to help finance and direct the world's most violent international terrorism cells.The "Protecting the Homeland" organization charter embodies two main objectives: ceaseless dedication in counter-acting Islamic radicals who repeatedly attempt to threaten our constitutional freedoms, and channeling funds to educate US First Responders through sponsorship of training programs in the USA and Israel.Jim Kouri, CPP is currently fifth vice-president of the National Association of Chiefs of Police and he's a staff writer for the New Media Alliance (thenma.org). In addition, he's the new editor for the House Conservatives Fund's weblog. Kouri also serves as political advisor for Emmy and Golden Globe winning actor Michael Moriarty. He's former chief at a New York City housing project in Washington Heights nicknamed "Crack City" by reporters covering the drug war in the 1980s. In addition, he served as director of public safety at a New Jersey university and director of security for several major organizations. He's also served on the National Drug Task Force and trained police and security officers throughout the country. Kouri writes for many police and security magazines including Chief of Police, Police Times, The Narc Officer and others. He's a news writer for TheConservativeVoice.Com and PHXnews.com. He's also a columnist for AmericanDaily.Com, MensNewsDaily.Com, MichNews.Com, and he's syndicated by AXcessNews.Com. He's appeared as on-air commentator for over 100 TV and radio news and talk shows including Oprah, McLaughlin Report, CNN Headline News, MTV, Fox News, etc. His book Assume The Position is available at Amazon.Com. Kouri's own website is located at http://jimkouri.us
http://www.theconservativevoice.com/article/34361.html#

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How to Manage Savagery
By BRET STEPHENSSeptember 5, 2008
"Islam has bloody borders." So wrote Samuel Huntington in "The Clash of Civilizations?," his 1993 Foreign Affairs article later expanded (minus the question mark) into a best-selling book. Huntington argued that, eclipsing past eras of national and ideological conflict, "the battle lines of the future" would be drawn along the "fault lines between civilizations." Here, according to Huntington, was where current and coming generations would define the all-important "us" versus "them."
At the time of its writing, "The Clash of Civilizations?" had, beyond the virtues of pithiness and historical sweep, something to recommend it on purely empirical grounds. It seemed especially plausible as applied to the "crescent-shaped Islamic bloc" from the Maghreb to the East Indies.
In the Balkans, for example, Orthodox Serbs were at the throats of Bosnian and later Kosovar Muslims. In Africa, Muslims were either skirmishing or at war with Christians in Nigeria, Sudan, and Ethiopia. In the Caucasus, there was all-out war between Orthodox Russia and Muslim Chechnya, all-out war between Christian Armenia and Muslim Azerbaijan, and violent skirmishes between Orthodox Ossetia and Muslim Ingushetia.
In the Middle East, some 500,000 U.S. troops had intervened to expel Iraq from Kuwait. Israel had just endured several years of the first Palestinian intifada, soon to be followed by a fraudulent peace process leading, in turn, to a second and far bloodier intifada. Further to the east, Pakistan and India were at perpetual daggers drawn over Kashmir. There were tensions—sometimes violent—between the Hindu majority and the large Muslim minority in India, just as there were between the Christian minority and the Muslim majority in Indonesia.
For Huntington, all this was of a piece with a pattern dating at least as far back as the battle of Poitiers in 732, when Charles Martel turned back the advancing Umayyads and saved Europe for Christianity. Nor was the pattern likely to end any time soon. "The centuries-old military interaction between the West and Islam is unlikely to decline," he wrote. To the contrary: "It could become more virulent."
As predictions go, Huntington's landmark thesis seemed in many ways to have been borne out by subsequent events. Long before 9/11, and long before George W. Bush came to office, anti-American hostility within the Muslim—and, particularly, the Arab—world was plainly on the rise. So was terrorist activity directed at U.S. targets. Meanwhile, the advent of satellite TV brought channels like al-Jazeera and Hizballah's al-Manar to millions of Muslim homes and public places, offering their audience a robust diet of anti-American, anti-Israel, and often anti-Semitic "news," propaganda, and Islamist indoctrination.
It should have come as no surprise, then, that Muslim reaction to the attacks of September 11, 2001 tended toward the euphoric—in striking confirmation, it would seem, of Huntington's bold thesis. And that thesis would seem to be no less firmly established today, when opinion polls show America's "favorability ratings" plummeting even in Muslim countries once relatively well-disposed toward us: in Turkey, for example, descending from 52 percent in 1999 to 12 percent in 2008, and in Indonesia from 75 percent to 37 percent in the same period (according to the Pew Global Survey). These findings are all the more depressing in light of the massive humanitarian assistance provided to Indonesia by the U.S. after the 2004 tsunami. The same might be said of Pakistan where, despite similarly critical U.S. assistance after the 2005 earthquake, already low opinions of the U.S. have sunk still further.
Read the entire essay via active link: http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122059157681303377.html?mod=opinion_journal_federation

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Russia courts old allies, steps up defiance of the West
President Dmitry Medvedev said Saturday that Russia is 'a nation to be reckoned with.'
By Fred Weir Correspondent of The Christian Science Monitor
from the September 8, 2008 edition
Moscow - Russia is groping for fresh ways to engage with the world after its lightning-fast summer war with Georgia chilled relations with the West and dismayed even some of its closest regional allies.
"We are facing the beginning of a complete review of Russian foreign policy," says Fyodor Lukyanov, editor of Russia in Global Affairs, a leading Moscow foreign-policy journal. "Things have changed and, based on what Russian leaders are saying, our long effort to integrate with Western institutions, to become part of the Western system, is over. The aim now is to be an independent power in a multipolar world in which Russia is a major player."
Analysts here are divided over whether a "new cold war" between Russia and the West is in the offing, but a growing sense of isolation is leading Moscow to circle the wagons closer to home and to revive alliances with former Soviet allies such as Syria and Cuba, and new partners such as Venezuela.
At a State Council meeting with Russian regional leaders Saturday, President Dmitry Medvedev announced that national security will have to be bolstered to counteract unnamed forces "who are trying to exert political pressure on Russia."
In a series of statements over the past week Mr. Medvedev has spelled out what amounts to a Russian version of the Monroe Doctrine, warning that Moscow will intervene to protect its citizens and business interests, particularly in the "near abroad," meaning the former Soviet Union. "The events in [Georgia's breakaway province of South Ossetia] showed that Russia will not allow anyone to infringe upon the lives and dignity of its citizens, that Russia is a state to be, from now on, reckoned with," he told the regional leaders.
The basic message to the West is "don't even think of parking here," says Natalya Narochnitskaya, former deputy chair of the State Duma's foreign relations commission and now an executive of the Moscow-based Institute for Democracy and Cooperation, which is funded by Russian business interests.
After a decade that has seen NATO – a 26-nation Western military alliance – absorb all the former USSR's allies and move to the borders of Russia itself, and the US move to install strategic antimissile weapons in Poland and the Czech Republic, Moscow has had enough. "There is a red line, where Russia cannot accept further pressure on its borders in its traditional geopolitical arena," Ms. Narochnitskaya says.
Multipolar era emerging?
Russian policy-makers say the world order has shifted from the bipolar arrangement of the four-decade-long standoff between the US and the USSR, to a brief period of American preeminence, to an emerging multi-polar era in which many powerful players will have to learn to work out their differences.
"We need new mechanisms for strategic security cooperation, because the old ones are not working," says Andrei Klimov, a member of the State Duma's international affairs committee. "There is a new reality in the world, and we need to discuss it openly."
At the center of the current storm are Georgia and Ukraine, both NATO aspirants that Vice President Dick Cheney visited last week with a message of support that is bound to further antagonize Moscow.
Ukraine, a nation deeply divided between pro-Western and Russified parts that is currently sliding into a renewed political crisis, could face intense Russian pressure if it presses on with its bid for NATO membership. "In many Western countries there are already protests against this crazy idea of getting Georgia and Ukraine into NATO," says Mr. Klimov. "It's a formula for crisis inside NATO."
Narochnitskaya, like many other Russian experts, insists that Moscow probably wouldn't attempt to break up or annex Ukraine if it declared neutrality and became a kind of buffer state between East and West, akin to Finland's unique status during the cold war. They insist that Moscow's objection is to Ukraine joining a military alliance, and not to its economic or political cooperation with the West in general. "The majority of Ukrainians identify themselves as an independent Slavic nation," Narochnitskaya says. "But they don't need to build their national identity on hostility to Russia."
Moscow has been putting out feelers to former Soviet allies, such as Syria and Cuba, as well as emerging partners like Venezuela. A Russian delegation led by Deputy Prime Minister Igor Sechin visited Havana in early July to explore rebuilding Soviet-era economic and security ties. Medvedev discussed sophisticated arms sales and the possibility of the Russian Navy using former Soviet port facilities at Tartus, on the Mediterranean, when Syrian President Bashar al-Assad visited Moscow in late August. The Russian Foreign Ministry expressed "deep satisfaction" last week when another old Soviet crony, Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega, became the first foreign leader to extend diplomatic recognition to South Ossetia and the other breakaway Georgian territory, Abkhazia.
New contacts a warning to the US
But any talk of reviving the USSR's alliance system may be deliberate disinformation intended to remind Washington of its own regional sensitivities. "Russia doesn't have any resources [to match the US around the world], and no desire to do so anymore," says Mikhail Delyagin, director of the independent Institute of Globalization Problems in Moscow.
But even in its own backyard, Moscow is finding its tough new stance a hard sell. On Friday, at a summit of the Moscow-led, seven-member Collective Security Treaty Organization (which includes Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan), Medvedev won backing for Russia's crushing military rebuff of Georgia's attempt to retake South Ossetia, but found not one ally willing to follow Moscow's lead in establishing diplomatic ties with the tiny pro-Moscow enclave.
Experts say Medvedev has received an even cooler response from Russia's traditional Asian friends, China and India. Both nations generously supported Moscow's decade-long effort to suppress its own separatist challenge in Chechnya and backed its angry opposition to Western recognition of Kosovo's self-declared independence earlier this year. At a summit of the influential Shanghai Cooperation Organization last week, where China is a leading member and India an observer, participants would only agree to a tepid statement that expressed "support [for] Russia's active role in facilitating peace and cooperation" in the Caucasus region.
But being a neighbor of Russia has just gotten harder, say experts.
"Russia has demonstrated that it's ready to use force outside its own borders, and this means countries of the region are going to have to take note and choose whom they listen to," on big geopolitical issues, says Mr. Lukyanov.
"The space for maneuvering between East and West [for Russia's neighbors] is definitely shrinking," he says.
French President Nicolas Sarkozy travels to Moscow on Monday with European Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso and European Union foreign-policy chief Javier Solana to encourage Medvedev to comply with a month-old peace plan for Georgia. Meanwhile, Georgia seeks a ruling from The Hague over its claims of human rights abuses against ethnic Georgians in South Ossetia and Abkhazia.


Find this article at: http://www.csmonitor.com/2008/0908/p01s06-woeu.html

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Russia’s “ Russia problem”
by Linas Kojelis
August 17, 2008
In his successful bid to topple incumbent President Gerald Ford in 1976, Governor Jimmy Carter made very effective use of the “misery index.” This index is simply the sum of the unemployment and inflation rates, by which Carter compared and contrasted very simply the results of the Nixon/Ford administrations with those of their predecessors.
In 2008, as the world again recoils at the sight of Russian tanks brutally crushing the hopes and aspirations of a small neighboring country, it’s a good time to consider the concept of an “international misery index” -- the sum of devastation caused by a country to both its neighbors and own citizens. For many international observers, the single obvious champion of such an index is Russia . For the past several centuries that country has won so many gold medals consistently in both categories that its national anthem seems to be on a continuous loop as the Russian bear once again ascends the victory stand.
In considering the category of “The Most Misery Caused Internationally,” let it be said that since the dawn of civilization the world’s been a tough place. First tribes battled tribes then kingdoms battled kingdoms until the 18th and 19th centuries when the consolidation of European nation states and their empires established and defined, for better or worse, the international stage we see today. In terms of the positive and negative social and economic consequences of their rule, one could argue there wasn’t much difference between, for example, Queen Victoria ’s empire and that of her royal Russian cousins.
However, it is striking to contrast the enthusiasm with which her Highness’s former subjects, upon attaining independence, re-established both warm and official relations through the British Commonwealth against the driving desire of states arising from both the royal and communist Russian empires to quickly distance themselves culturally, economically and politically as far as possible from Moscow . Since the collapse of the USSR, every country of the former Warsaw Pact and the Baltic States have joined NATO, perceived by both Russia’s hierarchy and a majority of its citizenry as a Great Satan. In short, it is not illogical to surmise that the Russian occupation of much of Europe in the 20th century was especially brutal and worthy of many medals for “international misery.”
As regards current events in Georgia , the key point of divergence between modern European and Russian mentalities relates to the self-identification of average citizens, i.e., what does it mean to be a “proud Frenchman” or “proud German?” Before 1945, the pounding of Teutonic boots on the streets of Amsterdam and Brussels gave Germans pride. The French took pride in African and Asian colonies, and the British in an empire upon which the sun never set.
But by the 1950’s and 60’s, modern west European states came to realize that national pride comes not from foreign occupation but by building dynamic, successful and generous societies benefiting as many citizens as possible within their own national borders. One can argue that some social programs (ex. French vacation policies, German labor laws or Swedish public health) went too far, but no one can argue that the vast majorities of people in these countries aren’t content, and have no desire to invade their neighbors in the name of “national pride.”
This then is the first part of Russia ’s “ Russia problem.” In the 21st century Russian national pride continues to base itself on brutal domination of its neighbors. It can come in the form of Russians goose-stepping through Georgia . Or it can be more subtle, such as the use of energy policy against Ukraine when it flirts too openly with the West.
Perhaps, and most dangerously, it can take the form of cyber-warfare, as was Russia ’s response to Estonia ’s decision last year to respectfully move the Soviet Bronze Soldier monument from downtown Tallinn to a military cemetery. In this case it wasn’t the Russian military, but an army of Putin-jugend who turned their cyber talents against Estonian-based internet servers. Consider the spam that comes to your computer, and then multiply it by ten thousand. That was Russia ’s tactic.
This attack on the websites of the Estonian parliament, banks, ministries, newspapers and broadcasters was so devastating that NATO ( Estonia is a member) began a substantial review of its entire military doctrine. If the Russians could shut down Estonia , why couldn’t they do the same to France , Norway or even the United States ?
In contrast to the sophisticated strategies and technologies of the international part of Russia ’s misery index rating, the domestic side – the misery Russians exact on each other – is based on crudeness and indifference.
Starting at least with Ivan the Terrible in the 16th century, the Russians people consistently acquiesce to rulers with national sadomasochistic tendencies. This pattern culminated with the reign of Josef Stalin in the 20th century. Stalin orchestrated notorious purges and ethnic cleansings (e.g. state sponsored famine in Ukraine ), which sent untold millions of Soviet citizens to their graves at the hands of their own military and security personnel.
But that’s just the tip of Russia ’s domestic misery index. In contrast to the flourishing capitalist societies in the West, life throughout the vast majority of the largest country in the world was and continues to be miserable. The simplest and most basic health and sanitation needs go unmet for the average Russian. As poor as West Virginia or Pennsylvania coal miners might have been, they never had to make availability of plain soap a strike demand, as their Russian counterparts did in the 1990’s.
Today Russia spends billions of dollars invading tiny neighbors, training its Olympic teams and hiring American image consultants, while alcoholism, smoking, drug abuse, prostitution, STDs, tuberculosis and untold environmental horrors devastate her citizens. At the Woodrow Wilson Center for International Scholars in Washington, Murray Feshbach, America’s leading expert on Russian demographics, predicts that, due to these maladies and low birth rates (especially of healthy babies), “by 2050 Russia's current population of 144 million could fall to 101 million or as low as 77 million if factoring in the AIDS epidemic.”
In short, the second part of Russia ’s “ Russia problem” is that they don’t value their own lives. In 2008, if the Russians really cared about themselves, they wouldn’t invest in foreign invasions and international intrigue, but would tend to their own social, political, health and cultural ailments first, for they are many and multiplying rapidly.
Russia is not a poor country and former President and current Prime Minister Vladimir Putin is given great credit for stabilizing Russia ’s economy. In reality, he has simply ridden a wave of success solely dependent on skyrocketing prices for oil and gas, these natural resources being in great supply in his country.
The Russian “middle class” in Moscow or St. Petersburg is simply a tiny fraction of lucky suckers sipping cream from the Russian energy cow, for that country manufactures nothing – save Kalashnikovs and nuclear power plants – for global consumption. Go a few kilometers beyond the grand boulevards of Russia ’s big cities and you return to almost medieval conditions. Repeating the pattern of preceding centuries, the 21st century Russian elites hold the masses in disdain.
In sum, Russia ’s greatest “problem” is Russia itself. Pogo’s quaint observation, “We have met the enemy and they are us,” is appropriate for the sad Russian people as for few others.
But a handful of other nations have the cultural achievements, grand landscape and bountiful resources of Russia . If only the Russians were more introspective and mindful of their God given gifts and dutiful in meeting the needs of their own people, both their lives and those of their long-suffering neighbors would be much, much improved.
Linas Kojelis served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State and Special Assistant to the President at the White House during the Reagan Administration, and is a co-founder of the U.S.- Baltic Foundation (http://www.usbaltic.org/). He can be contacted at linas@koco2.com.


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Putin wants a new Russian empire

By Con Coughlin
Last Updated: 12:01am BST 05/09/2008
Have your say Read comments
Just how far is Russia prepared to go in its attempts to build a new Russian empire? As the West struggles to digest the aftermath of Moscow's audacious land grab in Georgia, all the signals emanating from the Kremlin suggest that, far from being cowed by the international condemnation it has received for its dramatic intervention in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, this is just the start of Russia's quest to establish a new era of imperial glory.
That is certainly how senior officials across Whitehall are interpreting the new mood of territorial expansionism that seems to be sweeping through the Kremlin. "The Russians may be able to come to terms with the collapse of the Soviet Union, but they will never get used to the idea that they are no longer an empire," one senior Whitehall official told me this week. "The desire to build a new empire is far stronger than any desire to rebuild the Soviet Union, and that is what is currently driving Moscow's behaviour in the Caucasus."

Vladimir Putin displays his hunter instincts tracking tigers in Russia
There was a time when the mere sight of the American vice-president, Dick Cheney - the éminence grise of the Bush administration - making his considerable presence felt in the Caucasus would be sufficient to bring the Kremlin to its senses. Unlike some of the younger and less-experienced members of President George W Bush's foreign policy team, Mr Cheney is a veteran Cold War warrior who, even after the collapse of the Soviet Union, warned that the threat of resurgent Russian nationalism could never be discounted.
Read more from Con Coughlin
EU moves to loosen Russia's 'energy stranglehold'
When Mr Bush said he had looked the former Russian president Vladimir Putin in the eye and got "a sense of his soul" after their first encounter in Slovenia in the summer of 2001, Mr Cheney remained deeply sceptical about Mr Putin's ultimate intentions. This might have been the high point in the thaw in relations between the Kremlin and the White House, but that did not stop Mr Cheney forging ahead with his Nato enlargement agenda, signing up as many of the former Soviet republics for membership as possible, and building a network of oil and gas pipelines linking the West to the vast new energy resources coming on stream in central Asia. For all Moscow's talk of becoming a trusted ally of the West, the hawkish Mr Cheney simply did not trust it to deliver.
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And so it has proved. Whether the Kremlin ordered last month's invasion of Georgia to prevent it from joining Nato, or because it was concerned that the new oil pipeline might jeopardise Russia's stranglehold over the West's energy supplies, what is clear is that Moscow simply could not tolerate the notion that any country occupying what Mr Putin defines as "post-Soviet space" has the right to think and act for itself.
Yesterday Mr Cheney, during his stopover in Georgia, said America remained "fully committed" to Georgia's efforts to join Nato, but it is highly unlikely that it president, Mikheil Saakashvili, can continue with Tbilisi's pursuit of Nato membership while a third of his country remains under occupation by Russian troops.
Indeed, as Mr Cheney will have discovered during his hastily arranged tour of the Caucasus this week, the Kremlin's success in undermining the Georgian government has served only to strengthen Moscow's determination to prevent the West from making any further advances into territory it considers part of its historic sphere of interest.
Mr Putin's lament that the collapse of the Soviet Union was "the greatest geopolitical catastrophe" of the 20th century has often been taken to suggest that Russia, buoyed by its vast oil wealth, is intent on re-establishing the old Cold War boundaries in central Europe. But a more accurate insight to the Kremlin's current thinking is contained in Mr Putin's book First Person, published in 2000, in which he talks about establishing a new Russian empire, rather than resurrecting the Soviet Union.
This would certainly explain Moscow's current preoccupation with the Caucasus, which, under the tsars, was always regarded as a prime target for Russia's expansionist aims and parts of which are now the subject of a sustained campaign of destabilisation by the Kremlin.
Having dealt the Saakashvili government what could still prove to be a lethal blow, Moscow hardly missed a beat before turning its attention towards Ukraine, another post-Soviet state that nurtures aspirations to join both the European Union and Nato. Russia has made no secret of its disdain for the pro-Western government of President Viktor Yushchenko that took office after the 2004 Orange Revolution, at one point turning off the oil and gas supply taps just to demonstrate the extent of Kiev's dependence on Russian goodwill.
Now Moscow can take comfort from the fact that the presence of Russian military hardware in neighbouring Georgia has provoked deep political divisions in Kiev, where Yulia Tymoshenko, Ukraine's strong-willed prime minister, has been accused by Mr Yushchenko of siding with the main pro-Russian opposition leader, Viktor Yanukovich.
Moscow will not always need to rely on military hardware to redraw geographical boundaries in its favour - sometimes all that will be required is clever manipulation of local politics, as is currently happening in Ukraine.
Nor are Russia's imperial ambitions confined to the Caucasus. It has already been active in Central Asia - another favourite imperial hunting ground - where Moscow has established close relations with the deeply unpleasant despots who currently hold power in Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. It has taken a keen interest in the separatist movements that are currently active in Moldova and the disputed Azerbaijan enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh. Moscow has also made clear its determination to protect the Russian minorities who remain in the plucky little Baltic states liberated at the end of the Cold War, but which continue to be on the receiving end of Moscow's intimidatory tactics.
Nobody knows whether, lying somewhere in the dark recesses of the Kremlin, there is a map containing a definitive outline of the new Russian empire Mr Putin and his acolytes would like to create. But that is what they are undoubtedly seeking to achieve and there's very little - or so it seems - the West can do to stop them.

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/opinion/main.jhtml?xml=/opinion/2008/09/05/do0505.xml

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Russia’s Oligarchs May Face a Georgian Chill
By LANDON THOMAS Jr.


Alexander Nemenov/Agence France-Presse — Getty Images
Roman Abramovich, a former oil baron, has combined close ties
to the Kremlin with personal and business ties to the West.

LONDON — As Russia’s hot war with Georgia threatens to become a colder, drawn-out conflict with the West, the global ambitions of some of its politically connected, controversial billionaires could suffer a setback.
The oligarchs, as they are widely known, have already paid a price from Russia’s forceful assertion in South Ossetia: the stock market recently hit a two-year low as foreign investors left in droves.
And while the sharpest of stock market swoons would only nick the oligarch’s giant fortunes, of more lasting effect, perhaps, is the notion gaining currency in some financial circles that their close ties to Prime Minister Vladimir V. Putin and his handpicked president, Dmitri A. Medvedev, may elevate the risk of doing business with them.
As the European Union seeks a diplomatic approach to Moscow, some policy makers are starting to suggest that the best way to influence the Kremlin would be to put more pressure on the Russian business community in Europe, particularly here in London, where many of the oligarchs have financial interests.
“This is a big blow, a shock for all these people,” said Anders Aslund, a critic of the Russian government who is an expert in Russian and East European studies at the Peterson Institute for International Economics in Washington. “Relations with the West will be difficult. There will be sanctions, the stock market is down and governance is going down the drain, and it is all Putin’s doing.”
Russia’s clash with the West follows a six-year, commodity-fueled boom that has pumped new life into a once destitute economy and catapulted the country’s business elite to the ranks of billionaires. It also comes as some of the country’s businessmen have begun to expand their international operations and loosen ties to Russia.
Roman Abramovich, the 42-year-old onetime oil baron with close ties to Mr. Putin, has established deep ties in London by turning part of his estimated $23 billion fortune into ownership of the Chelsea soccer club. He has plans to turn a 19th-century apartment residence in London’s Lowndes Square into a mansion with a pool and parking garage. Although he recently sold much of his Russian portfolio and resigned as governor of Russia’s Chukotka region, his ties with the Kremlin have helped him avoid the fate of oligarchs like Mikhail B. Khodorkovsky, the former billionaire owner of the Yukos oil company who sits in a Siberian jail cell after failed efforts to oppose Mr. Putin’s policies.
Another oligarch with close ties to Mr. Putin is Oleg V. Deripaska, 40, an aluminum magnate with a net worth of $28 billion who has also moved beyond Russia’s borders. His holding company, Basic Element, with $27 billion in revenue, has invested in Magna, a Canadian auto parts company. It has purchased large stakes in two construction companies in Austria and Germany and is a large investor in Montenegro. Mr. Deripaska is weighing a public offering of Rusal, the aluminum company that he controls.
For Boris Berezovsky, a billionaire whose once-powerful stature was cut down after Mr. Putin began scrutinizing the nation’s richest men, Russia’s conflict with Georgia opens the door for the West to consider influencing the Kremlin by going after its favored oligarchs — including Mr. Abramovich and Mr. Deripaska. “They are part of his regime,” Mr. Berezovsky said.
“The West plays with the rules of a democrat, but Putin is a gangster,” he declared, sitting at the head of a boardroom table in his London office. “He understands only power.”
Since his 2000 escape to London, where he was granted asylum, Mr. Berezovsky has been a ceaseless (if not perhaps self-interested) scold, calling for the United States and Europe to cut ties with Mr. Putin.
With regard to Mr. Abramovich Mr. Berezovsky does not pretend to be objective. He has filed a £2 billion ($3.5 billion) lawsuit against his former business associate, claiming Mr. Abramovich forced him to sell his shares of the Russian oil company Sibneft and other assets for far less than their real value.
To support his claim that Mr. Abramovich and Mr. Putin are “business partners,” he cites an encounter with Mr. Abramovich in 1999 where he was asked to split the cost of a $50 million yacht for Mr. Putin — an offer Mr. Berezovsky says he refused.
Bankers in Moscow also say there will be lasting results from Russia’s diplomatic estrangement. Raising capital from Western banks, already difficult with the tighten credit markets, will become harder, and securing visas may become more difficult.
Mr. Deripaska has already had a visa to the United States revoked over concerns about his business practices. And last month David Cameron, the British Conservative Party leader, called for a review of his country’s visa policy toward Russia’s elite — without naming names. To some observers, the mere mention of the idea by a leading British politician shows that international attitudes toward Russia’s leading oligarchs may have further to fray.
Spokesmen for Mr. Abramovich and Mr. Deripaska disputed the notion that their expanding business operations would feel the sting of an anti-Putin effort.
Speaking for Mr. Abramovich, John Mann declined to address Mr. Berezovsky’s claims, citing the continuing litigation.
A spokesman for Mr. Deripaska said: “Basic Element maintains normal and constructive relations with Russian authorities.”
According to Mr. Aslund, Mr. Abramovich has the closer relationship to the Russian leadership. He pointed to Mr. Abramovich’s $13 billion sale in 2005 of his stake in the oil company Sibneft to Gazprom, where Mr. Medvedev was a top executive.
For years these cozy links were played down by investors. But the outbreak of war, coming on top of the conflict between the oil company BP and its partners in a Russian joint venture, suggests that in the future the compact between big business and big government in Russia will no longer be looked upon so benignly.
“The risk premium has to be applied more broadly in Russia,” said John-Paul Smith, a strategist for Russia and Central Europe at Pictet, a Swiss asset manager. “You are never sure where private business ends and government starts.”
For the moment, there is little immediate likelihood that Mr. Deripaska or Mr. Abramovich would suffer an indignity here. The breadth and scope of Mr. Deripaska’s and Mr. Abramovich’s businesses should be enough to protect them from any kind of investor strike. Mr. Abramovich and Mr. Deripaska have built strong personal and business ties to the West as well. Mr. Deripaska, for example, has relied on the financial advice of Nathaniel Rothschild, the man in line to be the fifth Baron Rothschild. He is also an investment partner with Peter Munk, chairman and founder of Barrick Gold, in several projects.
“The fact that he is close to Putin is neither a plus or a minus,” said Mr. Munk, who sits on the advisory board of Rusal. “I judge him by his behavior, and my trust in him is complete.”
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/05/business/worldbusiness/05oligarchs.html?_r=1&oref=slogin&ref=business&pagewanted=print

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LUKOIL says output growth hinges on more tax cuts
Thu Sep 11, 2008 9:57am EDT
By Tanya Mosolova
MOSCOW (Reuters) - LUKOIL (LKOH.MM: Quote, Profile, Research, Stock Buzz), Russia's second-largest oil producer, cannot guarantee its oil production will grow if the government decides against extending tax breaks to the industry, its vice president said.
Leonid Fedun told the Reuters Russia Investment Summit that the industry needed at least 400 billion roubles ($15.6 billion) in extra tax breaks in addition to the alleviation of 140 billion roubles already approved.
"The state should decide what is more important: Tax stability or growth," Fedun said at the event, held at the Reuters office in Moscow.
"If Russia plans to grow (production) by 1.5 percent we should understand that annual investments in oil production should exceed $100 billion," he said.
"LUKOIL can have an investment programme of $7 billion, $12 billion or $14 billion. Under the first scenario we do not grow, under the second scenario we grow very slowly, under the third we grow faster," he said.
U.S. oil major ConocoPhillips (COP.N: Quote, Profile, Research, Stock Buzz) holds one fifth of LUKOIL's stock.
LUKOIL's production amounts to around one-fifth of Russia's total output, which has been falling since the beginning of the year, making it almost impossible for the country to avoid its first annual output decline in a decade.
Poor oil output performance in Russia, the world's second-largest oil exporter after Saudi Arabia, has become a major concern for the country's government, which depends heavily on oil revenues, as well as for global markets.
Many officials have said a second stage of oil tax reform is needed but Finance Minister Alexei Kudrin, the main fiscal hawk in the government of Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, has said oil firms should not expect further cuts before 2011.
Fedun said the first stage of the tax reform, when the government agreed to cut the mineral extraction tax and introduce tax holidays for depleted and new fields from next year, will allow LUKOIL to invest more in deposits in the Arctic Timan Pechora region and speed up its offshore Caspian fields.
LUKOIL cut its oil output growth forecast for 2008 earlier this year to 1.4-1.7 percent from over 2 percent before. It produced 91.5 million tons (1.8 million barrels per day) last year.
(Additional reporting by Dmitry Zhdannikov, Michael Stott, Robin Paxton and Katya Golubkova; Editing by Jason Neely)
http://www.reuters.com/articlePrint?articleId=USLB1688420080911
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Russian generals should weigh words and not attempt to scare Europe - Polish FM Sikorski


WARSAW. SEPTEMBER 11. INTERFAX CENTRAL EUROPE - Poland will try to build trust and will proceed in a predictable way with regard to a planned U.S. anti-missile shield to be based on Polish territory - but Russian generals should not attempt to scare Europe with harsh rhetoric, Polish Foreign Minister Radoslaw Sikorski in Warsaw Thursday during a joint press conference held with Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov.
"We've said today that the generals should weight their words a little more in order not to scare Europe," Sikorski said. "Poland will try to build trust and will proceed in a predictable and transparent way."
Russia has long opposed the anti-missile system, elements of which will be installed on Polish and Czech territory.
For his part, Lavrov said that Russia does not see a threat from Poland, but that the shield still poses a risk to Russian security.
"We don't see any threats from PL, but we said there are risks for the security of the Russian Federation that arise as a result of the U.S. infrastructure coming closer to our borders," Lavrov said.
"We appreciate that the Polish side is trying to understand our concerns, as well as what Minister Sikorski said about consultations and building trust and transparency," he added. "We will wait for concrete proposals and on that base we will be holding those consultations."
Lavrov went on to add that Russia sees the missile shield as part of U.S. strategy, noting that parity between the two countries was long regulated by agreements between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.
"We don't see a threat for the Russian Federation that would come from Poland," Lavrov said. "We cannot ignore, however, that those elements are an integral part of a strategic installation of the U.S.A. - a system that has so far been regulated by agreements between USSR and USA and this was the base of the parity in the military system.
Lavrov said that the U.S. has moved forward on an international missile shield and that it is considering placing elements of the shield in space, which is opposed by some EU countries.
"The U.S. some time ago cancelled the agreement on the missile shield," he added. "At this point they try to install shield systems in various parts of the globe and even plan to place elements of the system to outer space, which is opposed by a number of countries, including some in the EU.
"The U.S. is currently developing a project for a rapid global assault, which is a serious threat for the concept of the parity that used to exist, especially that there are plans for installing non- nuclear warheads on strategic vessels," Lavrov continued. "This is why the authorities of the Russian Federation must take steps to ensure safety."
For his part, Sikorski said that Poland is ready to go the extra mile to reassure Russia regarding the shield.
"We've talked about the Polish-U.S. agreement on antiballistic missiles," Sikorski said. "I've confirmed to the minister our readiness to discuss the tools for building trust. Our deputies will meet soon to discuss details.
"Our deputies will meet by the end of this year to determine the formula."
The Warsaw meeting is Lavrov's first visit to a European Union state following the conflict in Georgia, which saw Russian forces drive deep into Georgia, following Georgiat's attempt to regain control over the breakaway region of South Ossetia in early August.
MS/PS
For further information please e-mail newsroom@interfax.pl or phone (+48) 22 630 83 88.
http://www.interfax.cn/
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Arabians ask to provide land from City of Tallinn for Islamic centre


BC, Tallinn, 08.09.2008.
Representatives of Sheikh Sultan bin Mohammed Al Qasimi are asking the City of Tallinn to provide land for building an Islamic religious and culture centre in Tallinn, the Baltic Business News channel informed, based on information provided by Äripäev.
Sheikh Sultan bin Mohammed Al Qasimi, UAE Supreme Council Member and Ruler of Sharjah, the third largest emirate of the United Arabian Emirates, considers building of the first Islamic centre in Estonia.
The plan was unveiled in March by Jamal Al Taraifi, the Director General of Sharjah Secretariat General for Auqaf, during a meeting with visiting Muft of Estonia Eldar Muhammed Shun.
Al Tarifi said the centre is expected to be built in coordination with the Organisation of Islamic Conference.
http://www.baltic-course.com/eng/baltic_news/&doc=1538
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Realism about Russia
Author: Joschka Fischer, Germany’s Foreign Minister and Vice Chancellor from 1998 to 20058 September 2008 - Issue : 798
Joschka Fischer, Germany’s Foreign Minister and Vice Chancellor from 1998 to 2005, led Germany’s Green Party for nearly 20 years.

Russia’s strategy to revise the post- Soviet order in what it calls its “near abroad” will be pursued with even more perseverance follow ing its victory over Georgia. Europe should have no illusions about this and sh - ould begin to prepare itself. But, as the Euro - pean Union ponders what to do, cold rea - lism, not hysterical overreaction, is in order. Unfortunately, equating the current situation in the Caucasus with the Soviet Union’s invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 does not attest to this kind of realism. Neither the West nor NATO constitutes the decisive strategic threat facing Russia, which comes from the Islamic South and from the Far East, in particular the emerging superpower, China. Moreover, Russia’s strength is in no way comparable to that of the former Soviet Union. Indeed, demographically, Russia is undergoing a dramatic decline. Apart from commodity exports, it has little to offer to the global economy. Notwithstanding booming oil and gas revenues, its infrastructure remains underdeveloped, and successful economic modernization is a long way off. Likewise, its political and legal system is authoritarian, and its numerous minority problems remain unsolved. As a result, Russia’s current challenging of the territorial integrity of Georgia might prove to be a grave error in the not-so-distant future. Given this structural weakness, the idea of a new Cold War is misleading. The Cold War was an endurance race between two similarly strong rivals, the weaker of which eventually had to give up. Russia does not have the capacity to wage another struggle of that type. Nevertheless, as a restored great power, the new Russia will for the time being attempt to ride in the slipstream of other great powers for as long as doing so coincides with its possibilities and interests; it will concentrate on its own sphere of influence and on its role as a global energy power; and it will otherwise make use of its opportunities on a global scale to limit America’s power. But it will not be able to seriously challenge the United States – or looking towards the future, China – in ways that the Soviet Union once did. It is now clear that in the future, Russia will once again pursue its vital interests with military force – particularly in its “near abroad.” But Europe must never accept a renewal of Russian great power politics, which operates according to the idea that might makes right. Indeed, it is here that Russia’s renewed confrontation with the West begins, because the new Europe is based on the principle of the inviolability of boundaries, peaceful conflict resolution, and the rule of law, so to forgo this principle for the benefit of imperial zones of influence would amount to self-abandonment. Further eastward expansion of NATO, however, will be possible only against fierce Russian resistance. Nor will this kind of policy in any way create more security, because it entails making promises that won’t be kept in an emergency – as we now see in Georgia. For too long, the West has ignored Russia’s recovery of strength and was not prepared to accept the consequences. But not only Russia has changed; so has the entire world. America’s neo-conservatives have wasted a large part of their country’s power and moral authority in an unnecessary war in Iraq, willfully weakening the only global Western power. China, India, Brazil, Russia, and the Persian Gulf today are the world economy’s new growth centers and will soon be centers of power to be reckoned with. In view of these realities, the threat of exclusion from the G8 doesn’t really feel earth shattering to Russia. Europe’s disunity and impotence underline this image of a West that has partially lost touch with geo-political realities. The response to the return of Russia’s imperial great power politics has nothing to do with punishing Russia, and a lot to do with establishing innately Western – especially European – positions of power. This requires several measures: l a new political dynamism vis-à-vis Turkey to link this country, one crucial for European security, permanently to Europe; l putting a stop to Moscow’s divide-and-conquer politics by adopting a common EU energy policy; l a serious initiative for strengthening Europe’s defense capabilities; l a greater EU commitment to Ukraine to safeguard its independence; l a greater freedom of travel for all the EU’s Eastern neighbors. All of this, and much more, is needed to send a clear signal to Russia that Europe is unwilling to stand idly by as it returns to great power politics. Presumably, none of this will happen, and it is precisely such inaction that is, in large part, the cause of Russia’s strength and Europe’s weakness. At the same time, however, one shouldn’t lose sight of the joint interests linking Russia and the West. Cooperative relations should be maintained as far as possible. It is blatantly obvious that for Russia’s elites, weakness and cooperation are mutually exclusive. Therefore, whoever wants cooperation with Russia – which is in Europe’s interest – must be strong. That is the lesson from the violence in the Caucasus that Europe must urgently take to heart.
http://www.neurope.eu/articles/89602.php
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Baltic tigers face fears of economic jungle
By eNews 2.0 Staff 14:09, September 8th 2008

Three tiny post-communist countries earned the nickname Baltic Tigers with years of spectacular economic growth that made them the envy of the European Union's old economies. But Monday brought new evidence that Estonia and Latvia risk recession amid a worldwide credit crunch and plummeting domestic demand, while Lithuania also faces economic woes. Estonia's gross domestic product (GDP) shrank 1.1 per cent year-on-year in the second quarter of 2008, down from growth of 0.2 per cent in the previous quarter, Statistics Estonia said in revised figures. Latvia's economy grew by 0.1 per cent in the second quarter, down from 3.6 per cent in the previous three-month period, the office of statistics said in second estimates on Monday. Once part of the fastest-growing economy in the European Union, Latvians now face a gruelling winter of rising heating costs and a shrinking labour market. "This will be the year when each Latvian resident will suffer from the economic crisis and there will not be the privileged ones who will suffer less," Latvian President Valdis Zatlers told LNT TV Monday morning. Major employers say Latvians are now less likely to demand higher wages, and less frequently change jobs in the volatile economy. "People more seriously evaluate why they want to change a job and whether this is the right time to do it," human resources manager at Latvia's largest bank Hansabanka Kristine Sneidere told a daily newspaper recently. That is likely to dampen Latvia's high annual inflation which ran at 15.7 per cent in August, compared to 17.7 per cent in May, according to the statistics bureau. The central bank of Latvia has forecast growth this year will be between 2.5 and 3 per cent, though commercial bank forecasts are lower. SEB bank sees growth this year at zero to 0.5 per cent, while Nordea expects an economic contraction of 0.4 per cent this year and 0.7 per cent next year. Not everything is doom and gloom for the Baltics. Latvia's current account deficit, once the largest in the European Union, has been shrinking. "The government has been forced to question the effectiveness of the budgetary spending, to revise the employment figures in the public sector and to listen to the advice from the business community," SEB economist Andris Vilks said in a research note. A slowing economy and dwindling revenues are confronting Baltic governments with tough choices when they present their budgets to their parliaments later this month. The Latvian government last week decided to freeze wages for state employees, putting it under pressure from unions. Unions of police employees and doctors are planning to stage one-day warning strikes this month. International investors pulled their funds out of the Baltic market about one year ago, said Kestutis Celiesius, head of the brokerage unit for Danske Bank in Lithuania. As a result all major Baltic stock exchange indexes have lost 30-40 per cent in a year, he said.

http://www.enews20.com/action-print-n_id-11213.html

Thursday, September 4, 2008

Baltic Blog......Security & Intelligence Briefs, International, Baltic & Russia News September 5, 2008


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What is the ACT! for America Congressional Scorecard?
(Before looking at the voting records of Members of the House and Senate, it is recommended you read the following information to understand how the congressional scorecard works.)
ACT! for America has reviewed hundreds of votes related to national security and the threat of Islamofascism cast in the U.S. Senate and U.S. House between 2003 and 2008. The House and Senate votes we have chosen to highlight reflect a broad range of issues, including…
Intelligence gathering and protection of classified information
Detention, trial and punishment of terrorists
Financing of terrorism
Dealing with Iran and Iraq
Protecting American citizens who report suspicious activity
Grounds for deportation of suspected terrorists
Energy proposals to reduce American dependence on oil produced by countries unfriendly to the United States

See how your Congressman voted on important issues re: security, intelligence, terrorism, and the war. Click on the active link below:
http://www.actforamerica.org/index.php/house-110th-session-of-congress-2007-2008-


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The Medvedev Doctrine and American Strategy

Stratfor Today »-->September 2, 2008


By George Friedman
The United States has been fighting a war in the Islamic world since 2001. Its main theaters of operation are in Afghanistan and Iraq, but its politico-military focus spreads throughout the Islamic world, from Mindanao to Morocco. The situation on Aug. 7, 2008, was as follows:
The war in Iraq was moving toward an acceptable but not optimal solution. The government in Baghdad was not pro-American, but neither was it an Iranian puppet, and that was the best that could be hoped for. The United States anticipated pulling out troops, but not in a disorderly fashion.
The war in Afghanistan was deteriorating for the United States and NATO forces. The Taliban was increasingly effective, and large areas of the country were falling to its control. Force in Afghanistan was insufficient, and any troops withdrawn from Iraq would have to be deployed to Afghanistan to stabilize the situation. Political conditions in neighboring Pakistan were deteriorating, and that deterioration inevitably affected Afghanistan.
The United States had been locked in a confrontation with Iran over its nuclear program, demanding that Tehran halt enrichment of uranium or face U.S. action. The United States had assembled a group of six countries (the permanent members of the U.N. Security Council plus Germany) that agreed with the U.S. goal, was engaged in negotiations with Iran, and had agreed at some point to impose sanctions on Iran if Tehran failed to comply. The United States was also leaking stories about impending air attacks on Iran by Israel or the United States if Tehran didn’t abandon its enrichment program. The United States had the implicit agreement of the group of six not to sell arms to Tehran, creating a real sense of isolation in Iran.
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The Russian Resurgence
In short, the United States remained heavily committed to a region stretching from Iraq to Pakistan, with main force committed to Iraq and Afghanistan, and the possibility of commitments to Pakistan (and above all to Iran) on the table. U.S. ground forces were stretched to the limit, and U.S. airpower, naval and land-based forces had to stand by for the possibility of an air campaign in Iran — regardless of whether the U.S. planned an attack, since the credibility of a bluff depended on the availability of force.
The situation in this region actually was improving, but the United States had to remain committed there. It was therefore no accident that the Russians invaded Georgia on Aug. 8 following a Georgian attack on South Ossetia. Forgetting the details of who did what to whom, the United States had created a massive window of opportunity for the Russians: For the foreseeable future, the United States had no significant forces to spare to deploy elsewhere in the world, nor the ability to sustain them in extended combat. Moreover, the United States was relying on Russian cooperation both against Iran and potentially in Afghanistan, where Moscow’s influence with some factions remains substantial. The United States needed the Russians and couldn’t block the Russians. Therefore, the Russians inevitably chose this moment to strike.
On Sunday, Russian Prime Minister Dmitri Medvedev in effect ran up the Jolly Roger. Whatever the United States thought it was dealing with in Russia, Medvedev made the Russian position very clear. He stated Russian foreign policy in five succinct points, which we can think of as the Medvedev Doctrine (and which we see fit to quote here):
First, Russia recognizes the primacy of the fundamental principles of international law, which define the relations between civilized peoples. We will build our relations with other countries within the framework of these principles and this concept of international law.
Second, the world should be multipolar. A single-pole world is unacceptable. Domination is something we cannot allow. We cannot accept a world order in which one country makes all the decisions, even as serious and influential a country as the United States of America. Such a world is unstable and threatened by conflict.
Third, Russia does not want confrontation with any other country. Russia has no intention of isolating itself. We will develop friendly relations with Europe, the United States, and other countries, as much as is possible.
Fourth, protecting the lives and dignity of our citizens, wherever they may be, is an unquestionable priority for our country. Our foreign policy decisions will be based on this need. We will also protect the interests of our business community abroad. It should be clear to all that we will respond to any aggressive acts committed against us.
Finally, fifth, as is the case of other countries, there are regions in which Russia has privileged interests. These regions are home to countries with which we share special historical relations and are bound together as friends and good neighbors. We will pay particular attention to our work in these regions and build friendly ties with these countries, our close neighbors.
Medvedev concluded, “These are the principles I will follow in carrying out our foreign policy. As for the future, it depends not only on us but also on our friends and partners in the international community. They have a choice.”
The second point in this doctrine states that Russia does not accept the primacy of the United States in the international system. According to the third point, while Russia wants good relations with the United States and Europe, this depends on their behavior toward Russia and not just on Russia’s behavior. The fourth point states that Russia will protect the interests of Russians wherever they are — even if they live in the Baltic states or in Georgia, for example. This provides a doctrinal basis for intervention in such countries if Russia finds it necessary.
The fifth point is the critical one: “As is the case of other countries, there are regions in which Russia has privileged interests.” In other words, the Russians have special interests in the former Soviet Union and in friendly relations with these states. Intrusions by others into these regions that undermine pro-Russian regimes will be regarded as a threat to Russia’s “special interests.”
Thus, the Georgian conflict was not an isolated event — rather, Medvedev is saying that Russia is engaged in a general redefinition of the regional and global system. Locally, it would not be correct to say that Russia is trying to resurrect the Soviet Union or the Russian empire. It would be correct to say that Russia is creating a new structure of relations in the geography of its predecessors, with a new institutional structure with Moscow at its center. Globally, the Russians want to use this new regional power — and substantial Russian nuclear assets — to be part of a global system in which the United States loses its primacy.
These are ambitious goals, to say the least. But the Russians believe that the United States is off balance in the Islamic world and that there is an opportunity here, if they move quickly, to create a new reality before the United States is ready to respond. Europe has neither the military weight nor the will to actively resist Russia. Moreover, the Europeans are heavily dependent on Russian natural gas supplies over the coming years, and Russia can survive without selling it to them far better than the Europeans can survive without buying it. The Europeans are not a substantial factor in the equation, nor are they likely to become substantial.
This leaves the United States in an extremely difficult strategic position. The United States opposed the Soviet Union after 1945 not only for ideological reasons but also for geopolitical ones. If the Soviet Union had broken out of its encirclement and dominated all of Europe, the total economic power at its disposal, coupled with its population, would have allowed the Soviets to construct a navy that could challenge U.S. maritime hegemony and put the continental United States in jeopardy. It was U.S. policy during World Wars I and II and the Cold War to act militarily to prevent any power from dominating the Eurasian landmass. For the United States, this was the most important task throughout the 20th century.
The U.S.-jihadist war was waged in a strategic framework that assumed that the question of hegemony over Eurasia was closed. Germany’s defeat in World War II and the Soviet Union’s defeat in the Cold War meant that there was no claimant to Eurasia, and the United States was free to focus on what appeared to be the current priority — the defeat of radical Islamism. It appeared that the main threat to this strategy was the patience of the American public, not an attempt to resurrect a major Eurasian power.
The United States now faces a massive strategic dilemma, and it has limited military options against the Russians. It could choose a naval option, in which it would block the four Russian maritime outlets, the Sea of Japan and the Black, Baltic and Barents seas. The United States has ample military force with which to do this and could potentially do so without allied cooperation, which it would lack. It is extremely unlikely that the NATO council would unanimously support a blockade of Russia, which would be an act of war.
But while a blockade like this would certainly hurt the Russians, Russia is ultimately a land power. It is also capable of shipping and importing through third parties, meaning it could potentially acquire and ship key goods through European or Turkish ports (or Iranian ports, for that matter). The blockade option is thus more attractive on first glance than on deeper analysis.
More important, any overt U.S. action against Russia would result in counteractions. During the Cold War, the Soviets attacked American global interest not by sending Soviet troops, but by supporting regimes and factions with weapons and economic aid. Vietnam was the classic example: The Russians tied down 500,000 U.S. troops without placing major Russian forces at risk. Throughout the world, the Soviets implemented programs of subversion and aid to friendly regimes, forcing the United States either to accept pro-Soviet regimes, as with Cuba, or fight them at disproportionate cost.
In the present situation, the Russian response would strike at the heart of American strategy in the Islamic world. In the long run, the Russians have little interest in strengthening the Islamic world — but for the moment, they have substantial interest in maintaining American imbalance and sapping U.S. forces. The Russians have a long history of supporting Middle Eastern regimes with weapons shipments, and it is no accident that the first world leader they met with after invading Georgia was Syrian President Bashar al Assad. This was a clear signal that if the U.S. responded aggressively to Russia’s actions in Georgia, Moscow would ship a range of weapons to Syria — and far worse, to Iran. Indeed, Russia could conceivably send weapons to factions in Iraq that do not support the current regime, as well as to groups like Hezbollah. Moscow also could encourage the Iranians to withdraw their support for the Iraqi government and plunge Iraq back into conflict. Finally, Russia could ship weapons to the Taliban and work to further destabilize Pakistan.
At the moment, the United States faces the strategic problem that the Russians have options while the United States does not. Not only does the U.S. commitment of ground forces in the Islamic world leave the United States without strategic reserve, but the political arrangements under which these troops operate make them highly vulnerable to Russian manipulation — with few satisfactory U.S. counters.
The U.S. government is trying to think through how it can maintain its commitment in the Islamic world and resist the Russian reassertion of hegemony in the former Soviet Union. If the United States could very rapidly win its wars in the region, this would be possible. But the Russians are in a position to prolong these wars, and even without such agitation, the American ability to close off the conflicts is severely limited. The United States could massively increase the size of its army and make deployments into the Baltics, Ukraine and Central Asia to thwart Russian plans, but it would take years to build up these forces and the active cooperation of Europe to deploy them. Logistically, European support would be essential — but the Europeans in general, and the Germans in particular, have no appetite for this war. Expanding the U.S. Army is necessary, but it does not affect the current strategic reality.
This logistical issue might be manageable, but the real heart of this problem is not merely the deployment of U.S. forces in the Islamic world — it is the Russians’ ability to use weapons sales and covert means to deteriorate conditions dramatically. With active Russian hostility added to the current reality, the strategic situation in the Islamic world could rapidly spin out of control.
The United States is therefore trapped by its commitment to the Islamic world. It does not have sufficient forces to block Russian hegemony in the former Soviet Union, and if it tries to block the Russians with naval or air forces, it faces a dangerous riposte from the Russians in the Islamic world. If it does nothing, it creates a strategic threat that potentially towers over the threat in the Islamic world.
The United States now has to make a fundamental strategic decision. If it remains committed to its current strategy, it cannot respond to the Russians. If it does not respond to the Russians for five or 10 years, the world will look very much like it did from 1945 to 1992. There will be another Cold War at the very least, with a peer power much poorer than the United States but prepared to devote huge amounts of money to national defense.
There are four broad U.S. options:
Attempt to make a settlement with Iran that would guarantee the neutral stability of Iraq and permit the rapid withdrawal of U.S. forces there. Iran is the key here. The Iranians might also mistrust a re-emergent Russia, and while Tehran might be tempted to work with the Russians against the Americans, Iran might consider an arrangement with the United States — particularly if the United States refocuses its attentions elsewhere. On the upside, this would free the U.S. from Iraq. On the downside, the Iranians might not want —or honor — such a deal.
Enter into negotiations with the Russians, granting them the sphere of influence they want in the former Soviet Union in return for guarantees not to project Russian power into Europe proper. The Russians will be busy consolidating their position for years, giving the U.S. time to re-energize NATO. On the upside, this would free the United States to continue its war in the Islamic world. On the downside, it would create a framework for the re-emergence of a powerful Russian empire that would be as difficult to contain as the Soviet Union.
Refuse to engage the Russians and leave the problem to the Europeans. On the upside, this would allow the United States to continue war in the Islamic world and force the Europeans to act. On the downside, the Europeans are too divided, dependent on Russia and dispirited to resist the Russians. This strategy could speed up Russia’s re-emergence.
Rapidly disengage from Iraq, leaving a residual force there and in Afghanistan. The upside is that this creates a reserve force to reinforce the Baltics and Ukraine that might restrain Russia in the former Soviet Union. The downside is that it would create chaos in the Islamic world, threatening regimes that have sided with the United States and potentially reviving effective intercontinental terrorism. The trade-off is between a hegemonic threat from Eurasia and instability and a terror threat from the Islamic world.
We are pointing to very stark strategic choices. Continuing the war in the Islamic world has a much higher cost now than it did when it began, and Russia potentially poses a far greater threat to the United States than the Islamic world does. What might have been a rational policy in 2001 or 2003 has now turned into a very dangerous enterprise, because a hostile major power now has the option of making the U.S. position in the Middle East enormously more difficult.
If a U.S. settlement with Iran is impossible, and a diplomatic solution with the Russians that would keep them from taking a hegemonic position in the former Soviet Union cannot be reached, then the United States must consider rapidly abandoning its wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and redeploying its forces to block Russian expansion. The threat posed by the Soviet Union during the Cold War was far graver than the threat posed now by the fragmented Islamic world. In the end, the nations there will cancel each other out, and militant organizations will be something the United States simply has to deal with. This is not an ideal solution by any means, but the clock appears to have run out on the American war in the Islamic world.
We do not expect the United States to take this option. It is difficult to abandon a conflict that has gone on this long when it is not yet crystal clear that the Russians will actually be a threat later. (It is far easier for an analyst to make such suggestions than it is for a president to act on them.) Instead, the United States will attempt to bridge the Russian situation with gestures and half measures.
Nevertheless, American national strategy is in crisis. The United States has insufficient power to cope with two threats and must choose between the two. Continuing the current strategy means choosing to deal with the Islamic threat rather than the Russian one, and that is reasonable only if the Islamic threat represents a greater danger to American interests than the Russian threat does. It is difficult to see how the chaos of the Islamic world will cohere to form a global threat. But it is not difficult to imagine a Russia guided by the Medvedev Doctrine rapidly becoming a global threat and a direct danger to American interests.
We expect no immediate change in American strategic deployments — and we expect this to be regretted later. However, given U.S. Vice President Dick Cheney’s trip to the Caucasus region, now would be the time to see some movement in U.S. foreign policy. If Cheney isn’t going to be talking to the Russians, he needs to be talking to the Iranians. Otherwise, he will be writing checks in the region that the U.S. is in no position to cash.
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September 03, 2008
NATO States Seek To Reassure Baltics
by Reuters
BRUSSELS -- NATO states back a U.S. call to show the alliance is prepared to defend Baltic members Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania from any attack after Russia's intervention in Georgia, an alliance spokesman says.U.S. envoy Kurt Volker said in an interview published in the "Financial Times" that the 26-nation Western military alliance must send signals through "planning and exercises" that it intends to help shore up the Baltic states."Those countries are members of NATO; so if there is any attack on those countries, we will respond," Volker told the paper in an interview."They are feeling a little rattled by seeing Russia use military force to invade a sovereign, small neighboring country. We need to send signals to shore them up a little bit."We will have to make sure ... that the Article 5 commitment is realizable, not just as a political matter, but as a military matter too," he said.NATO's Article 5 guarantees defense of a NATO member by other members of the alliance in the event of attack.NATO spokesman James Appathurai said the U.S. proposal was under discussion by NATO states and was expected to be a topic for NATO defense ministers when they hold a informal meeting in London on September 18."I think he has reflected a sentiment that is more widely shared within the alliance," Appathurai told a news briefing. The spokesman said he was not aware of any request from the Baltic states for more visible NATO deployments, but they had sought more routine defense planning."There has been an exchange of views as to whether or not it is necessary to do it in a routine way or if we were faced as an alliance with a particular situation," he said.Appathurai said NATO had full capability to provide collective defense for its members. "NATO clearly has the capability to do it and do it very quickly," he said.Latvia and its Baltic neighbors Estonia and Lithuania have been strong supporters of Georgia in its conflict with Russia. All four of the small nations are former Soviet states and the Balts particularly have a strong mistrust of Moscow.NATO has promised Georgia eventual membership of the alliance -- something that greatly angered Russia -- but Tbilisi is not currently covered by the security guarantee.Russia's intervention in Georgia has cast a pall over recent efforts by NATO and Russia to improve military ties.NATO has said normal contacts are not possible until Moscow abides by terms of a French-brokered peace deal, and Russia has cast doubt on various joint projects between the two.

http://www.rferl.org/articleprintview/1196103.html

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'Stop! Or We'll Say Stop Again!'
FROM TODAY'S WALL STREET JOURNAL EUROPESeptember 2, 2008
With apologies to comedian Robin Williams, that's the line that comes to mind when weighing the European Union's declaration yesterday on Russia's continued occupation of Georgia.
At a special meeting in Brussels, EU national leaders told Russian President Dmitry Medvedev to abide by the terms of a French-brokered cease-fire, including a pullback of Russian troops to their preconflict positions. If he doesn't do so, they warned, they will hold another meeting.
That's all. It's been almost three weeks since Mr. Medvedev signed the cease-fire, and five days since Moscow broke with the rest of the world by recognizing the self-declared independence of Georgian provinces South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Yet Europe's leaders evidently need more time to ruminate over the situation in the Caucasus.
Well, that's almost all. The European leaders did make one concrete "threat." The EU said it would freeze negotiations with Moscow on a new economic cooperation agreement if Russian forces haven't pulled back to their pre-August 7 positions by next Monday. But this is meaningless. It had taken the Europeans months to agree among themselves to begin the talks, and even before the Russian invasion of Georgia Eastern European leaders had signaled that their countries were unlikely to sign off on any deal anytime soon. Nor was Moscow pushing very hard for it.
During a postsummit press conference, French President Nicolas Sarkozy, who holds the rotating EU presidency, got the obvious question: Is the EU a "paper tiger"? Mr. Sarkozy, visibly angered by the suggestion, responded that "Demonstrations of force, verbal aggression, sanctions, countersanctions . . . will not serve anyone." He didn't say how Brussels' latest tsk-tsk-ing serves anyone in Georgia.
Mr. Sarkozy also insisted that his efforts to reach a cease-fire had borne fruit. Again, the Georgians might beg to disagree. Russia has used the agreement's vague language to justify a continued presence in Georgia far beyond the original conflict zone. The cease-fire called for international talks about security and stability for the separatist regions, but that didn't stop Mr. Medvedev from recognizing their independence. Europe's call yesterday to begin these talks rang hollow; that horse isn't going back into the barn.
The most cynical comment of the day, though, was Mr. Sarkozy's attempt to use the conflict to bully the Irish over their rejection of the union's Lisbon Treaty in June. "This crisis has shown that Europe needs to have strong and stable institutions" like those it would have gotten under Lisbon, Mr. Sarkozy said.
No, what Europe needs is political will -- and a new treaty isn't going to solve that. Rather than scolding Irish voters for exercising their democratic rights, Mr. Sarkozy would do better to name and shame those member states whose desire to curry favor with Moscow kept the EU from taking a firmer stand yesterday.
For now, the Continent is determined to talk things out with Moscow. When will it realize that Moscow doesn't to listen?
See all of today's editorials and op-eds, plus video commentary, on Opinion Journal1.

URL for this article:http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122030756867788409.html

Hyperlinks in this Article:(1) http://online.wsj.com/opinion

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'I Fear for Germany'
By DANIEL SCHWAMMENTHAL FROM TODAY'S WALL STREET JOURNAL EUROPESeptember 2, 2008
Erich Honecker's heirs are making a remarkable comeback in Germany. The Left Party, an amalgam of the successors to the former East German Communist Party and disgruntled Social Democrats, is now the country's third-strongest political force. With about 15% public support, it is quickly closing the gap with the Social Democrats, whose popularity is at a historic low of 20%, according to a Forsa poll published last week.
With general elections scheduled for next year, it's even possible that the Communists may be able to return to power a mere 20 years after the fall of the Berlin Wall. Such a development would undermine nothing less than Germany's standing as a market economy and Western ally.
It is the Social Democrats who may pave the way for the Communists' relaunch. Currently in an uneasy grand coalition with the Christian Democrats, the Social Democrats might be tempted to lead the next government by joining forces with the Green Party and the Left. Such a three-way coalition, were it to occur, already has enough votes in parliament to elect a Social Democratic Chancellor; it could possibly gain a majority next year.
While the Social Democrats have been cooperating with the Left in regional parliaments in East Germany, doing so in West Germany, let alone at the national level, has been taboo. Social Democratic leader Kurt Beck said last month that this won't change -- at least not for now. While ruling out cooperating with the Left next year, he added that "No one can know today what will exist in 2020."
That's not exactly reassuring. The recent speculation about a national alliance with the Communists has been fueled by the Social Democrats' about-face in the state of Hesse, in the former West Germany. Ahead of January's regional elections there, Social Democratic leader Andrea Ypsilanti solemnly pledged to keep a cordon sanitaire around the Left Party. That promise held until election day, when it turned out that she would need the Left's support to become governor.
She has been trying since March to form a government with the Left's help. The party agreed on Saturday to support a Social Democratic-Green coalition without officially joining it. The Social Democrats will discuss in the following weeks whether to accept this offer.
Ms. Ypsilanti's decision to break her election promise in Hesse may lead to the breakup of the grand coalition in Berlin, warns Christian Wulff, the Christian Democratic governor of Lower Saxony and one of Chancellor Angela Merkel's deputy party leaders. If Ms. Ypsilanti is elected governor with the votes from the Left, "nobody will believe the Social Democrats that they wouldn't do that with the Communists also at the federal level," he told the Bild am Sonntag.
By supporting a Social Democrat-Green government in Hesse, the Left can eat its cake and have it: The Communist party would wield power and thus gain prestige without having direct responsibility for the government's policies.
The Social Democrats, on the other hand, can only lose credibility. The Left is already picking up Social Democratic voters angered by the economic reforms of the previous Social Democrat-Green government in Berlin. In panic, the Social Democrats have been drifting leftward in the hope of regaining lost ground. But pushing a minimum wage and rolling back some of the welfare reforms hasn't helped them. Voters who want anti-capitalist polices seem to prefer the original Communists. Reneging on their election promise to keep the Left at arm's length may cause a further voter exodus of more conservative supporters to the Christian Democrats or other parties.
Considering the Left's success in driving Germany's economic debate from the opposition bench, it's not hard to imagine the damage the party could inflict once in national government. Its reach would go beyond just economic policy and affect foreign affairs as well.
That's a worrying prospect as Germany is already one of the weaker links in the Western alliance. Former Social Democratic Chancellor Gerhard Schröder successfully tapped into anti-American feelings when he disagreed with Washington's Iraq policy and tried to sabotage it. Mr. Schröder also pushed for closer ties with Russia while insisting on toothless diplomacy to stop Iran's nuclear program.
His successor, Angela Merkel, has had only limited success in reversing those polices. After all, Mr. Schröder's former chief of staff, Frank-Walter Steinmeier, is her foreign minister.
If trans-Atlantic relations are still a little frosty under the grand coalition, wait until Berlin is run by a coalition government that includes the Communists. The Left Party has contacts to terror organizations around the globe. Spiegel Online documented on Sunday the party's friendly relations with the FARC in Columbia and Eta, the Basque separatists, among others. The Left Party also advocates Germany's pullout from both Afghanistan and NATO. Given that Germany's deployment of non-combat troops in Afghanistan is not particularly popular among Greens and left-wing Social Democrats either, it's not too far-fetched to see such a coalition actually bringing German troops home. Berlin wouldn't then even have to bother pulling out from NATO. The alliance would hardly survive such an act of betrayal.
"I fear for Germany," Mr. Wulff told Bild am Sonntag," as I know in which direction the journey with the Left is going." It is hard to call those fears exaggerated.
Mr. Schwammenthal edits the State of the Union column.
See all of today's editorials and op-eds, plus video commentary, on Opinion Journal1.

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September 1, 2008
Russia Claims Its Sphere of Influence in the World
By ANDREW E. KRAMER
MOSCOW — President Dmitri A. Medvedev of Russia on Sunday laid out what he said would become his government’s guiding principles of foreign policy after its landmark conflict with Georgia — notably including a claim to a “privileged” sphere of influence in the world.
Speaking to Russian television in the Black Sea resort of Sochi, a day before a summit meeting in Brussels where European leaders were to reassess their relations with Russia, Mr. Medvedev said his government would adhere to five principles.
Russia, he said, would observe international law. It would reject what he called United States dominance of world affairs in a “unipolar” world. It would seek friendly relations with other nations. It would defend Russian citizens and business interests abroad. And it would claim a sphere of influence in the world.
In part, Mr. Medvedev reiterated long-held Russian positions, like his country’s rejection of American aspirations to an exceptional role in world affairs after the end of the cold war. The Russian authorities have also said previously that their foreign policy would include a defense of commercial interests, sometimes citing American practice as justification.
In his unabashed claim to a renewed Russian sphere of influence, Mr. Medvedev said: “Russia, like other countries in the world, has regions where it has privileged interests. These are regions where countries with which we have friendly relations are located.”
Asked whether this sphere of influence would be the border states around Russia, he answered, “It is the border region, but not only.”
Last week, Mr. Medvedev used vehement language in announcing Russia’s recognition of the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Though he alluded in passing to respecting Georgia’s territorial integrity, he defended Russia’s intervention as necessary to prevent a genocide.
Mr. Medvedev, inaugurated in May, was an aide to Vladimir V. Putin, the former president and now prime minister.
Mr. Putin appeared on Russian television on Sunday from the nation’s far east, where he was inspecting progress on a trans-Siberian oil pipeline to China and the Pacific Ocean, a clear warning to Europe that Russia could find alternative customers for its energy exports. He was later shown in a forest, dressed in camouflage and hunting a Siberian tiger with a tranquilizer gun.
Leaders of the 27 members of the European Union, who will meet in an emergency session on Monday, were considered highly unlikely to impose sanctions or go beyond diplomatic measures in expressing disapproval of Russia’s conflict with Georgia.
The members in Eastern Europe have tended to be more wary and more confrontational toward Russia, while Western European countries have tended to be more concerned with not jeopardizing energy imports from Russia.
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/01/world/europe/01russia.html?_r=1&hp=&oref=slogin&pagewanted=print
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Saakashvili 'no longer exists' as Georgia's president: Medvedev
by Sebastian Smith Tue Sep 2, 4:57 PM ET
MOSCOW (AFP) - Russian President Dmitry Medvedev said Tuesday Moscow no longer considered Mikheil Saakashvili as Georgia's leader, calling him a "political corpse" and accusing his regime of "aggression that ended in many deaths."
Speaking in an interview ahead of US Vice President Dick Cheney's visit to Georgia, Medvedev again accused Washington of helping Tbilisi "build its war machine" and urged the United States to review its relations with the country.
"For us, the present Georgian regime has collapsed. President Saakashvili no longer exists in our eyes. He is a political corpse," Medvedev said in the interview broadcast on Russian television.
Medvedev said Moscow was ready to hold talks with the international community "on all sorts of questions, including post-conflict resolution in the region" of the Caucasus.
"But we would like the international community to remember who began the aggression and who is responsible for people's deaths," he said.
The Kremlin leader said the US should reconsider its relations with Tbilisi "because it has put Georgia in a very difficult position, caused serious destablisation and launched an aggression that ended in many deaths."
The strong rhetoric came as Cheney was to head to Georgia in a show of support for the former Soviet republic that has been seeking to join NATO.
He will be the highest-ranking US official to visit Tbilisi since Russian tanks rolled into its smaller neighbour in early August and fought a five-day war over the Moscow-backed rebel region of South Ossetia.
Medvedev's interview was broadcast after Moscow claimed victory Tuesday following a European Union emergency summit, where EU leaders stepped back from imposing sanctions over Russia's partial occupation of Georgia.
Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, who retains huge power after leaving the presidency earlier this year, praised what he called the EU's "common sense."
EU leaders decided at the summit in Brussels on Monday to freeze talks on a new strategic EU-Russia accord.
But the bloc did not accept proposals by Britain and eastern European nations for harder measures, including sanctions, over Russia's August military offensive in Georgia and recognition of two separatist regions.
"Thank God, common sense prevailed. We saw no extreme conclusions and proposals, and this is very good," Putin said in comments shown on NTV television.
Saakashvili, meanwhile, pointed to the moratorium on EU-Russia partnership talks as proof of Western solidarity behind Georgia.
"Russia failed to break the unity at the heart of Europe," he told France 24 television.
US President George W. Bush, one of Moscow's harshest critics during the crisis, also "expressed appreciation for the EU sending strong messages," the White House said.
The Russian foreign ministry said that "the intention to freeze talks about a new partnership agreement is a cause for regret."
Medvedev had earlier criticised what he called the EU's failure to understand Russian motives for going to war in Georgia.
"Unfortunately there is still no full understanding of the motives of the leadership of the Russian Federation when it took the decision to repel the aggression of Georgia," Medvedev said, according to state news agency ITAR-TASS.
However, Russia will fulfill all its contractual gas export commitments to the European Union, Medvedev also told Euronews television Tuesday.
"We will respect all our obligations as the principal provider of hydrocarbons to Europe," he said.
Moscow says that troops were sent to repulse an attempt by Georgia to restore control over South Ossetia, a tiny region where the local ethnic Ossetian population broke away with Russian backing in the 1990s.
Last week the Kremlin recognised the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. No other country has yet followed suit.
Georgia says the Russian incursion was part of a plan to annex its territory and bring down Saakashvili's government, which wants Georgia to join NATO and has positioned the country as a key export route for Caspian Sea energy.
Meanwhile, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said during a visit to NATO-member Turkey that the alliance had been arming Georgia ahead of the conflict.
He also reiterated Russia's support for sending an international police mission to Georgia to help maintain security around South Ossetia and another secessionist region, Abhkazia.
However, the Russian envoy to the European Union was cautious on this issue, saying that the rebel governments in Abkhazia and South Ossetia would also have to agree.
"So far they said they would accept only Russian peacekeepers," he said.
Both rebel areas have made formal requests to host Russian military bases -- a move that Georgia says underlines Moscow's desire to annex the territories and weaken its statehood.
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FROM GEORGIA:

Dear Friends,
I have a request to all, who loves Georgia, loves Georgian people and herewith your own motherland
With our patriarch's consecraste, who has a wish, on Monday, 1th of september, at 15:00 (georgian time) (14:00 Estonia Time) (13:00 London Time) all must come out in street and make a live chain to make a world and at first Russia to see, that Georgia is united and we are together, georgians an all who loves georgia.
Please make this request extend to everybody, with your friends, in place where you live and express your support to Georgia and to georgian people.
God Bless us all
Beka Gonashvili (member of men’s ensemble which sang in Estonia)
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From Edward Lucas:
Here is a quick draft shopping list of possible reactions to theGeorgia crisis (I am back properly from holiday next week). I would beinterested in all thoughts about priorities, practicalities,desirabilities. Please post comments on my blogsiteedwardlucas.blogspot.com1) A "Georgia Solidarity Campaign" to lobby hard for a full troopwithdrawal, NATO soldiers in Georgia (see the "Checkpoint Georgia"article by ex-ambassador Donald Maclarin in today's Telegraph).International brigade of volunteers to help Georgia. Visa free travelto EU and US for Georgian (and Ukrainian) passport-holders. 2) Sweden and Finland into NATO ASAP3) Big counter-attack on information warfare, expose Kremlin lies,inventions, distortions of history. Hit hard on Katyn, Gulag denial,Stalin nostalgia. 4) Sue Chekists everywhere--Strasbourg, Hague, any western court(Can't someone in Spain get Pinochet-style arrest warrant out?) Makethem scared to travel.5) Use separatist weapon against Chekists Idel-Ural, Tatarstan, Chechnya6) Stop talking about "Russia". These guys aren't Russia. They arecriminal gang of bullies, crooks and murderers who have hijacked Russia. 7) Demand Germany and Netherlands pull out of Nord Stream 8) Build up NATO presence in Baltic states (Balts provide thebuildings, other NATO countries the people) 9) Constant name and shame of Chekist allies and stooges in Europe.What the **** is Cyprus doing? 10) Attack them financially. Raid Raiffeisen Bank, find out who ownsGunvor, RosUkrEnergo. Make all contact with Chekist-run commercialentitities toxic to reputations. Without bankers, auditors, lawyersetc they will find life much more difficult.This was a full-page piece in today's Daily Telegraph
Saturday, August 30, 2008Putin's pipeline to powerRussia is fighting a new Cold War with banks and pipelines, not tanksand warplanesBy Edward LucasIn classical mythology, Georgia was the land where the Argonauts hadto harness bulls with bronze hooves to win the Golden Fleece. ModernGeorgia is the source of a treasure scarcely less precious: oil andgas from central Asia and the Caspian, piped along the only east-westenergy corridor that Russia does not control. But whereas Jason andhis comrades triumphed, our quest has ended in humiliating failure.As the occupying power in Georgia, Russia can close or destroy thosepipelines whenever it wishes. The only country in the region that evencame close to sharing Western values, one vital for our energysecurity, has been humiliatingly defeated and dismembered.As politicians and voters in the free world return from theirholidays, two big questions require answering. What happens next? Andhow do we stop it?Decoding the Kremlin's precise intentions is as tricky now as it wasin the days of Kremlinology – a discipline as archaic as Morse code.But the outlines are clear.Russia wants to recreate a "lite" version of the Soviet empire ineastern Europe and to neutralise the rest of the continent. Unlike theold Cold War, military action is a last resort: for the most part, itis banks and pipelines, not tanks and warplanes, that are doing thedirty work.This may sound strange, given what has happened in Georgia. But it isvital to realise that this was not the beginning of a new Russianpush, but part of something that began in the mid-1990s.Russia has nobbled Belarus – the only other country, apart from theHamas-controlled Gaza Strip, that is ready to recognise the newstatelets of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. It props up the narco-stateof Tajikistan, cossets the dictatorship in Uzbekistan and woos thebenighted despots of Turkmenistan. It has a cautious alliance withChina, in the form of the Shanghai Co-operation Organisation, anoutfit dedicated to fighting "extremism, terrorism and separatism"(although this last "-ism" has evidently been forgotten when it comesto Georgia).It has stitched up energy deals in North Africa; it flirts with Iranand sells weapons to Hugo Chavez, the America-hating windbag who runsVenezuela. And by using energy diplomacy and divide-and-rule tactics,it is stitching up Europe country by country, from Cyprus to theNetherlands.And it works. Over the crisis in Georgia, Europe has shown astonishingsoftness. The leaders of the EU have been all but invisible.Where is the supposed foreign-policy chief, Javier Solana? Or theforeign-affairs commissioner, Benita Ferrero-Waldner? Meanwhile,Nicolas Sarkozy, the French president, has been humiliated by theblatant Russian breaches of the ceasefire agreement that henegotiated. Europe's weakness is the result of multiple forms ofsoft-headedness and short-sightedness.Partly it is simple anti-Americanism: if Vladimir Putin is making lifedifficult for George Bush, he must be a good guy. That attitude liesbehind the astonishing opinion polls in countries such as Germany,which show that people have more trust in xenophobic, authoritarianRussia than they do in the world's most powerful democracy.There is also a mistaken belief that Russia is an ally in the struggleagainst globalisation: here is a country, argue intellectuals such asthe British historian Correlli Barnett, that does not let itself bepushed around by multinational companies and the meddling do-goodersof the self-appointed "international community".But this is to misunderstand Russia under its kleptocratic andchauvinist ex-KGB rulers. Russia likes multilateral organisations, solong as it dominates them. It runs a whole bunch: for example, the"Commonwealth of Independent States", which it is using to legitimiseits occupation of Georgia.Russia is also advocating a new pan-European security organisation,with formal legal status. This, it hopes, will exclude the UnitedStates, and tie up the West in the knots of international law, so thatmilitary intervention of the kind seen in the former Yugoslaviabecomes all but impossible.Similarly, although the Kremlin makes life difficult domestically forWestern oil companies and tightly restricts foreign investment in anyindustry that it dubs "strategic" (which potentially covers almostanything), it is another story abroad. Russia delights in thepossibilities of the global economy. If regulators in New York aresniffy about listing stolen companies on the stock exchange, there isalways London. And if you fail even London's undemanding test, Dubai,Bombay and Shanghai await with open arms.Russia also uses its colossal war chest, fuelled by oil and gasrevenues, to buy up assets in other countries. And that is the taprootof European softness: money.In the Cold War, doing business with the Soviet Union was a rare andsuspicious activity. Now Russia has penetrated our markets andbusinesses to a huge degree. Energy companies such as Austria's OMV,Germany's E.ON and Italy's ENI work hand-in-glove with outfits such asGazprom, which is nominally Russia's biggest company, but betterdescribed as the gas division of Kremlin, Inc.This directly affects politics. Germany, with Russia, is building theNord Stream gas pipeline along the Baltic seabed to bypass Poland.Russia has already cut off energy supplies to punish Lithuania, theCzech Republic and other countries. When Nord Stream is built, it willbe able to do the same to Poland.advertisementYet even now, after a clear and brutal demonstration of Russianimperialism, Germany refuses to consider cancelling the pipeline.Angela Merkel was willing to pay a high-profile visit to the Balticstates – a likely target for Russia's next push westwards – to offersupport. But she would not even contemplate ending her energy alliancewith Russia.And it is hard to see this changing: European consumers will not payhugely higher energy prices to finance alternative supplies, nor willpoliticians give the EU the weight it needs to bargain properly withRussia (a country, don't forget, that is three times smaller inpopulation than the EU, with an economy roughly a tenth of the size).With the EU and Nato hopelessly divided, Russia can dismiss ourtoothless whimpers about Georgia. That leaves Eastern Europe to baseits security on the United States.Yet even America's willingness to confront Russia is limited. Everyincoming president since Bill Clinton has criticised his predecessorfor being soft on Russia. But none has proved any better. For all JohnMcCain's fighting talk, and Barack Obama's belated belligerence,neither man will be able to take a hard line. America needs Russia –for nuclear security, to hold back Iran, to contain North Korea, as asupply route to Afghanistan, in hunting down terrorists. And Russiaknows it. If the mood in Washington is frosty, the Kremlin need onlyflirt more intensively with Iran, Venezuela and China, or withholdco-operation on some pressing topic, and America will buckle.On top of all that, Russia's leaders have a massively secure positionat home. Their central bank has nearly $600 billion in hard-currencyreserves, while their popularity is far greater than the Politburoever dreamed of. Mr Putin, and the war in Georgia, are acclaimed – aview stoked by the docile media, which portrayed the conflict as avaliant crusade against genocide and Georgian leader MikheilSaakashvili as a murderous fascist.Abroad, Russia senses that power in the world is shifting east andsouth, to countries such as India and China, which see Georgia verydifferently. They may not much like separatism, but they also thinkthat the West is practising double standards: America would nottolerate the Kremlin's meddling in its backyard, so why should Russiahave to put up with an America protégé in the Caucasus?The German philosopher GF Hegel wrote that the owl of Minerva spreadsher wings only at dusk: we perceive historical changes only when theyare almost complete. We have enjoyed an extraordinary 20-year periodin which Russia was weak and seemingly benign. Europe became (mostly)whole and free.The idea that the continent could again become a battleground betweenEast and West is unwelcome, and to many still inconceivable. But it ishappening: and our resurgent enemy seemingly holds most of the cards.There is, however, one chink of light, for us if not for the Russians.In the long term, the Putin regime means catastrophe for his country.The political system is opaque and fossilised, unable to respond tothe needs of a changing economy or to rein in corruption, let alonedeal with the fast-growing Muslim population, which has soared to 25million – a 40 per cent rise since 1989 – as the birthrate among theSlavs has plunged. Modernisation of public services andinfrastructure, in a country awash with money, has been dismally slow.Foreign adventures are the traditional way for autocratic rulers todistract public opinion from problems at home, and Russia is noexception. The regime running Russia will come unstuck in the end. Butthe cost in the meantime will be dreadful.This was this week's Europe View. In deference to taste and decency Ihave renamed Khuiyovich as Shutnik (which means "Joker" in Russian).Amazingly, some readers of The Economist website seem not to realisethat this is satire and have been crossly demanding the "originaltext" and denouncing the "forgery". Shades of 1993...
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Window on Eurasia: The Third Cold War Has Begun, Karaganov Says

Paul Goble

Vienna, August 31 – Most commentators who talk about a new cold war emerging after the events in Georgia are referring only to the geopolitical contest between the Soviet bloc and the Western alliance after World War II, but one of Moscow's most interesting commentators says that any new cold war will not be the second but the third the two sides have engaged in.
By pointing out that there were two earlier such competitions – one prior to the second world war which the USSR ultimately won in the course of that military conflict and the second, better-known one, which Moscow lost decisively, Sergei Karaganov provides some important insights into what the new conflict is likely to look like from Moscow's perspective.
In a lengthy article in "Rossiiskaya gazeta," the head of Moscow's Council on Foreign and Defense Policy says that he is convinced that the world is once again being divided between "ours and theirs," in which "ours" will be defended regardless of what they do and "theirs" will be condemned no matter how they act (www.rg.ru/2008/08/29/karaganov.html).
According to Karaganov, the new era of conflict reflects both the redistribution of resources in the world following the end of the second cold war, a development that he suggests will be long term, and the rise of authoritarian and semi-authoritarian states after the 1991 settlement, a temporary phenomenon but "for those who are losing – a matter of here and now."
After gaining economically in the immediate wake of the end of the second cold war, the "old" West started to lose out rapidly because increases in the price of oil and gas led to a massive transfer of resources away from the United States and Europe to those states, including Russia, where these critical energy resources came from.
Many of these energy suppliers, again including Russia, were authoritarian or semi-authoritarian, the Moscow analyst says, and this led to the rise of "authoritarian capitalism" as "the ideological system of the new 'enemy.'" The West needed an enemy to unite, he insists, but its effort to create "'a union of democracies'" against the authoritarian states was "tragicomic."
Other changes in the world – including the proliferation of nuclear weapons and America's loss of prestige around the world because of its actions in Iraq – simply reinforced this development, and effort after September 11th to use counter-terrorism as a unifying force proved a failure.
Thus, Karaganov continues, a new cold war became likely. The West is promoting it as a means to recover the positions it has lost. And Moscow has assisted this effort not only because Russia "has become a symbol and incarnation" of the changes the West opposes but also because Moscow has behaved in ways in Georgia and elsewhere that have only added to that image.
Both in the cold wars of the past and in the one starting now, the Moscow specialist on international relations says, geopolitics is more significant than ideology, and that reality, one often overlooked in recent commentaries, is likely to define the course of the international divide now opening.
Russia has certain advantages and certain disadvantages in this renewed struggle, Karaganov argues. On the one hand, it has a freer society and a richer one than in the past, making it more attractive to many. But on the other, it lacks the resources in terms of space, population and GDP that the Soviet Union had, making it less able to compete.
At the same time, however, Russia's "corrupt state capitalism" is something "hardly any of the thinking and patriotically inclined Russians" are happy about, he says, but the West has not focused on that political and economic elite in this new "cold war" but rather on Russia itself and thus on all Russians.
And it is worth remembering that what he calls "the old West" is now weaker than it was as well. The standing of the U.S. in the world has fallen precipitously because of its actions in Iraq and Afghanistan, and this group of states controls a much smaller portion of the world's population and GDP than it did 30 years ago.
That helps to explain what has happened in Georgia. According to Karaganov, "Russia had no other way out" except to respond militarily to "the aggression of Tbilisi and of the forces standing behind" it and then to seal its gains on the ground by extending diplomatic recognition to South Ossetia and Abkhazia. While many are still focusing on those developments alone, "the main goal" of the current rise in tensions involves not Georgia but the potential entry of Ukraine into NATO. "That is absolutely unacceptable for Russia. And even if we were to suddenly agree to this, the logic of events would all the same lead to a confrontation and possibly a military one."
In order to block this, Moscow must denounce the Russia-NATO Council that when set up ten years ago opened the way to the expansion eastward of the Western alliance and was denounced at the time by some as "'a second Brest peace,'" a reference to the treaty Lenin signed with the Germans in 1918 that sacrificed Russian territory to win time for the Bolsheviks.
"It is time to recognize that this union is not only a relic of 'the cold war,' but that it is one of the basic instruments of its rebirth," Karaganov says.
Two other reports from Moscow about the possibility of a new cold war are worthy of note. First of all, Aleksandr Prokhanov, the editor of the nationalist newspaper "Zavtra," said on Ekho Moskvy that he welcomed such a conflict because "for Russia, a cold war today represents salvation" (www.echo.msk.ru/programs/personalno/536528-echo/).
Without one, he said, Russia would degenerate and die, whereas with one, its citizens will not only bring their money home but focus on developing their country so that it will not lose this latest episode of what he sees as the longstanding and inevitable conflict between Russia and the West.
And for those who are frightened that a new cold war will lead to a hot one, Prokhanov had this to day: "A third world war is not beginning [because] the Americans are not in a position to conduct [it]. They have a terrible crisis, their civilization is collapsing … and they have" incurred huge debts at home and abroad.
And second, Aleksandr Dugin's nationalist Eurasian website reported today that sources in the Russian ministry of education say that they are preparing a new required course for Russian schools on geopolitics, a course that they suggest may displace current courses in geography (evrazia.org/n.php?id=3893).
The officials reportedly said that the course will explain to students "how to build an empire" as well as "who its enemies and friends are," content that almost certainly would lead many Russian students to conclude that they and their parents have no option but to restore an empire and to engage in a cold war with the West.


Russia's isolation plays into China's hands
The Associated Press
Saturday, August 30, 2008
DUSHANBE, Tajikistan: Russian President Dmitry Medvedev has cast vague Central Asian support for Russia's actions in South Ossetia as a diplomatic victory. But a summit in the region held signs that China, already a powerful regional player, will benefit from concerns about an aggressive Russia.
As Moscow's combative rhetoric leaves it increasingly isolated, China may have tipped the balance of influence in Russia's backyard.
Russian peacekeepers ended Georgia's "barbaric aggression" according to "international legal standards," Medvedev told a news conference Friday after a summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.
The group comprises China, Russia and four ex-Soviet republics in Central Asia, whose energy riches are coveted by Russia, China and the West.
The summit members issued a statement Thursday vaguely praising what it called Russia's efforts to ensure peace after its war with Georgia this month.
But they did not condemn Georgia — as Russia had hoped — and none of them backed Russia's decision to recognize breakaway South Ossetia and Abkhazia.
Russian media reported before the summit that Russia's efforts to insert wording condemning Georgia were thwarted by China.
The Chinese government is usually wary of supporting separatists in other countries, mindful of its own problems with Tibet and nationalists in the western territory of Xinjiang. It has also resisted being drawn into alliances that could damage its diplomatic standing.
"China has always stood in the middle and it has no intention of keeping with the same company as Russia," said Alexei Malashenko, an analyst at the Carnegie Moscow Center.
China's approach to courting its Central Asian partners has been low-key but assiduous and based on concrete proposals.
While Russia and the West attempt to persuade gas-rich states in the region of the appeal of their competing pipeline proposals, China has already begun construction of a transit route that is expected to carry up to 40 billion cubic meters of natural gas per year from Turkmenistan by 2009.
Several crumbling highways in impoverished Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan have been resurrected as a result of Chinese investment and technology. In stark contrast, Russian efforts to revive the vital Rogun hydropower plant project in electricity-starved Tajikistan have foundered in recent years.
Russia did secured some qualified support for its policy in the Caucasus.
"We all believe that Russia's actions were aimed at protecting the long-suffering residents of the South Ossetian capital," Kazakhstan's President Nursultan Nazarbayev said.
Speaking to reporters in Dushanbe, Iranian leader Mahmoud Ahmadinejad offered a veiled defense of Russia's role in Georgia.
"These problems are in part caused by the interference of powers outside the region," he said. "The situation has also been caused by the mistaken behavior of some high-placed Georgian officials."
Nonetheless, most Shanghai Cooperation Organization members will remain circumspect about offering anything that could encourage secessionist impulses in their own countries.
"Kyrgyzstan has territorial issues in the south with ethnic Uzbeks and Kazakhstan are concerned with the ethnic Russian dominated north," said independent political analyst Parviz Mullodzhanov. "While we in Tajikistan have our own Gorno-Badakshan autonomous region."
The four Central Asian members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization — Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan — are reluctant to endanger their relations with Europe and the United States.
Kazakhstan enjoys significant Western investment in its rich hydrocarbon sector, and impoverished Kyrgyzstan received U.S. aid and rent for hosting a U.S. air base that supports military operations in Afghanistan.
http://www.iht.com/bin/printfriendly.php?id=15754420
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Russia 'may target' Baltic states next
From correspondents in London September 03, 2008
NATO must strengthen its defence of the three Baltic countries – Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania – after Russia's assault on Georgia, the new US envoy to NATO said in an interview.
Speaking to the Financial Times in Brussels after an emergency summit of European Union leaders there, Kurt Volker said it was important that NATO remained "credible".
"Those countries are members of NATO; so if there is any attack on those countries we will all respond," Mr Volker told the business daily.
"They are feeling a little rattled by seeing Russia use military force to invade a sovereign, small neighbouring country. We need to send signals to shore them up a little bit."
Mr Volker said NATO must send signals that it intends to help the Baltic states, and uphold its Article 5, which guarantees the defence of each signatory by all the rest.
"We will have to make sure ... that the Article 5 commitment is realisable not just as a political matter but as a military matter too," the American envoy said.
He continued: "We need to do what NATO ought to do, not in a provocative way and not in a rushed or hasty way. But NATO being credible is what's important."
Russia sent tanks and troops into Georgia on August 8, a day after Georgia launched an offensive to regain control of breakaway South Ossetia.
Moscow halted its offensive after five days but refused to withdraw all its troops, saying they are on a peacekeeping mission. Georgia has called them an occupation force.
http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/story/0,25197,24286674-12377,00.html

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EXHIBITION ON LITHUANIA’S DIPLOMACY OF THE INTERWAR PERIOD OPENS IN KAUNAS
On 5 September, at 16:00 h., an exhibition called ‘White Gloves: Official and Unofficial Diplomacy in Kaunas in 1918-1940’ will open at the historical Office of the President in Kaunas.
On 5 September 2008, we are celebrating the 110th anniversary of the birth of Stasys Lozoraitis (1898–1983), whom we call the chief of Lithuania’s diplomacy. Sixteenth of February this year also marks the 90th anniversary of Declaration of Independence in 1918.
The exhibition reflects official activities of diplomats: intergovernmental agreements, photos of the ceremonies of presentation of credentials, official meetings and state celebrations.
The exposition in two halls of the historical Office of the President is dedicated to Lithuanian diplomatic missions abroad, to the activity of Lithuania’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1918–1940 and to the chief of the Lithuanian diplomacy Stasys Lozoraitis.
Photos of receptions and hunts that were organised during the unofficial meetings of high-ranking officials, cartoons, printings with funny stories, and some recollections about informal events are also on display at the exhibition.
The exhibition will be open from 5 September this year till 5 July 2009. Everyday working hours: 11:00-17:00 h. It is closed on Mondays.
The exhibition is organised by the historical Office of the President of the Republic of Lithuania in Kaunas with partners: the Lithuanian Central State Archives, Vytautas the Great War Museum and the Lozoraitis Family Museum. Sponsors of the exhibition are: Lithuanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Kaunas City Municipality, Sport and Culture Support Foundation, the Embassies of Italy and of the Republic of Poland, Centre of French Culture. The exhibition was organised also in cooperation with the British Embassy and the German Embassy.
This year, Lithuania’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs also marks the 90th anniversary of its establishment on 11 November 1918. On this occasion in November at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs an exhibition on the history of the Lithuanian diplomacy will be organised. The exposition will include historical evidence for the origins of the Lithuanian diplomacy, diplomatic efforts to re-establish the statehood in the 19th century, and the interwar and modern Lithuanian diplomacy. The exhibition will consist of photos, documents, press, signs of diplomatic missions, seals and other paraphernalia of diplomats and Ambassadors.
http://www.urm.lt/popup2.php?ru=bS9tX2FydGljbGUvZmlsZXMvdl9hcnRpY2xlX3ByaW50LnBocA==&tmpl_name=m_article_print_view&article_id=20956

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Baltic States Failing To Protect Most Damaged Sea
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The poor state of the Baltic Sea environment has received attention this summer because of the extensive algal blooms caused by eutrophication and for recent scientific reports on the vast "dead zones" on the sea bottom. (Credit: iStockphoto/Janno Vään)
ScienceDaily (Sep. 3, 2008) — Nine Baltic sea states all scored failing grades in an annual WWF evaluation of their performance in protecting and restoring the world’s most damaged sea.
The assessment, presented today at the Baltic Sea Festival, graded the countries on how well they are doing in six separate areas - biodiversity, fisheries, hazardous substances, marine transport and eutrophication - and on how they have succeeded in developing an integrated sea-use management system.
The best grade (an F for just 46 per cent) was received by Germany, followed by Denmark (41 per cent) and the worst were Poland (25 per cent) and Russia (26 per cent).
“It is a shame no country could be given a satisfactory total score,” said Lasse Gustavsson, CEO of WWF Sweden. “The Baltic Sea is influenced by a multitude of human activities, regulated by a patchwork of international and national regulations and authorities.
“What the Baltic Sea needs now is political leadership that can look beyond national or sectoral interests and take an integrated approach to solving the problems.”
Behind the bad overall scores there were some rays of hope. Germany received an A on the biodiversity score for their protection of marine areas with around 40 per cent of the country’s sea areas protected.
Latvia and Lithuania have taken measures to combat illegal fishing of cod, partly by giving inspectors the mandate to impose sanctions on site. Estonia has a narrow lead in lowering the impact of hazardous substances.
Also at the festival WWF awarded Tarja Halonen, president of the Republic of Finland, with the Baltic Sea Leadership Award for “her persistent efforts to unite groups and encourage cross-border discussions on the future of the Baltic Sea”.
Finland is the only country in the region that has developed a cross-sectoral marine policy and several other countries are now taking steps to review their marine management.
“We now have an opportunity in the area of sea-use management with two current processes on the European level,” said Vicki Lee Wallgren, programme manager for WWF’s Baltic Ecoregion Programme.
She said initiatives such as the EU’s Maritime Policy and the EU Baltic Sea Strategy meant that “there is hope for the Baltic Sea”.
The poor state of the Baltic Sea environment has received attention this summer because of the extensive algal blooms caused by eutrophication and for recent scientific reports on the vast “dead zones” on the sea bottom. Seven of the world’s 10 biggest dead zones, where nothing can survive due to lack of oxygen, are found in the Baltic Sea.